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If the National Archives Blurs Anti-Trump Speech From Its Exhibits, Is It Really an Archive? |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=52792"><span class="small">Zack Linly, The Root</span></a>
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Monday, 20 January 2020 09:35 |
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Linly writes: "Why show us the Women's March but obscure one of the main issues that fed the energy of that day?"
The Women's March. (photo: Mario Tama/Getty Images)

If the National Archives Blurs Anti-Trump Speech From Its Exhibits, Is It Really an Archive?
By Zack Linly, The Root
20 January 20
here’s a large 49-by-69-inch photograph in the National Archives Museum in Washington D.C. which celebrates the centennial of women’s suffrage by depicting the massive crowd that filled Pennsylvania Avenue NW for the Women’s March on Jan. 21, 2017, the day after President Donald Trump’s inauguration. Viewed from another angle, it shifts to show a 1913 black-and-white image of a women’s suffrage march also on Pennsylvania Avenue linking momentous demonstrations for women’s rights which took place more than a century apart in the same location. The 2017 photo gives museum visitors an idea of how many Americans felt about the Pussy-grabber-in-Chief being elected to the highest office in the nation.
Only, not quite.
The Archives acknowledged in a statement this week that it made multiple alterations to the photo by blurring signs held by marchers in protest that were critical of Trump, the Washington Post reported.
In the original version of the 2017 photograph, taken by Getty Images photographer Mario Tama, the street is packed with marchers carrying a variety of signs, with the Capitol in the background. In the Archives version, at least four of those signs are altered.
A placard that proclaims “God Hates Trump” has “Trump” blotted out so that it reads “God Hates.” A sign that reads “Trump & GOP — Hands Off Women” has the word Trump blurred out.
Signs with messages that referenced women’s anatomy — which were prevalent at the march — are also digitally altered. One that reads “If my vagina could shoot bullets, it’d be less REGULATED” has “vagina” blurred out. And another that says “This Pussy Grabs Back” has the word “Pussy” erased.
The Archives claims the decision to obscure obscenities and anti-Trump speech was made while the exhibit was in development.
“As a non-partisan, non-political federal agency, we blurred references to the President’s name on some posters, so as not to engage in current political controversy,” Archives spokeswoman Miriam Kleiman said in an emailed statement to The Post. “Our mission is to safeguard and provide access to the nation’s most important federal records, and our exhibits are one way in which we connect the American people to those records. Modifying the image was an attempt on our part to keep the focus on the records.”
Okay, but, for the record: Fuck Trump!
Listen, besides the fact that the Archives are apparently fine with a sign that appears to read “God Hates” so long as Trump’s good name isn’t tacked onto it, it just seems strange that they claim it their mission to “safeguard and provide access” to federal records, but choose to omit, what many would argue, are key parts of said record. Why show us the Women’s March but obscure one of the main issues that fed the energy of that day?
The spokespeople also made it a point to note that David S. Ferriero, the archivist of the United States who was appointed by President Barack Obama in 2009, participated in talks regarding the exhibit and supports the decision to edit the photo, according to Washington Post. That sounds a little too “I have a friend who has a black friend and he says it’s totally cool” for my tastes, but Kleiman says the images from the 2017 and 1913 marches were presented together “to illustrate the ongoing struggles of women fighting for their interests.”
She added that the National Archives “only alters images in exhibits when they are used as graphic design components.”
“We do not alter images or documents that are displayed as artifacts in exhibitions,” she said. “In this case, the image is part of a promotional display, not an artifact.” But, like myself, many historians remain unmoved by the justification.
“There’s no reason for the National Archives to ever digitally alter a historic photograph,” Rice University historian Douglas Brinkley said. “If they don’t want to use a specific image, then don’t use it. But to confuse the public is reprehensible. The head of the Archives has to very quickly fix this damage. A lot of history is messy, and there’s zero reason why the Archives can’t be upfront about a photo from a women’s march.”
Wendy Kline, a history professor at Purdue University, also weighed in via email saying, “Doctoring a commemorative photograph buys right into the notion that it’s okay to silence women’s voice and actions. It is literally erasing something that was accurately captured on camera. That’s an attempt to erase a powerful message.”
It’s also worth mentioning that Archive officials didn’t respond to a request from The Post to provide examples of previous instances in which the Archives altered a document or photograph so as not to engage in political controversy.
