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FOCUS: The Insecurity Industry Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=60292"><span class="small">Edward Snowden, Edward Snowden's Substack</span></a>   
Friday, 06 August 2021 12:17

Snowden writes: "The greatest danger to national security has become the companies that claim to protect it."

Edward Snowden. (photo: Getty)
Edward Snowden. (photo: Getty)


The Insecurity Industry

By Edward Snowden, Edward Snowden's Substack

06 August 21


The greatest danger to national security has become the companies that claim to protect it

he first thing I do when I get a new phone is take it apart. I don’t do this to satisfy a tinkerer’s urge, or out of political principle, but simply because it is unsafe to operate. Fixing the hardware, which is to say surgically removing the two or three tiny microphones hidden inside, is only the first step of an arduous process, and yet even after days of these DIY security improvements, my smartphone will remain the most dangerous item I possess.

Prior to this week’s Pegasus Project, a global reporting effort by major newspapers to expose the fatal consequences of the NSO Group—the new private-sector face of an out-of-control Insecurity Industry—most smartphone manufacturers along with much of the world press collectively rolled their eyes at me whenever I publicly identified a fresh-out-of-the-box iPhone as a potentially lethal threat.

Despite years of reporting that implicated the NSO Group’s for-profit hacking of phones in the deaths and detentions of journalists and human rights defenders; despite years of reporting that smartphone operating systems were riddled with catastrophic security flaws (a circumstance aggravated by their code having been written in aging programming languages that have long been regarded as unsafe); and despite years of reporting that even when everything works as intended, the mobile ecosystem is a dystopian hellscape of end-user monitoring and outright end-user manipulation, it is still hard for many people to accept that something that feels good may not in fact be good. Over the last eight years I’ve often felt like someone trying to convince their one friend who refuses to grow up to quit smoking and cut back on the booze—meanwhile, the magazine ads still say “Nine of Ten Doctors Smoke iPhones!” and “Unsecured Mobile Browsing is Refreshing!”

In my infinite optimism, however, I can’t help but regard the arrival of the Pegasus Project as a turning-point—a well-researched, exhaustively-sourced, and frankly crazy-making story about a “winged” “Trojan Horse” infection named “Pegasus” that basically turns the phone in your pocket into an all-powerful tracking device that can be turned on or off, remotely, unbeknownst to you, the pocket’s owner.

Here is how the Washington Post describes it:


In short, the phone in your hand exists in a state of perpetual insecurity, open to infection by anyone willing to put money in the hand of this new Insecurity Industry. The entirety of this Industry’s business involves cooking up new kinds of infections that will bypass the very latest digital vaccines—AKA security updates—and then selling them to countries that occupy the red-hot intersection of a Venn Diagram between “desperately craves the tools of oppression” and “sorely lacks the sophistication to produce them domestically.”

An Industry like this, whose sole purpose is the production of vulnerability, should be dismantled.

2.

Even if we woke up tomorrow and the NSO Group and all of its private-sector ilk had been wiped out by the eruption of a particularly public-minded volcano, it wouldn’t change the fact that we’re in the midst of the greatest crisis of computer security in computer history. The people creating the software behind every device of any significance—the people who help to make Apple, Google, Microsoft, an amalgamation of miserly chipmakers who want to sell things, not fix things, and the well-intentioned Linux developers who want to fix things, not sell things—are all happy to write code in programming languages that we know are unsafe, because, well, that’s what they’ve always done, and modernization requires a significant effort, not to mention significant expenditures. The vast majority of vulnerabilities that are later discovered and exploited by the Insecurity Industry are introduced, for technical reasons related to how a computer keeps track of what it’s supposed to be doing, at the exact time the code is written, which makes choosing a safer language a crucial protection... and yet it’s one that few ever undertake.

If you want to see change, you need to incentivize change. For example, if you want to see Microsoft have a heart attack, talk about the idea of defining legal liability for bad code in a commercial product. If you want to give Facebook nightmares, talk about the idea of making it legally liable for any and all leaks of our personal records that a jury can be persuaded were unnecessarily collected. Imagine how quickly Mark Zuckerberg would start smashing the delete key.

Where there is no liability, there is no accountability... and this brings us to the State.

3.

