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The Trump Administration's New Method for Cracking Down on Leakers |
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Friday, 19 October 2018 08:22 |
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Timm writes: "The Trump administration has now indicted at least five journalists' sources in less than two years' time - a pace that, if maintained through the end of Trump's term, would obliterate the already-record number of leakers and whistleblowers prosecuted under eight years of the Obama administration."
Attorney General Jeff Sessions. (photo: Getty)

The Trump Administration's New Method for Cracking Down on Leakers
By Trevor Timm, Columbia Journalism Review
19 October 18
he Trump administration has now indicted at least five journalists’ sources in less than two years’ time—a pace that, if maintained through the end of Trump’s term, would obliterate the already-record number of leakers and whistleblowers prosecuted under eight years of the Obama administration.
The latest case, which broke on Wednesday, shows the administration taking advantage of a new avenue to go after a potential whistleblower. Instead of using the archaic Espionage Act—the 100-year-old law meant for spies, not sources—prosecutors are pursuing the latest alleged leaker using financial laws.
A senior Treasury official named Natalie Mayflower Sours Edwards has been arrested and charged by the US Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of New York for allegedly sharing “Suspicious Activity Reports” (SARs) about financial red flags with a news organization and its journalist for a series of stories related to the Russia investigation in 2017 and 2018.
While the news organization went unnamed in the complaint, the story titles and dates identified correspond with a series published by BuzzFeed that showed, in part, that Trump’s campaign manager Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, an associate of Manafort’s, engaged in suspicious foreign transactions in the lead-up to the 2016 election. The BuzzFeed stories were widely viewed as important contributions to the Russia story when they were first published.
For her alleged crime, Edwards faces one count of “unauthorized disclosures of suspicious activity reports” and one count of “conspiracy to make unauthorized disclosures of suspicious activity reports” under Section 5322 of Title 3 and federal regulation Section 1020.320(e)(2) of Title 31 of the US Code, which deal with the protection of information involving foreign financial transactions.
Edwards’s case is the second involving news publications about potential Russian interference that the Justice Department has prosecuted so far. The first case was that of Reality Winner, who shared an intelligence document showing how Russian actors allegedly tried to gain access to voter information in several states. For her act of public service, she was given more than five years in prison—far more than anyone has received so far in the Mueller investigation. Each charge against Edwards carries a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
Like almost all leak cases, this one involves the ensnarement of a journalist and news organization. The indictment contains several excerpts of text messages from an encrypted messaging application allegedly between Edwards and the unnamed journalist. Prosecutors claim they searched the defendant’s phone and got the messages directly, and filed several legal orders to get the metadata—who Edwards allegedly talked to, when she talked to them, and for how long—on several other communications that allegedly took place between journalist and source. We don’t know if any journalists were spied on directly in Edwards’s case, but we do know the Trump administration isn’t afraid to take that step, as it did against The New York Times’ Ali Watkins, in another leak case that broke earlier this year.
(A reminder to journalists: While encrypted messaging apps provide some great protections that regular SMS texts do not, they don’t completely protect journalists or sources. If prosecutors get your source’s phone, end-to-end encrypted texts are not necessarily going to help. Signal, for example, lets users set automatic disappearing messages after a certain time frame, a function that should be always be turned on for conversations with sources who may be in danger of investigation. Metadata can still give the government a lot of information—though it’s unclear what “encrypted messaging app” the journalist and source used in this case—and Signal stores less metadata than, for instance, WhatsApp.)
The complaint contains an interesting allegation, albeit one buried in a footnote: Edwards, according to prosecutors, told investigators she considered herself a “whistleblower.” The government also admitted she had filed a whistleblower complaint within her agency and had talked to Congressional staffers about the issue as well. The government contends the whistleblower complaint was unrelated to the case, but it’s hard to tell for sure since, so far, we only have the government’s side of the story.
As Adam Klasfeld at Courthouse News noted, The New Yorker’s Ronan Farrow also wrote an important story about SARs information, involving Trump’s personal lawyer Michael Cohen, at around the same time. Farrow noted in his story that, “According to FinCEN, disclosing a SAR is a federal offense, carrying penalties including fines of up to two hundred and fifty thousand dollars and imprisonment for up to five years. The official who released the suspicious-activity reports was aware of the risks but said fears that the missing reports might be suppressed compelled the disclosure.” [Emphasis added.]