Let me find out this has only been done for 45.

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"Electability" Is a Poisonous Political Shibboleth |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=52932"><span class="small">Osita Nwanevu, The New Republic</span></a>
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Sunday, 19 January 2020 14:17 |
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Nwanevu writes: "Like many of the other concepts that shape electoral punditry and political discourse - charisma, qualification, momentum, authenticity - electability is a shibboleth of a political mysticism that 'tickles the brain' only because it cannot fully engage it - a drab, gray astrology, maintained by over-caffeinated men."
Sanders and Warren. (photo: BuzzFeed/Getty Images)

"Electability" Is a Poisonous Political Shibboleth
By Osita Nwanevu, The New Republic
19 January 20
If this recursive way of thinking about politics captures our imagination, it will imperil America's future.
e are several days now into a spat betweenBernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren—the Democratic primary’s two progressiveswho, as has been widely reported, have observed a pact of nonaggressionagainst each other for the majority of the primary campaign. That arrangement collapsedamid two controversies. The first was brought about by the leak of a Sanderscampaign canvasser script that had volunteers challenging Warren’s viabilityin the general election based on the composition of her coalition in theprimary—a kind of argument, it should be said, that has been made againstSanders throughout the race. The second, more serious controversy was broughtabout by Warren’s allegation that Sanders had privately confessed to her hisbelief that a woman cannot win the presidency.
Both of these controversies, in their own way,touch upon the question of electability, which polls have told us is front ofmind for Democratic voters. As far as Warren’s gender is concerned, even thosewho argue that Sanders deserves criticism if he made the remark concede thatmany ordinary Democrats are themselves wary about nominating a woman. “It can be hard to shake the tickle in the back of yourbrain,” The New York Times’ Michelle Cottle wrote Wednesday, “that Mr. Trump’sretrograde brand of politics—his naked appeals to sexism, racism and otherforms of old-school bigotry—can be weaponized all too easily against a womanopponent, who, fairly or not, already faces generic, gender-based hurdles.”
It is clearly true thatperceptions of female candidates can be tinted by sexism and that women facemore obstacles to success in politics than men. But our last presidentialelection was instructive. It’s often pointed out, appropriately, that HillaryClinton won three million more votes than Trump in 2016. It should also benoted that Clinton’s share of the popular vote was not markedly different fromthe shares won by losing male candidates past—she won a slightly largerproportion of the vote than Mitt Romney and John McCain had previously managed;a slightly smaller proportion than Al Gore and John Kerry.
Her performance, in short,was statistically unremarkable—any additional handicap she might have faced asa woman simply cannot be found in the vote tally. It’s possible that her gendermight have cost her some support in the regions of the country critical to anelectoral college victory. But the margins in those places were extraordinarilyclose—to believe that female candidates are doomed to fail is to believe,implausibly, that there were no conceivable scenarios in which Clinton mighthave garnered the few thousand more votes necessary to carry her to victory.The lesson some Democratic voters have internalized stands opposite to thetakeaway that the figures actually offer. Clinton’s narrow loss is hardly evidencethat a woman can’t win the presidency. It proves that a woman can.
But received wisdom aboutelectability is powerful precisely because it defies reason and is resistant tocritical scrutiny. Like many of the other concepts that shape electoralpunditry and political discourse—charisma,qualification, momentum, authenticity—electability is a shibboleth of apolitical mysticism that “tickles the brain” only because it cannot fullyengage it—a drab, gray astrology, maintained by over-caffeinated men.
The whole idea muddles more than it clarifies. Consider the leaders of the 2020field. The candidate most favored by voters who prioritize electability is Joe Biden:a moderate, appealing to middle of the road voters who want our partisandivisions bridged and political norms restored much more than they favor anyparticular policy program. He also has considerable baggage. Beyond whatevercontroversies Hunter Biden’s activities in Ukraine might bring to a generalelection, Biden can also expect intense scrutiny over his mental fitness andany gaffes he might make on the campaign trail. He could also face the same struggleto juice turnout among the Democratic base as his primary rivals.