State-sponsored hacking has become such a regular competition that it should have its own Olympic category in Tokyo. Each country denounces the others’ efforts as a crime, while refusing to admit culpability for its own infractions. How, then, can we claim to be surprised when Jamaica shows up with its own bobsled team? Or when a private company calling itself “Jamaica” shows up and claims the same right to “cool runnings” as a nation-state?

If hacking is not illegal when we do it, then it will not be illegal when they do it—and “they” is increasingly becoming the private sector. It’s a basic principle of capitalism: it’s just business. If everyone else is doing it, why not me?

This is the superficially logical reasoning that has produced pretty much every proliferation problem in the history of arms control, and the same mutually assured destruction implied by a nuclear conflict is all-but guaranteed in a digital one, due to the network’s interconnectivity, and homogeneity.

Recall our earlier topic of the NSO Group’s Pegasus, which especially but not exclusively targets iPhones. While iPhones are more private by default and, occasionally, better-engineered from a security perspective than Google’s Android operating system, they also constitute a monoculture: if you find a way to infect one of them, you can (probably) infect all of them, a problem exacerbated by Apple’s black-box refusal to permit customers to make any meaningful modifications to the way iOS devices operate. When you combine this monoculture and black-boxing with Apple’s nearly universal popularity among the global elite, the reasons for the NSO Group’s iPhone fixation become apparent.

Governments must come to understand that permitting—much less subsidizing—the existence of the NSO Group and its malevolent peers does not serve their interests, regardless of where the client, or the client-state, is situated along the authoritarian axis: the last President of the United States spent all of his time in office when he wasn’t playing golf tweeting from an iPhone, and I would wager that half of the most senior officials and their associates in every other country were reading those tweets on their iPhones (maybe on the golf course).

Whether we like it or not, adversaries and allies share a common environment, and with each passing day, we become increasingly dependent on devices that run a common code.

The idea that the great powers of our era—America, China, Russia, even Israel—are interested in, say, Azerbaijian attaining strategic parity in intelligence-gathering is, of course, profoundly mistaken. These governments have simply failed to grasp the threat, because the capability-gap hasn’t vanished—yet.

4.

In technology as in public health, to protect anyone, we must protect everyone. The first step in this direction—at least the first digital step—must be to ban the commercial trade in intrusion software. We do not permit a market in biological infections-as-a-service, and the same must be true for digital infections. Eliminating the profit motive reduces the risks of proliferation while protecting progress, leaving room for publicly-minded research and inherently governmental work.

While removing intrusion software from the commercial market doesn’t also take it away from states, it does ensure that reckless drug dealers and sex-criminal Hollywood producers who can dig a few million out of their couch cushions won’t be able to infect any or every iPhone on the planet, endangering the latte-class’ shiny slabs of status.

Such a moratorium, however, is mere triage: it only buys us time. Following a ban, the next step is liability. It is crucial to understand that neither the scale of the NSO Group’s business, nor the consequences it has inflicted on global society, would have been possible without access to global capital from amoral firms like Novalpina Capital (Europe) and Francisco Partners (US). The slogan is simple: if companies are not divested, the owners should be arrested. The exclusive product of this industry is intentional, foreseeable harm, and these companies are witting accomplices. Further, when, a business is discovered to be engaging in such activities at the direction of a state, liability should move beyond more pedestrian civil and criminal codes to invoke a coordinated international response.

5.

Imagine you’re the Washington Post’s Editorial Board (first you’ll have to get rid of your spine). Imagine having your columnist murdered and responding with a whispered appeal to the architects of that murder that next time they should just fill out a bit more paperwork. Frankly, the Post’s response to the NSO scandal is so embarrassingly weak that it is a scandal in itself: how many of their writers need to die for them to be persuaded that process is not a substitute for prohibition?

Saudi Arabia, using “Pegasus,” hacked the phones of Jamal Khashoggi’s ex-wife, and of his fiancée, and used the information gleaned to prepare for his monstrous killing and its subsequent cover-up.

But Khashoggi is merely the most prominent of Pegasus’ victims — due to the cold-blooded and grisly nature of his murder. The NSO Group’s “product” (read: “criminal service”) has been used to spy on countless other journalists, judges, and even teachers. On opposition candidates, and on targets’ spouses and children, their doctors, their lawyers, and even their priests. This is what people who think a ban is “too extreme” always miss: this Industry sells the opportunity to gun down reporters you don’t like at the car wash.