As far as I can tell, Farrow’s story is not mentioned in the government’s complaint. But it shows how important whistleblowers can be to the public interest—even when they are breaking the law.
Sources frequently risk their careers and sometimes their freedom to get important information to citizens. It’s hard to quantify how many times the Trump administration has been the subject of an exposé in the media that contains information the government considers a crime to leak. But often these stories are the most important to get to the public.
Leak investigations strike at the heart of the press’s job. We should all consider this growing crackdown on leaks a danger to investigative journalism and stick up for the alleged sources involved. The laws involved almost never provide whistleblowers any public interest defense. The Justice Department reportedly has dozens of other investigations open, and we don’t know who will be next.

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FOCUS | "I Was Ordered Silent": How Jamal Khashoggi Fell Out With Bin Salman |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=46416"><span class="small">Gabriel Sherman, Vanity Fair</span></a>
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Thursday, 18 October 2018 11:36 |
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Sherman writes: "Khashoggi and I spoke last March during M.B.S.'s three-week tour of the United States that was designed to cement M.B.S.'s image on the global stage as an avatar of a modern Middle East."
Jamal Khashoggi during a press conference in the Bahraini capital Manama, December 15, 2014. (photo: Mohammed al-Shaikkh/Getty)

"I Was Ordered Silent": How Jamal Khashoggi Fell Out With Bin Salman
By Gabriel Sherman, Vanity Fair
18 October 18
An interview conducted shortly after the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton imprisonments sheds new light on the Saudi “progressive authoritarian”—and Trump and Kushner’s infatuation with him.
wo days after Donald Trump’s election, Jamal Khashoggi returned to the Red Sea port city of Jeddah from Washington where he’d given a foreign-policy talk lightly critical of then president-elect Trump, when he received a phone call from the media adviser to the kingdom’s ascendent deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, better known by his initials M.B.S. “He said, ‘You’re not allowed to tweet or write your column or give comments to foreign journalists,’” Khashoggi recalled to me in March 2018. “I was ordered silent.”
As a member of the Saudi elite for decades, Khashoggi understood that political expression had strict limits in the kingdom, but M.B.S.’s apparent determination to quell even mild dissent on foreign soil left Khashoggi unnerved. Ten months later, in September 2017, he fled to Washington. “I began to feel whatever narrow space I had in Saudi Arabia was getting narrower. I thought it would be better to get out and be safe,” he told me.
I initially contacted Khashoggi for a prospective article about the young prince’s relationship to the White House, which I shelved because he was one of the few people who would speak openly. When he left Saudi Arabia, Khashoggi told me, he didn’t see himself in the mold of a dissident. He’d been editor-in-chief of the Saudi newspaper Al Watan and a media adviser to Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to Britain. Moreover, he wanted M.B.S. to succeed. “He truly wants to make Saudi Arabia great again. But he is doing it the wrong way,” Khashoggi told me.
But a month after his departure from the kingdom, Khashoggi’s view of M.B.S. fundamentally changed. Saudi security services arrested scores of prominent businessmen and imprisoned them inside the Ritz-Carlton under the guise of an “anti-corruption” crackdown. Khashoggi soon began hearing from friends in Saudi Arabia that prisoners were coerced, in some cases tortured, into turning over billions of dollars to the government. “It was tough. Some were insulted. Some were hit. Some claim they were electrocuted,” he said. The purge, which also included intellectuals, media personalities, and moderate clerics, convinced Khashoggi that M.B.S. had sold himself as a reformer when in fact he was a brutal authoritarian. “When the arrests started happening, I flipped. I decided it was time to speak,” he told me.
Khashoggi subsequently landed a column in The Washington Post where he wrote critically about M.B.S.’s internal power grab; his reckless military intervention in neighboring Yemen, where he has created a humanitarian emergency; and the prince’s bizarre plot to kidnap Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri. “Saudi Arabia wasn’t a free society, but people weren’t being arrested like this,” he said. “The people M.B.S. arrested were not radicals. The majority were reformers for women’s rights and open society. He arrested them to spread fear. He is replacing religious intolerance with political closure.” An adviser to one prominent Saudi businessman who was arrested told me: “People are scared. It has become a bit of a police state.”