Turnout, of course, iscentral to the electability case for Bernie Sanders, who believes theDemocratic electorate can be expanded with disengaged voters, young people, andsome Trump supporters, all drawn to his candidacy by ambitious policies likeMedicare for All, which would materially benefit the working class. But it’soften said that Sanders’s leftism might turn off the middle-class suburbanitesand moderate voters who were integral to Democrats taking the House in 2018.Elizabeth Warren, just to the right of Sanders on policy, does better with moreaffluent voters but is thought to be too progressive for some and is wrestlingwith the aforementioned worries about gender. Pete Buttigieg, a man and amoderate, isn’t, and has demonstrated real pull with the same sort of more affluent,educated voters with whom Warren is strong. His lack of experience, however,could fuel doubts about his competence, and he has struggled, moreover, to winblack voters—a hurdle some have shakily tied to his sexual orientation. Thoseworried about this might be willing to consider another white, male moderate—astraight one, with more support among African American voters. This, naturally,brings us back to Joe Biden … and so on.
This is a discourseincapable of producing anything beyond recursive guesswork—hypotheticals withinsuppositions that send us pacing in circles over questions that no electioncan actually resolve. The victory or defeat of any given candidate does notforeclose the possibility that they might have performed differently underslightly different circumstances and cannot tell us conclusively whetheranother candidate might have done better or worse. The 2016 election race drewus close, but not close enough, to understanding this. Any politically engagedperson today can rattle off a list offactors that might have tilted the race: Russian interference,irresponsible coverage of the Clinton email scandal, Trump’s omnipresence oncable television, James Comey’s eleventh-hour machinations, the Clintoncampaign’s inattention to the Rust Belt. Yet the politically engaged have also taken to believing thatelectability is a stable and perhaps even measurablequality innate to the candidates themselves. This belief persists despitethe victory, in that election, of a man who was widely considered one of themost unelectable candidates ever to seek the presidency. Now many of the sageswho rendered that judgment have reconvened to tell us Donald Trump can only bebeaten by someone matching a profile—white, male, moderate—that has not wonDemocrats the presidency in 24 years.
It might work this timearound. It also might not. All we can be reasonably sure of is the persistenceof a dynamic that Trump’s nomination and election brought into relief—givenpartisan polarization, and assuming the absence of a strong third-partychallenge, just about any candidate from one of our two major political partiescan reliably expect to win the support of about half the electorate. Differentcamps within the Democratic Party have put together plausible theories on whatmight put one candidate or another over the top in the states and regionsnecessary to prevail in the electoral college. But these are hermetic argumentsthat could run up against a variety of competing factors—from unforeseeable worldevents to the state of the economy to the competence of each campaignorganization—once the general election leaves the world of abstraction. Theextremely early relevant numbers that we have, the candidate favorability andhead-to-head matchups, don’t tell us anything more than what we should alreadyknow: We are in for a close race, and the leading Democratic candidates arecompetitive with Trump.
If this dissatisfiespundits and voters alike, we should ask ourselves how and why they came toagree so closely. Last week, Democratic strategist Jared Leopold made anobservation that has been repeatedly echoed by reporters on the ground in theearly states. “Cable news has warped voters’ brains and turned everyone intomini-pundits,” he told Politico. “That means candidates need to win not just onpolicy but on process.” This seems like a product of both the uncertainty thatTrump’s election created among voters and shifting norms in politicaljournalism—in which fixed characteristics and variables granular enough to beplugged into statistical models have largely supplanted the naïve horse-racejournalism of yesteryear, with its focus on narratives and assumption of closecompetition. It’s ironic that this mode was dominant within a period when electoralmargins were wider and victories were more decisive. That era is now fading—evenas candidates run neck and neck more often, and even though it has become moreplausible that a specific event or misstep could nudge one candidate or theother just over the line.
In many ways, the newanalytical mode has left us better informed. But it is also driving us mad. Forover a year, the Democratic primary had been defined by novel policy proposalsand theories of change. Now, electability as a concept, a runaway monster, hastorn it all down—not just by seizing much of the oxygen and attention availablein the discourse but also, as a second-order impact, by distracting and fuelingenmity on the left. Until last week, the debate between supporters of BernieSanders and Elizabeth Warren had been centered around the records of bothcandidates, their strategies for achieving their political goals and thesubstance of those goals themselves, given meaningful differences inperspective on topics like health care and American foreign policy. What we havenow is a drearily conventional political slap-fight that grew from competingideas about who can win the election and how.