If we don’t do anything to stop the sale of this technology, it’s not just going to be 50,000 targets: It’s going to be 50 million targets, and it’s going to happen much more quickly than any of us expect.

This will be the future: a world of people too busy playing with their phones to even notice that someone else controls them.

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Trump Begs Federal Judge Not to Turn Over His Tax Returns to Congressional Investigators Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=44994"><span class="small">Bess Levin, Vanity Fair</span></a>   
Friday, 06 August 2021 08:24

Levin writes: "He's apparently very concerned about what lawmakers might find."

Trump's lawyers are attempting to block a House committee's request to obtain six years of Mr. Trump's tax returns. (photo: Mandel Ngan/Getty)
Trump's lawyers are attempting to block a House committee's request to obtain six years of Mr. Trump's tax returns. (photo: Mandel Ngan/Getty)


Trump Begs Federal Judge Not to Turn Over His Tax Returns to Congressional Investigators

By Bess Levin, Vanity Fair

06 August 21


He’s apparently very concerned about what lawmakers might find.

omething you may have picked up on over the last five years or so is that Donald Trump really, really, really doesn’t want anyone to see his tax returns. So terrified is he of anyone getting a peek at these financial documents that not only did he buck with decades of tradition by not voluntarily releasing them while running for president, he panicked and threw the full weight of his lawyers on anyone who tried to access them while he was in office, reacting to various demands and subpoenas as though someone was trying to take his child away from him (though, to be fair, it’s not clear he’d actually go to court to win custody of Don Jr. or Eric). So naturally, now that Joe Biden’s Justice Department has said the Treasury must turn over Trump’s returns to congressional investigators, he’s gone characteristically apeshit.

Per The New York Times:

Lawyers for President Donald J. Trump argued in a new court document on Wednesday that a House committee’s request to obtain six years of Mr. Trump’s tax returns should be blocked, portraying the effort as politically motivated and illegitimate. In a 37-page filing, Mr. Trump’s legal team picked up arguments that the Trump-era Justice Department had put forward in a bid to stonewall the congressional request, but that the Biden-era Justice Department abandoned last week when it said the Treasury Department was legally obligated to provide the documents to lawmakers.

Mr. Trump’s legal team wrote that the requests for the former president’s tax returns “are unlawful and unenforceable because they lack a legitimate legislative purpose, exceed statutory authority, violate the First Amendment, violate due process, and/or violate the separation of powers.”

The filing argues that even though Mr. Trump is no longer the sitting president, the case must still be evaluated as if he were in office since it dates back to that period. Much of the filing reprised statements made by Democrats dating back to the 2016 campaign, when Mr. Trump broke with the norm of presidential candidates disclosing their tax returns. Democrats have repeatedly suggested that he must be hiding something politically damaging.

Claiming that Democrats are only trying to access Trump’s returns for “political gain,” the ex-president’s lawyers insist in the filing that “The requests are tailored to, and in practical operation will affect, only President Trump. The requests single out President Trump because he is a Republican and a political opponent. They were made to retaliate against President Trump because of his policy positions, his political beliefs, and his protected speech, including the positions he took during the 2016 and 2020 campaigns.” Which is basically a fancy way of screaming, “Witch hunt! Witch hunt!” over and over again, as Trump has done hundreds of millions of times, about everything from his taxes to impeachment to criminal probes, since 2016.

While the continued legal battle means Congress is unlikely to see Trump’s tax returns anytime soon, if ever, history, at the moment, is not on his side. Earlier this year, a Supreme Court ruling paved the way for Manhattan district attorney Cyrus Vance Jr. to obtain his tax returns, a turn of events Trump responded to by screaming at whatever poor soul had to dictate his words: “These are attacks by Democrats willing to do anything to stop the almost 75 million people (the most votes, by far, ever gotten by a sitting president) who voted for me in the election—an election which many people, and experts, feel that I won.… In the meantime, murders and violent crime are up in New York City by record numbers, and nothing is done about it. Our elected officials don’t care. All they focus on is the persecution of President Donald J. Trump.”