Tragically, Khashoggi’s self-imposed exile didn’t keep him safe. Earlier this month, Khashoggi entered Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul to obtain documents he needed for his upcoming wedding and never emerged. Turkish officials have told Western journalists that a kill team of 15 Saudi agents detained Khashoggi inside the consulate, tortured him to death, and dismembered his body with a bone saw. M.B.S. and his father, King Salman, have denied their involvement in Khashoggi’s disappearance, but already the grisly episode has damaged M.B.S.’s ambitions to cultivate global elites. A parade of C.E.O.s including Uber’s Dara Khosrowshahi, JPMorgan Chase’s Jamie Dimon, and BlackRock’s Larry Fink have canceled plans to attend an investment conference hosted by M.B.S. next week at the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton dubbed “Davos in the Desert,” though Fink, at least, has said he’ll maintain his business ties to the kingdom.
Khashoggi and I spoke last March during M.B.S.’s three-week tour of the United States that was designed to cement M.B.S.’s image on the global stage as an avatar of a modern Middle East. In the Times, Tom Friedman wrote a column gushing that M.B.S. possessed a “fire hose of new ideas about transforming his country . . . who talks the language of tech, and whose biggest sin may be that he wants to go too fast.” One media C.E.O. who met with the prince on his visit praised the prince’s plans to allow women to drive and movie theaters to open. M.B.S. was feted by the Trump administration, Rupert Murdoch, Jeff Bezos, and even Oprah.
The elite’s embrace of M.B.S. had been one of the chief foreign-policy goals of the Trump White House, particularly Jared Kushner. Saudi Arabia was crucial to Kushner’s yet-to-be-released Middle East peace plan that involved building a Sunni-Israeli alliance to broker peace with the Palestinians and counter an expansionist Iran. “Jared had a vision from the very beginning,” a former West Wing official said. Kushner’s support for M.B.S. at times bordered on blind faith. In November 2017, the Post reported that Kushner made an unannounced trip to Riyadh just days before the Ritz arrests began and stayed up several nights discussing strategy with M.B.S. ’til 4 A.M. (The White House declined to comment.)
Kushner’s bromance with M.B.S. generated criticism from Trump’s national security team, especially former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. “Tillerson said, ‘The kid’s a rookie, he doesn’t know the region.’ He was beyond dismissive,” a former West Wing official said. Another former West Wing official recalled: “There were many confrontations between Tillerson and Jared where Tillerson was emotionally angry that Jared was in contact with M.B.S. I remember in a couple of instances, Tillerson would confront Jared about directly talking to M.B.S. Rex felt out of loop.” (Tillerson did not respond to a request for comment.)
Diplomats who served in the region also question Kushner’s logic of investing so much in an untested and impulsive young royal. “I’ve taken to calling M.B.S. a progressive authoritarian. He’s using this anti-corruption push toward cleaning up but also removing rivals,” said Robert Jordan, who served as George W. Bush’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia after 9/11.
Yesterday, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo flew to Riyadh to diffuse the global crisis over Khashoggi’s death—a State Department spokesperson said in a statement that he “conveyed the importance of conducting a thorough, transparent, and timely investigation” in meetings with both M.B.S. and King Salman. As of now, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin still plans to attend the conference at the Ritz.

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FOCUS: The Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee Won't Restart a Full-On Russia Probe |
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Thursday, 18 October 2018 10:34 |
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Bertrand writes: "With a projected victory in the House as they enter the homestretch of the campaign season, however, House Intelligence Committee Democrats are sending a more muted message: While they hope to investigate any questions left open by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, they are also managing expectations when it comes to a fully reopened Russia investigation."
House Intelligence Committee Chair Devin Nunes (R-CA) and ranking member Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) at the US Capitol on March 15, 2017. (photo: Aaron Bernstein/Reuters)

The Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee Won't Restart a Full-On Russia Probe
By Natasha Bertrand, The Atlantic
18 October 18
If the Democrats take back the House in November, Congressman Adam Schiff says he’ll try to close a hyper-partisan divide on the House Intelligence Committee.
even months ago, shortly after Republicans on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence shut down the panel’s Russia investigation, the committee’s top Democrat appeared to lay the groundwork for a reopened probe should Democrats take back the House after the midterm elections.