Our elections should neverbe about elections. A voter who hastaken to a narrow model of political possibility cannot be told much about themerits of proposals and candidates that aren’t fitted to it. It’s alwaysclarifying to consider just how many of our freedoms have been extended and howmany lives have been saved by people and policies that prevailed againstperceived odds. The more that ideas like electability arrest our politicalimagination, the less likely those outcomes will become—an entirelyself-fulfilling dynamic that cedes our agency to the judgments rendered byblinkered pundits and jury-rigged algorithms. The democratic principle rests onthe assumption that the votes the people cast on candidates and the proposalsat hand are, in fact, votes truly for or against those candidates and proposals—thatour votes are based not on what we suppose might win, but on what we believe isright. That assumption has always been flawed. But we should work to bringreality as close to it as we can.

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The Tricky Task of Tallying Carbon |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=53025"><span class="small">Adam Levy, The Week</span></a>
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Sunday, 19 January 2020 14:10 |
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Levy writes: "More than 60 years ago, atmospheric scientist Charles David Keeling began regular measurements of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere."
Carbon emissions. (photo: Getty Images)

The Tricky Task of Tallying Carbon
By Adam Levy, The Week
19 January 20
ore than 60 years ago, atmospheric scientist Charles David Keeling began regular measurements of carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere. In the heart of the Pacific and far from the largest human sources of the gas, Hawaii's Mauna Loa Observatory was an ideal location for these measurements. Within just two years, Keeling had detected two patterns in the data. The first was an annual rise and fall as the seasons came and went. But the second — a year-by-year increase — suggested something alarming: a rise in carbon dioxide produced by the widespread burning of fossil fuels. In 1965, Keeling's measurements were incorporated into a report for U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson that described carbon dioxide from fossil fuels as "the invisible pollutant" and warned of its dangers.
Since then, global emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases have continued to rise, as have the concerns over the changes that such an atmospheric shift brings.
Observations are still taken at Mauna Loa today, and the resulting "Keeling Curve" reveals that atmospheric carbon dioxide levels have increased by almost a third since the first measurements were taken. The world's average temperature has already warmed by around 1 degree Celsius (1.8 degrees Fahrenheit) since preindustrial times, driving increases in everything from sea levels to the frequency of extreme weather events.
For those groups and nations striving to limit global warming, accurately tracking carbon emissions will be key to assessing progress and validating international agreements. But how do scientists do that? And how does the amount released into the air relate to what scientists end up measuring at outposts such as Mauna Loa?
Here's the current state of counting carbon, explained.
Why is monitoring global carbon emissions important?
A comprehensive tally of carbon released is essential not just for assessing which countries are pulling their weight and meeting agreed targets. It's also key to improving understanding of carbon's natural cycle and to more precisely quantifying the link between humankind's emissions and the planet's temperature. But calculating, much less measuring, global carbon dioxide emissions remains an immense technical challenge, since almost every human activity is implicated in the molecule's release.
In Paris in 2015, most of the world reached an agreement on climate change. The deal was to limit the world's warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), with a target of just 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 degrees Fahrenheit) above preindustrial levels. Nations pledged to cut their emissions, and the Paris Agreement aims to periodically review progress. While these pledges are insufficient to achieve the deal's targets, the hope is that countries will gradually ramp up their ambitions, and further ramp down emissions.
The emissions pledges are exactly that — pledges. They are not legally binding, and if a country misses its intended targets, the only diplomatic consequence would be the judgment of the international community.
But all of this relies on a clear picture of the country's emissions in the first place. It's a crucial undertaking, because "monitoring emissions is directly at the heart of the pledge-and-review concept," says Gabriel Chan of the Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota, who reviewed the state of international climate policy in the Annual Review of Resource Economics.
Atmospheric observations — like those carried out at Mauna Loa — provide a global, cumulative picture, but cannot be decomposed into year-by-year national contributions. Global measures also fail to account for the natural carbon "sinks" — the portion of carbon dioxide emissions that are taken up by the oceans and land. For a clear picture of national emissions, researchers have to start from the bottom up.
How do you calculate a country's carbon emissions?