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As Biden Aims to Pass 2 Big Bills, Things Are About to Get Really Complicated Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=55442"><span class="small">Ron Elving, NPR</span></a>   
Friday, 06 August 2021 08:24

Elving writes: "In the days and weeks just ahead, the elected leaders of our federal government will perform a series of ritual dances that few Americans will understand."

A contractor works to recount ballots from the 2020 general election in Phoenix on May 1. The Maricopa County, Arizona, ballot recount came after two election audits found no evidence of widespread fraud in Arizona. (photo: Courtney Pedroza/Getty)
A contractor works to recount ballots from the 2020 general election in Phoenix on May 1. The Maricopa County, Arizona, ballot recount came after two election audits found no evidence of widespread fraud in Arizona. (photo: Courtney Pedroza/Getty)


As Biden Aims to Pass 2 Big Bills, Things Are About to Get Really Complicated

By Ron Elving, NPR

06 August 21

 

n the days and weeks just ahead, the elected leaders of our federal government will perform a series of ritual dances that few Americans will understand.

You may turn away with a dismissive gesture or a rolling of the eyes. But these seemingly arcane exercises will, in fact, represent — and may even resolve — real conflicts over national issues of enormous importance.

At stake are the $1.2 trillion infrastructure package, trillions more in a spending plan for the next decade and even the degree of difficulty citizens will encounter when next they try to vote. The outcome will be a turning point for the Biden administration's first year in office and may have a powerful influence on the midterm elections looming in 2022.

Profoundly important as all these substantive matters are, much of the impending day-to-day debate and media coverage will use a kind of procedural and political code.

There will be much talk of the "Byrd Rule," mentions of a "carve-out" and possibly a "nuclear option."

Bear with us, because it's all about stuff that makes a difference.

The filibuster

Most of the focus will be on the Senate, where it takes 60 votes to break the tactic known as the filibuster before proceeding to any significant legislative action.

With the Senate parties evenly split, the challenge of getting 60 votes is next to impossible. It took months of exhausting negotiations to get the current infrastructure bill.

There is no chance of a similar compromise on President Biden's $3.5 trillion spending plan that covers a host of other priorities, which Republicans oppose. Yet without action on the bigger package in the Senate, Democrats in the House of Representatives probably can't hold their fragile majority together on infrastructure.

So, right now, Democrats are grinding through the infrastructure debate in the Senate with Republican help before leaving for August recess.

Reconciliation and the "Byrd Rule"

Step two would be to approve a budget resolution and trigger a process known as reconciliation, which has the very special feature of immunity to filibuster. With reconciliation as the vehicle, Democrats could prevail on their own votes alone, with Vice President Harris breaking the 50-50 tie.

But Democrats cannot simply load up reconciliation with anything they like, because the "Byrd Rule" allows any senator to object to any add-ons not related to the budget or reducing the deficit.

Overruling that point takes, you guessed it, 60 votes.

But let's back up and consider ...

How we got here

During the 93rd Congress (1973 to 1974), the House and Senate were busy bringing down President Richard Nixon. In addition to the impeachment process that would force Nixon to resign, Congress passed two landmark laws to limit his powers over the military and federal spending. Presidents have had to live with those laws ever since.

Among those engineering the War Powers Act and the Budget and Impoundment Control Act was the second-ranking Democrat in the Senate, Majority Whip Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia.

Then in his third term, Byrd had first been elected in 1958 and would be reelected eight times before his death in 2010. He remains the longest-serving senator in history.

But back in 1974, Byrd was among those convinced that Congress needed to reassert itself after letting presidents wage undeclared war in Vietnam and re-engineer domestic spending through the White House Office of Management and Budget.

Byrd supported the creation of standing budget committees in the House and Senate along with a Congressional Budget Office. There would be a congressional "budget resolution" to guide changes to revenue and spending, and a procedure to reconcile each year's changes with existing appropriations law.

The Senate's provision for extended debate, commonly known as the filibuster, had long been used to delay bills to death. So the Budget Act provided that, if necessary, the reconciliation bill would come to a floor vote in the Senate with no more than 20 hours of debate.

Without the threat of a filibuster, final passage needed only a simple majority. Like other Democrats at the time, Byrd hoped this would make Congress more agile in its struggles with the executive.