“We will be submitting to the public a detailed account of what we have learned to date, and the work that has to be done, if not by us, then by others,” Democratic Representative Adam Schiff of California told reporters after the so-called status report was released. When Republicans characterized the Democrats’ effort as a “fishing expedition,” Schiff retorted that the GOP-led probe had been “fundamentally unserious.”
With a projected victory in the House as they enter the homestretch of the campaign season, however, House Intelligence Committee Democrats are sending a more muted message: While they hope to investigate any questions left open by Special Counsel Robert Mueller, they are also managing expectations when it comes to a fully reopened Russia investigation. While Schiff wrote last week that “it would be negligent to our national security” if a Democrat-controlled committee failed to find out whether the Russians “possess financial leverage over the president,” he said at a national-security conference that it’s been difficult to explain “on the Democratic side of the aisle why we do not demand the same things Republicans demanded when they were in the majority.”
Anyone expecting subpoenas to fly upon Democrats regaining control of the committee, for example, will be disappointed, Democratic members told me this week. “There will be some decision making regarding a more selective examination” of certain areas of the investigation, Democratic Representative Denny Heck of Washington told me. “But that’s a different thing from opening the whole investigation again.” Heck, like other Democratic members, said that he trusted Special Counsel Robert Mueller to do a thorough investigation. And he emphasized that while Democrats will have subpoena power if they regain the majority—Schiff has in the past expressed a desire to subpoena Jared Kushner and Donald Trump Jr., among others—he is “hoping it will be a collaborative conversation” if and when the committee wants to call someone to testify.
That may be wishful thinking—Republicans and Democrats are reportedly clamoring for spots on the committee for partisan reasons, to either protect or punish President Donald Trump using information gleaned from the law-enforcement and intelligence communities. Publicly, however, mainstream Democrats are promising to stay above the fray and return institutions to normalcy. Democratic leadership figures like Nancy Pelosi and Chuck Schumer, for example, have made uttering the “I” word—impeachment—taboo within the party. Campaigning on a process that would further upend American politics and test American institutions, they have argued, is a losing strategy; Pelosi told Rolling Stone that it would be “a gift to the Republicans.”
The idea behind downplaying an aggressive investigation into a potential conspiracy between Trump and Russia should Democrats take back the House seems largely the same. The degree to which the House Intelligence Committee’s infighting and dysfunction spilled into public view throughout Trump’s first 18 months in office—through leaks, television appearances, and press conferences—was remarkable. (The investigation so divided the panel that the Republican chairman, Devin Nunes, considered building a physical wall between staffers.) And it is a case study in how Russia’s election interference has only deepened divisions among the political leaders tasked with responding to it.
“We want to be productive and responsible, and show the American people what they should have learned two years ago: how responsible people investigate an attack on their country,” Democratic Representative Eric Swalwell of California, who sits on the House Intelligence Committee, told me. “If there are gaps that exist in the investigation, then we should fill them in. We don’t want to focus on the politics of it, but this isn’t going to be a dancing-in-the-end-zone investigation.”
Democratic Representative Jim Himes of Connecticut largely echoed Swalwell. Democrats will have to determine whether there were any holes that Mueller didn’t cover because they were outside his purview, he told me, and take it from there. “If Mueller’s probe didn’t examine areas where there could have been significant areas of Russian meddling, then of course we will do that,” Himes said. But he also called for a return to good-faith collaboration. “Nunes issued subpoena after subpoena without consulting the ranking member,” Himes said. “We will need to be the adult in the room,” he added. “We want to imbue the committee with a culture of cooperation.”
Representative Chris Stewart, a Republican from Utah who serves on the committee, remained a skeptic. “We were a bipartisan committee until President Trump was elected,” he said. “At that point it became political, with the Democrats reacting to Trump. Based on what I’ve seen, I’m not very optimistic that they will change as long as he is our president.”
Indeed, some Democrats don’t find bipartisanship an appealing strategy. Fighting dirty and breaking with norms as the Republicans have, they claim, is the only way to create a lasting political realignment. “We must be a party that fights fire with fire,” the attorney Michael Avenatti, who is weighing a potential presidential run in 2020, told an excited crowd in Iowa over the summer. “When they go low, I say hit back harder.” That impulse isn’t limited to political outsiders: Former Attorney General Eric Holder, a leading Democratic voice, explicitly rejected Michelle Obama’s “When they go low, we go high” mantra in a speech last week. “When they go low, we kick ’em,” Holder said. “That’s what this new Democratic Party is about.”