In theory this is just a matter of math, but in practice it's a question of huge-scale accounting. To get a picture of the carbon dioxide a country emits by burning fossil fuels, all energy use must first be counted. These assessments are already carried out for economic reasons and include tabulating the quantities of different fuels — such as coal, gas, or kerosene — that are produced, traded, converted, or used by a country across all sectors. While the contribution of large sources such as power plants can be relatively straightforward to assess, other ledger entries — such as household activities — "are very hard to account for," says Chan. Accurately estimating these sources requires surveys to assess what goes on within a typical home and extrapolating from those.
Figures from these energy assessments can be used to estimate national carbon dioxide emissions. Inventories provided by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change list the amount of carbon dioxide released when an amount of a particular fuel is burned. These "emissions factors" can be combined with energy data to calculate the amount of carbon dioxide that will be released from all of a nation's fossil fuel combustion.
The International Energy Agency, which has been collecting energy data for over 40 years and calculates its own statistics on emissions, recognizes the difficulty in getting it right. "We do really spend a substantial part of our time validating the data," says Roberta Quadrelli of the IEA's Energy Data Centre. For example, if a refinery disappears from the data, it's essential to find out whether its absence was caused by the refinery closing or by being missed in the reporting.
Issues can also crop up when converting energy use to emissions. A 2015 study found that in one year China's emissions had been overestimated by some 14 percent. "The error bar was like an entire Germany," says Chan. This huge miscalculation was primarily caused by a misassessment of the quality of the coal burned in Chinese power plants. Given the scale of China's emissions (currently higher than those of any other nation, although not on a per person basis), some errors are not a surprise, says climate scientist Corinne Le Quéré, who leads the annual Global Carbon Budget report. "I don't want to give them excuses, but it's a big challenge."
What about tracking smaller, less obvious sources of carbon?
In fact, one of the biggest challenges in tracking carbon dioxide emissions isn't related to burning fossil fuels at all. Certain changes in land use — such as deforestation or urbanization — can lead to an uptick in carbon dioxide entering the atmosphere through a number of complex processes. An area of much current research, these factors are far harder to assess than emissions from transportation or power plants. And while land use changes were estimated to be responsible for only around 12 percent of global emissions in 2016, they remain a major source of uncertainty about how much carbon is entering the atmosphere.
For all these reasons and more, overall uncertainty in total carbon emissions remains high, equivalent to nearly 10 percent of the calculated annual emissions and more than the European Union's entire fossil fuel emission tally for 2017.
How current are carbon emissions numbers?
Timing poses another challenge. The complexity of tabulating national emission totals also causes delays in reporting. These delays can make a big difference for policy. Official statistics may take many months to appear, meaning negotiators are often working with outdated information, says Niklas Ho?hne, who founded Climate Action Tracker, which monitors nations' climate commitments and actions.
At the extreme end, during the Copenhagen climate negotiations in 2009, negotiators were working with an IPCC report published in 2007. The report included emissions only up to 2004, and this chain of delays meant that there was a half-decade gap between policy and reality. These five years — it was later shown — had seen a significant increase in emissions, and the scenarios in terms of emissions and temperature targets sketched out in the negotiations were misaligned with the real world. Even as they were unveiled, they were out of date.

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FOCUS: Is Joe Biden a Climate Radical Now? |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=53024"><span class="small">Kate Aronoff, The New Republic</span></a>
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Sunday, 19 January 2020 13:12 |
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Aronoff writes: "Joe Biden may have stumbled into supporting one of the most radical climate proposals of the primary."
Vice President Joe Biden. (photo: Joshua Lott/Getty)

Is Joe Biden a Climate Radical Now?
By Kate Aronoff, The New Republic
19 January 20
Calling for emissions-related sanctions is far cry from Obama-era policies.
oe Biden may have stumbled into supporting one of the most radical climate proposals of the primary.
The moment came in an interview, published Friday, with members of The New York Times’ Editorial Board, which has been conducting a series of sit-downs with Democratic primary candidates. After a rambling discussion of the recently-passed U.S. Mexico-Canada Agreement’s (USMCA) enforcement mechanisms (“I’ve not read them yet. O.K.?” Biden responded), New York Times writer Binyamin Appelbaum asked Biden if he thought “Democrats should vote for an agreement that does not affirm the Paris accord and does not contain any binding commitments to deal with climate change.” In essence, he was asking whether Democrats should vote for a deal like the USMCA, which many Democrats supported this past week in the Senate and Joe Biden backed on the campaign trail.