Along came Reagan

Reconciliation was not a big deal in its first years of existence, but it was brought to prominence after 1980 when newly elected President Ronald Reagan brought a new Republican majority to the Senate.

Reagan and Co. used reconciliation in their first budget season to slash taxes and domestic programs while increasing spending for defense, and Democrats who opposed the changes could not filibuster them in the Senate. (They passed in the House with the votes of Republicans and conservative Democrats, mostly from the South.)

This use of reconciliation continued through Reagan's first term, and Senate Republicans used it for nonbudget items such as the size of federal commissions. At that point, Byrd rebelled and led a group of senators opposed to what he called "extraneous" provisions.

First used in 1985, and made permanent in 1990, the Byrd Rule allowed for any senator to raise a point of order against anything in reconciliation that was deemed extraneous. Defining extraneous was up to the Senate's presiding officer in consultation with the Senate parliamentarian.

That definition, or the point of order itself, could only be overruled by a 60-vote supermajority. So, while not directly related to the filibuster, the Byrd Rule had the effect of restoring the Senate's 60-vote threshold for legislative success on nonbudget measures.

Voting rights may not qualify in reconciliation bill

Most of what has been proposed for this year's reconciliation process, including the framework of Biden's $3.5 trillion spending plan, would be described as relevant to revenues and spending.

But advocates have urged that other urgent Democratic priorities be folded in, such as the voting rights protection bill known as the For the People Act.

Republicans who filibustered the legislation as a stand-alone bill this summer would surely raise a point of order against its inclusion in reconciliation.

Democrats would be hard-pressed to find the 10 votes from across the aisle they would need to prevail, at least as the bill is written now. Anything that passed muster with Democrats would be difficult to sell across the aisle in the current climate.

The "carve-out" option

In recent weeks, as the battle lines have hardened on the voting rights issue, some Democrats have argued for another route around the 60-vote obstacle.

House Majority Whip James Clyburn, a South Carolina Democrat, has suggested a "carve-out" might be created to enable this specific piece of legislation to reach the floor and ultimately become law.

Clyburn, who played a key role in Biden's primary campaign and nomination in 2020, has urged the president to press for an exception to current Senate rules.

"My dad used to say to me: 'Anything that's happened before can happen again,' " Clyburn said, pointing to past exceptions and exhorting Biden to "call Joe Manchin."

Manchin is the West Virginia Democrat elected to the Senate when Byrd died. Often seen as the most conservative Democrat in Congress, Manchin has repeatedly defended the filibuster as a guarantee of "involvement of the minority."

This week, Manchin said he does not support a "carve-out" as proposed by Clyburn.

Ending the filibuster?

One big exception to the filibuster is, of course, reconciliation itself. But the 1974 act sailed through Senate final passage without any nay votes and was in no danger of being filibustered. That is not true of the voting rights legislation today, which was stopped by a filibuster threat earlier this summer.

As an alternative, Clyburn has suggested the Senate could use the same procedure again that it used in 2013 when Nevada Democrat Harry Reid was the Senate majority leader. Frustrated by Republicans who had threatened to filibuster more than 100 nominations to executive positions during then-President Barack Obama's second term, Reid used his majority to "establish a new precedent."

Reid's new precedent in essence barred filibusters on the confirmation of presidential appointees. It made an exception for Supreme Court nominees. But that exception was removed four years later when Republicans were in the majority and their leader, Mitch McConnell, extended Reid's precedent to include the Supreme Court. It was no accident that all three of former President Donald Trump's appointees to the high court were confirmed under this precedent.

So why not another "new precedent" for voting rights? It could happen, in theory, but it faces a far higher hurdle. Because, unlike the Reid and McConnell precedents, the "Clyburn carve-out" would enable passage of a piece of legislation.

"Any such exception would be a very unstable equilibrium and a first step down a quick road to full filibuster abolition," said Molly Reynolds, senior fellow in governance studies at the Brookings Institution.

It would be the end of the filibuster — not just "as we know it," but period.

That was the Rubicon both Reid and McConnell explicitly refused to cross and promised not to cross. It has also been called, in a more modern metaphor, the "nuclear option." No leader to date has pushed a vote on this, in part, because none could be sure of the support of all his own party members.