For now, however, Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee are banking on the idea that voters don’t want a prolonged investigation that could provoke more partisan infighting either on their committee or in Congress more broadly. “I do worry that people are chomping at the bit for the investigations, but we’re a little out of practice on the legislation side of things,” Himes said. “If we screw this up, theres a chance in 2020 that voters say, ‘These guys are as bad as Trump.’’’

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The American Economy Is Rigged |
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Thursday, 18 October 2018 08:29 |
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Stiglitz writes: "By most accounts, the U.S. has the highest level of economic inequality among developed countries. It has the world's greatest per capita health expenditures yet the lowest life expectancy among comparable countries."
A demonstration for minimum wage. (photo: Getty)

The American Economy Is Rigged
By Joseph Stiglitz, Scientific American
18 October 18
And what we can do about it
mericans are used to thinking that their nation is special. In many ways, it is: the U.S. has by far the most Nobel Prize winners, the largest defense expenditures (almost equal to the next 10 or so countries put together) and the most billionaires (twice as many as China, the closest competitor). But some examples of American Exceptionalism should not make us proud. By most accounts, the U.S. has the highest level of economic inequality among developed countries. It has the world's greatest per capita health expenditures yet the lowest life expectancy among comparable countries. It is also one of a few developed countries jostling for the dubious distinction of having the lowest measures of equality of opportunity.
The notion of the American Dream—that, unlike old Europe, we are a land of opportunity—is part of our essence. Yet the numbers say otherwise. The life prospects of a young American depend more on the income and education of his or her parents than in almost any other advanced country. When poor-boy-makes-good anecdotes get passed around in the media, that is precisely because such stories are so rare.
Things appear to be getting worse, partly as a result of forces, such as technology and globalization, that seem beyond our control, but most disturbingly because of those within our command. It is not the laws of nature that have led to this dire situation: it is the laws of humankind. Markets do not exist in a vacuum: they are shaped by rules and regulations, which can be designed to favor one group over another. President Donald Trump was right in saying that the system is rigged—by those in the inherited plutocracy of which he himself is a member. And he is making it much, much worse.
America has long outdone others in its level of inequality, but in the past 40 years it has reached new heights. Whereas the income share of the top 0.1 percent has more than quadrupled and that of the top 1 percent has almost doubled, that of the bottom 90 percent has declined. Wages at the bottom, adjusted for inflation, are about the same as they were some 60 years ago! In fact, for those with a high school education or less, incomes have fallen over recent decades. Males have been particularly hard hit, as the U.S. has moved away from manufacturing industries into an economy based on services.
Deaths of Despair
Wealth is even less equally distributed, with just three Americans having as much as the bottom 50 percent—testimony to how much money there is at the top and how little there is at the bottom. Families in the bottom 50 percent hardly have the cash reserves to meet an emergency. Newspapers are replete with stories of those for whom the breakdown of a car or an illness starts a downward spiral from which they never recover.
In significant part because of high inequality [see “The Health-Wealth Gap,” by Robert M. Sapolsky], U.S. life expectancy, exceptionally low to begin with, is experiencing sustained declines. This in spite of the marvels of medical science, many advances of which occur right here in America and which are made readily available to the rich. Economist Ann Case and 2015 Nobel laureate in economics Angus Deaton describe one of the main causes of rising morbidity—the increase in alcoholism, drug overdoses and suicides—as “deaths of despair” by those who have given up hope.

Credit: Jen Christiansen; Sources: “The Fading American Dream: Trends in Absolute Income Mobility Since 1940,” by Raj Chetty et al., in Science, Vol. 356; April 28, 2017 (child-parent wealth comparison); World Inequality database (90% versus 1% wealth trend data)
Defenders of America's inequality have a pat explanation. They refer to the workings of a competitive market, where the laws of supply and demand determine wages, prices and even interest rates—a mechanical system, much like that describing the physical universe. Those with scarce assets or skills are amply rewarded, they argue, because of the larger contributions they make to the economy. What they get merely represents what they have contributed. Often they take out less than they contributed, so what is left over for the rest is that much more.