“Look,” Biden answered vaguely, “it’s like saying would you sign an agreement with Turkey on a base closure because it didn’t have that in it? It depends on if it’s related to climate. Absolutely they should be part of it.”
He pointed to China. “China, in fact, in their ‘Belt and Road’ proposal is in fact exporting more dirty coal around the world and is subsidizing more than anybody in the world.” That’s not all true. While China is by far the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitter and dominant coal producer, Australia is its top coal exporter. The United States is fourth. China is ninth. What Biden was likely referring to was China’s generous state subsidies for coal and large-scale financing of coal-fired power plants across multiple continents.
Fact-checks aside, Biden then tottered into an interesting, innovative thought that bears roughly zero resemblance to the trade agreement he was presumably defending:
[W]hat we should be saying to them is, you keep your agreement on the climate accord, which you signed up to. If you don’t, you will pay a price for it. You will not be able to sell product here. And organize the world to make sure that no, they couldn’t sell product anywhere. To make sure that they in fact have a requirement to stick to what they committed to.
When Appelbaum noted that Canada is a major fossil fuel exporter too, Biden remained resolute on this apparent proposal for sanctions on anyone not meeting Paris Agreement commitments: “That’s what we should be doing to everybody in the world.”
What about the United States? Were Biden’s principle of climate sanctions applied for all fossil fuels out of step with Paris Agreement goals (to which Biden pledged to recommit), such a rule would almost certainly place a major damper on U.S. fossil fuel production.
While this isn’t completely out of step with the policies outlined on Biden’s website, he hasn’t previously discussed many of the details of this part of his platform. Emphasizing the need to stop China in particular from “subsidizing coal exports and outsourcing carbon pollution,” Biden’s stated platform pledges to make any bilateral U.S.-China climate agreement contingent on their cutting fossil fuel subsidies and lowering the carbon footprint of Belt and Road projects. He would also impose border adjustment fees on carbon-intensive goods, preventing “other nations” from “undermining our climate efforts.”
Laudably, Biden’s platform further calls for eliminating fossil fuel subsidies across the G20. Yet experts say living up to the Paris goals will require more direct policies to stanch America’s domestic fossil fuel production, much of it destined for export. The Production Gap Report released this year by the UN Environment Program, Stockholm Environmental Institute, and several other research bodies finds that the world’s governments are on track to produce 50 percent more fossil fuels than is consistent with capping warming at 1.5 degrees Celsius, and 120 percent more than is consistent with a 2-degree rise. Another report by Oil Change International found that the U.S. is set to account for 60 percent of the global increase in oil and gas production between now and 2030—drilling plainly incompatible with the Paris Agreement’s goals of keeping warming “well below” 2 degrees Celsius.
The Times interview also represents a big departure from policies Biden has been associated with prior to the current election cycle. Domestic crude oil production increased by 77 percent during Biden’s time as Vice President, and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that it’ll reach record highs through 2021. That’s due in no small part to the lifting of the crude oil export ban under the Obama administration in 2015, which boosted the fossil fuel industry by opening up expansive new markets for its products.
“I’m glad to see Biden acknowledge trade in fossil fuels as a climate issue. There is some promise in using trade measures to bring fossil fuel production in line with climate limits. And of course that is not limited to coal from China, or oil from Canada,” Stockholm Environmental Institute US Senior Scientist Peter Erickson wrote to me in an email. “Shouldn’t that same logic be applied to oil and gas exports from the U.S.?”
Were Biden to faithfully follow his commitment to the Paris goals and plan as outlined to the Times, he would push for not only a rapid, managed decline of the fossil fuel industry, but the creation of a binding international trade regime with the power to materially discipline any nation—including the U.S.—failing to scale back emissions and carbon-intensive exports.
This would be a game-changer in American foreign policy, essentially upending the world order as we know it in the interest of building a low-carbon world. It would also be a far cry from his old boss’s approach. At a Shell and Chevron-sponsored gala last year for Rice University’s Baker Institute in Houston, Obama happily took credit for inconsistencies in his administration’s handling of climate issues. He said he was “extraordinarily proud of the Paris Accords” before bragging about how much oil his administration helped extract. “You wouldn’t always know it, but it went up every year I was president,” he exclaimed, referring to domestic oil production. “That whole, suddenly America’s like the biggest oil producer and the biggest gas—that was me, people.”

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