After all, the Senate is still the Senate. Its rules and customs are rooted in its origins as a 26-member club with no political parties and a penchant for individualism.

At a glacial pace, the chamber has inched toward simple majority rule. Cloture was established in 1917, creating a means for cutting off debate, and cloture got easier with the lower vote requirement in 1975.

But that led to increased use of — and indeed an almost casual reliance on — the threat to filibuster. So instead of one or two filibusters a year on average (1917-1970), the number of cloture votes per year has skyrocketed off the charts — averaging more than 80 per year since 2010.

Senators threaten filibusters on virtually anything requiring a vote, and the 60-vote threshold has all but become the chamber's defining feature.

No public vote has been taken on the question, but whichever party is in the minority can be assumed to oppose eliminating the filibuster. And at the present moment, Manchin is far from the only Democrat with doubts.

Life in the Senate without the filibuster would be much like life in the House, only with longer terms and much higher fundraising requirements.

Making them talk

Biden this summer has said the solution is to make the filibustering senators talk until they collapse, as was the custom in the 1950s and 1960s.

"People finally got tired of the talking and collapsing, and you could get a quorum and vote on the bill," Biden said.

That was the pressure, both physical and in terms of media and public attention, that finally brought the filibusters against civil rights legislation to an end, especially since C-SPAN began broadcasting Senate proceedings in 1985.

In the last half century, the threat to filibuster (sometimes called a virtual or silent filibuster) has proven a more durable and effective weapon. Television came to the Senate in the 1980s, and since then senators have used their right to extended debate occasionally to give what Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont has called "very long speeches."

But when Republicans such as Ted Cruz of Texas or Rand Paul of Kentucky have gone on for hours, it has been for the purpose of calling attention to something or someone.

Biden's suggestion, which has been made by others over the years, would be to require extended debate be done live and in color on the floor of the Senate for as many days and nights as necessary.

That might well bring the Senate to a full halt for months, but at least it would make clear who was responsible.

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EFF: Apple's Plan to "Think Different" About Encryption Opens a Backdoor to Your Private Life Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=60399"><span class="small">India McKinney and Erica Portnoy, The Electronic Frontier Foundation</span></a>   
Friday, 06 August 2021 08:24

Excerpt: "Apple is planning to build a backdoor into its data storage system and its messaging system."

Apple is planning to build a backdoor into its data storage system and its messaging system. (photo: Getty)
Apple is planning to build a backdoor into its data storage system and its messaging system. (photo: Getty)


EFF: Apple's Plan to "Think Different" About Encryption Opens a Backdoor to Your Private Life

By India McKinney and Erica Portnoy, The Electronic Frontier Foundation

06 August 21

 

pple has announced impending changes to its operating systems that include new “protections for children” features in iCloud and iMessage. If you’ve spent any time following the Crypto Wars, you know what this means: Apple is planning to build a backdoor into its data storage system and its messaging system.

Child exploitation is a serious problem, and Apple isn't the first tech company to bend its privacy-protective stance in an attempt to combat it. But that choice will come at a high price for overall user privacy. Apple can explain at length how its technical implementation will preserve privacy and security in its proposed backdoor, but at the end of the day, even a thoroughly documented, carefully thought-out, and narrowly-scoped backdoor is still a backdoor.

To say that we are disappointed by Apple’s plans is an understatement. Apple has historically been a champion of end-to-end encryption, for all of the same reasons that EFF has articulated time and time again. Apple’s compromise on end-to-end encryption may appease government agencies in the U.S. and abroad, but it is a shocking about-face for users who have relied on the company’s leadership in privacy and security.

There are two main features that the company is planning to install in every Apple device. One is a scanning feature that will scan all photos as they get uploaded into iCloud Photos to see if they match a photo in the database of known child sexual abuse material (CSAM) maintained by the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). The other feature scans all iMessage images sent or received by child accounts—that is, accounts designated as owned by a minor—for sexually explicit material, and if the child is young enough, notifies the parent when these images are sent or received. This feature can be turned on or off by parents.