This fictional narrative may at one time have assuaged the guilt of those at the top and persuaded everyone else to accept this sorry state of affairs. Perhaps the defining moment exposing the lie was the 2008 financial crisis, when the bankers who brought the global economy to the brink of ruin with predatory lending, market manipulation and various other antisocial practices walked away with millions of dollars in bonuses just as millions of Americans lost their jobs and homes and tens of millions more worldwide suffered on their account. Virtually none of these bankers were ever held to account for their misdeeds.
I became aware of the fantastical nature of this narrative as a schoolboy, when I thought of the wealth of the plantation owners, built on the backs of slaves. At the time of the Civil War, the market value of the slaves in the South was approximately half of the region's total wealth, including the value of the land and the physical capital—the factories and equipment. The wealth of at least this part of this nation was not based on industry, innovation and commerce but rather on exploitation. Today we have replaced this open exploitation with more insidious forms, which have intensified since the Reagan-Thatcher revolution of the 1980s. This exploitation, I will argue, is largely to blame for the escalating inequality in the U.S.
After the New Deal of the 1930s, American inequality went into decline. By the 1950s inequality had receded to such an extent that another Nobel laureate in economics, Simon Kuznets, formulated what came to be called Kuznets's law. In the early stages of development, as some parts of a country seize new opportunities, inequalities grow, he postulated; in the later stages, they shrink. The theory long fit the data—but then, around the early 1980s, the trend abruptly reversed.
Explaining Inequality
Economists have put forward a range of explanations for why inequality has in fact been increasing in many developed countries. Some argue that advances in technology have spurred the demand for skilled labor relative to unskilled labor, thereby depressing the wages of the latter. Yet that alone cannot explain why even skilled labor has done so poorly over the past two decades, why average wages have done so badly and why matters are so much worse in the U.S. than in other developed nations. Changes in technology are global and should affect all advanced economies in the same way. Other economists blame globalization itself, which has weakened the power of workers. Firms can and do move abroad unless demands for higher wages are curtailed. But again, globalization has been integral to all advanced economies. Why is its impact so much worse in the U.S.?
The shift from a manufacturing to a service-based economy is partly to blame. At its extreme—a firm of one person—the service economy is a winner-takes-all system. A movie star makes millions, for example, whereas most actors make a pittance. Overall, wages are likely to be far more widely dispersed in a service economy than in one based on manufacturing, so the transition contributes to greater inequality. This fact does not explain, however, why the average wage has not improved for decades. Moreover, the shift to the service sector is happening in most other advanced countries: Why are matters so much worse in the U.S.?
Again, because services are often provided locally, firms have more market power: the ability to raise prices above what would prevail in a competitive market. A small town in rural America may have only one authorized Toyota repair shop, which virtually every Toyota owner is forced to patronize. The providers of these local services can raise prices over costs, increasing their profits and the share of income going to owners and managers. This, too, increases inequality. But again, why is U.S. inequality practically unique?
In his celebrated 2013 treatise Capital in the Twenty-First Century, French economist Thomas Piketty shifts the gaze to capitalists. He suggests that the few who own much of a country's capital save so much that, given the stable and high return to capital (relative to the growth rate of the economy), their share of the national income has been increasing. His theory has, however, been questioned on many grounds. For instance, the savings rate of even the rich in the U.S. is so low, compared with the rich in other countries, that the increase in inequality should be lower here, not greater.
An alternative theory is far more consonant with the facts. Since the mid-1970s the rules of the economic game have been rewritten, both globally and nationally, in ways that advantage the rich and disadvantage the rest. And they have been rewritten further in this perverse direction in the U.S. than in other developed countries—even though the rules in the U.S. were already less favorable to workers. From this perspective, increasing inequality is a matter of choice: a consequence of our policies, laws and regulations.
In the U.S., the market power of large corporations, which was greater than in most other advanced countries to begin with, has increased even more than elsewhere. On the other hand, the market power of workers, which started out less than in most other advanced countries, has fallen further than elsewhere. This is not only because of the shift to a service-sector economy—it is because of the rigged rules of the game, rules set in a political system that is itself rigged through gerrymandering, voter suppression and the influence of money. A vicious spiral has formed: economic inequality translates into political inequality, which leads to rules that favor the wealthy, which in turn reinforces economic inequality.
Feedback Loop
Political scientists have documented the ways in which money influences politics in certain political systems, converting higher economic inequality into greater political inequality. Political inequality, in its turn, gives rise to more economic inequality as the rich use their political power to shape the rules of the game in ways that favor them—for instance, by softening antitrust laws and weakening unions. Using mathematical models, economists such as myself have shown that this two-way feedback loop between money and regulations leads to at least two stable points. If an economy starts out with lower inequality, the political system generates rules that sustain it, leading to one equilibrium situation. The American system is the other equilibrium—and will continue to be unless there is a democratic political awakening.
An account of how the rules have been shaped must begin with antitrust laws, first enacted 128 years ago in the U.S. to prevent the agglomeration of market power. Their enforcement has weakened—at a time when, if anything, the laws themselves should have been strengthened. Technological changes have concentrated market power in the hands of a few global players, in part because of so-called network effects: you are far more likely to join a particular social network or use a certain word processor if everyone you know is already using it. Once established, a firm such as Facebook or Microsoft is hard to dislodge. Moreover, fixed costs, such as that of developing a piece of software, have increased as compared with marginal costs—that of duplicating the software. A new entrant has to bear all these fixed costs up front, and if it does enter, the rich incumbent can respond by lowering prices drastically. The cost of making an additional e-book or photo-editing program is essentially zero.
In short, entry is hard and risky, which gives established firms with deep war chests enormous power to crush competitors and ultimately raise prices. Making matters worse, U.S. firms have been innovative not only in the products they make but in thinking of ways to extend and amplify their market power. The European Commission has imposed fines of billions of dollars on Microsoft and Google and ordered them to stop their anticompetitive practices (such as Google privileging its own comparison shopping service). In the U.S., we have done too little to control concentrations of market power, so it is not a surprise that it has increased in many sectors.

Credit: Jen Christiansen; Sources: Economic Report of the President. January 2017; World Inequality database
Rigged rules also explain why the impact of globalization may have been worse in the U.S. A concerted attack on unions has almost halved the fraction of unionized workers in the nation, to about 11 percent. (In Scandinavia, it is roughly 70 percent.) Weaker unions provide workers less protection against the efforts of firms to drive down wages or worsen working conditions. Moreover, U.S. investment treaties such as the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement—treaties that were sold as a way of preventing foreign countries from discriminating against American firms—also protect investors against a tightening of environmental and health regulations abroad. For instance, they enable corporations to sue nations in private international arbitration panels for passing laws that protect citizens and the environment but threaten the multinational company's bottom line. Firms like these provisions, which enhance the credibility of a company's threat to move abroad if workers do not temper their demands. In short, these investment agreements weaken U.S. workers' bargaining power even further.
Liberated Finance
Many other changes to our norms, laws, rules and regulations have contributed to inequality. Weak corporate governance laws have allowed chief executives in the U.S. to compensate themselves 361 times more than the average worker, far more than in other developed countries. Financial liberalization—the stripping away of regulations designed to prevent the financial sector from imposing harms, such as the 2008 economic crisis, on the rest of society—has enabled the finance industry to grow in size and profitability and has increased its opportunities to exploit everyone else. Banks routinely indulge in practices that are legal but should not be, such as imposing usurious interest rates on borrowers or exorbitant fees on merchants for credit and debit cards and creating securities that are designed to fail. They also frequently do things that are illegal, including market manipulation and insider trading. In all of this, the financial sector has moved money away from ordinary Americans to rich bankers and the banks' shareholders. This redistribution of wealth is an important contributor to American inequality.
Other means of so-called rent extraction—the withdrawal of income from the national pie that is incommensurate with societal contribution—abound. For example, a legal provision enacted in 2003 prohibited the government from negotiating drug prices for Medicare—a gift of some $50 billion a year or more to the pharmaceutical industry. Special favors, such as extractive industries' obtaining public resources such as oil at below fair-market value or banks' getting funds from the Federal Reserve at near-zero interest rates (which they relend at high interest rates), also amount to rent extraction. Further exacerbating inequality is favorable tax treatment for the rich. In the U.S., those at the top pay a smaller fraction of their income in taxes than those who are much poorer—a form of largesse that the Trump administration has just worsened with the 2017 tax bill.
Some economists have argued that we can lessen inequality only by giving up on growth and efficiency. But recent research, such as work done by Jonathan Ostry and others at the International Monetary Fund, suggests that economies with greater equality perform better, with higher growth, better average standards of living and greater stability. Inequality in the extremes observed in the U.S. and in the manner generated there actually damages the economy. The exploitation of market power and the variety of other distortions I have described, for instance, makes markets less efficient, leading to underproduction of valuable goods such as basic research and overproduction of others, such as exploitative financial products.

Credit: Jen Christiansen; Sources: World Inequality Report 2018. World Inequality Lab, 2017; Branko Milanovic
Moreover, because the rich typically spend a smaller fraction of their income on consumption than the poor, total or “aggregate” demand in countries with higher inequality is weaker. Societies could make up for this gap by increasing government spending—on infrastructure, education and health, for instance, all of which are investments necessary for long-term growth. But the politics of unequal societies typically puts the burden on monetary policy: interest rates are lowered to stimulate spending. Artificially low interest rates, especially if coupled with inadequate financial market regulation, often give rise to bubbles, which is what happened with the 2008 housing crisis.
It is no surprise that, on average, people living in unequal societies have less equality of opportunity: those at the bottom never get the education that would enable them to live up to their potential. This fact, in turn, exacerbates inequality while wasting the country's most valuable resource: Americans themselves.
Restoring Justice
Morale is lower in unequal societies, especially when inequality is seen as unjust, and the feeling of being used or cheated leads to lower productivity. When those who run gambling casinos or bankers suffering from moral turpitude make a zillion times more than the scientists and inventors who brought us lasers, transistors and an understanding of DNA, it is clear that something is wrong. Then again, the children of the rich come to think of themselves as a class apart, entitled to their good fortune, and accordingly more likely to break the rules necessary for making society function. All of this contributes to a breakdown of trust, with its attendant impact on social cohesion and economic performance.
There is no magic bullet to remedy a problem as deep-rooted as America's inequality. Its origins are largely political, so it is hard to imagine meaningful change without a concerted effort to take money out of politics—through, for instance, campaign finance reform. Blocking the revolving doors by which regulators and other government officials come from and return to the same industries they regulate and work with is also essential.

Credit: Jen Christiansen; Sources: Raising America’s Pay: Why It’s Our Central Economic Policy Challenge, by Josh Bivens et al. Economic Policy Institute, June 4, 2014; The State of Working America, by Lawrence Mishel, Josh Bivens, Elise Gould and Heidi Shierholz. 12th Edition. ILR Press, 2012
Beyond that, we need more progressive taxation and high-quality federally funded public education, including affordable access to universities for all, no ruinous loans required. We need modern competition laws to deal with the problems posed by 21st-century market power and stronger enforcement of the laws we do have. We need labor laws that protect workers and their rights to unionize. We need corporate governance laws that curb exorbitant salaries bestowed on chief executives, and we need stronger financial regulations that will prevent banks from engaging in the exploitative practices that have become their hallmark. We need better enforcement of antidiscrimination laws: it is unconscionable that women and minorities get paid a mere fraction of what their white male counterparts receive. We also need more sensible inheritance laws that will reduce the intergenerational transmission of advantage and disadvantage.
The basic perquisites of a middle-class life, including a secure old age, are no longer attainable for most Americans. We need to guarantee access to health care. We need to strengthen and reform retirement programs, which have put an increasing burden of risk management on workers (who are expected to manage their portfolios to guard simultaneously against the risks of inflation and market collapse) and opened them up to exploitation by our financial sector (which sells them products designed to maximize bank fees rather than retirement security). Our mortgage system was our Achilles' heel, and we have not really fixed it. With such a large fraction of Americans living in cities, we have to have urban housing policies that ensure affordable housing for all.
It is a long agenda—but a doable one. When skeptics say it is nice but not affordable, I reply: We cannot afford to not do these things. We are already paying a high price for inequality, but it is just a down payment on what we will have to pay if we do not do something—and quickly. It is not just our economy that is at stake; we are risking our democracy.
As more of our citizens come to understand why the fruits of economic progress have been so unequally shared, there is a real danger that they will become open to a demagogue blaming the country's problems on others and making false promises of rectifying “a rigged system.” We are already experiencing a foretaste of what might happen. It could get much worse.

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