When Apple releases these “client-side scanning” functionalities, users of iCloud Photos, child users of iMessage, and anyone who talks to a minor through iMessage will have to carefully consider their privacy and security priorities in light of the changes, and possibly be unable to safely use what until this development is one of the preeminent encrypted messengers.

Apple Is Opening the Door to Broader Abuses

We’ve said it before, and we’ll say it again now: it’s impossible to build a client-side scanning system that can only be used for sexually explicit images sent or received by children. As a consequence, even a well-intentioned effort to build such a system will break key promises of the messenger’s encryption itself and open the door to broader abuses.

All it would take to widen the narrow backdoor that Apple is building is an expansion of the machine learning parameters to look for additional types of content, or a tweak of the configuration flags to scan, not just children’s, but anyone’s accounts. That’s not a slippery slope; that’s a fully built system just waiting for external pressure to make the slightest change. Take the example of India, where recently passed rules include dangerous requirements for platforms to identify the origins of messages and pre-screen content. New laws in Ethiopia requiring content takedowns of “misinformation” in 24 hours may apply to messaging services. And many other countries—often those with authoritarian governments—have passed similar laws. Apple’s changes would enable such screening, takedown, and reporting in its end-to-end messaging. The abuse cases are easy to imagine: governments that outlaw homosexuality might require the classifier to be trained to restrict apparent LGBTQ+ content, or an authoritarian regime might demand the classifier be able to spot popular satirical images or protest flyers.

We’ve already seen this mission creep in action. One of the technologies originally built to scan and hash child sexual abuse imagery has been repurposed to create a database of “terrorist” content that companies can contribute to and access for the purpose of banning such content. The database, managed by the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), is troublingly without external oversight, despite calls from civil society. While it’s therefore impossible to know whether the database has overreached, we do know that platforms regularly flag critical content as “terrorism,” including documentation of violence and repression, counterspeech, art, and satire.

Image Scanning on iCloud Photos: A Decrease in Privacy

Apple’s plan for scanning photos that get uploaded into iCloud Photos is similar in some ways to Microsoft’s PhotoDNA. The main product difference is that Apple’s scanning will happen on-device. The (unauditable) database of processed CSAM images will be distributed in the operating system (OS), the processed images transformed so that users cannot see what the image is, and matching done on those transformed images using private set intersection where the device will not know whether a match has been found. This means that when the features are rolled out, a version of the NCMEC CSAM database will be uploaded onto every single iPhone. The result of the matching will be sent up to Apple, but Apple can only tell that matches were found once a sufficient number of photos have matched a preset threshold.

Once a certain number of photos are detected, the photos in question will be sent to human reviewers within Apple, who determine that the photos are in fact part of the CSAM database. If confirmed by the human reviewer, those photos will be sent to NCMEC, and the user’s account disabled. Again, the bottom line here is that whatever privacy and security aspects are in the technical details, all photos uploaded to iCloud will be scanned.

Make no mistake: this is a decrease in privacy for all iCloud Photos users, not an improvement.

Currently, although Apple holds the keys to view Photos stored in iCloud Photos, it does not scan these images. Civil liberties organizations have asked the company to remove its ability to do so. But Apple is choosing the opposite approach and giving itself more knowledge of users’ content.

Machine Learning and Parental Notifications in iMessage: A Shift Away From Strong Encryption

Apple’s second main new feature is two kinds of notifications based on scanning photos sent or received by iMessage. To implement these notifications, Apple will be rolling out an on-device machine learning classifier designed to detect “sexually explicit images.” According to Apple, these features will be limited (at launch) to U.S. users under 18 who have been enrolled in a Family Account. In these new processes, if an account held by a child under 13 wishes to send an image that the on-device machine learning classifier determines is a sexually explicit image, a notification will pop up, telling the under-13 child that their parent will be notified of this content. If the under-13 child still chooses to send the content, they have to accept that the “parent” will be notified, and the image will be irrevocably saved to the parental controls section of their phone for the parent to view later. For users between the ages of 13 and 17, a similar warning notification will pop up, though without the parental notification.

Similarly, if the under-13 child receives an image that iMessage deems to be “sexually explicit”, before being allowed to view the photo, a notification will pop up that tells the under-13 child that their parent will be notified that they are receiving a sexually explicit image. Again, if the under-13 user accepts the image, the parent is notified and the image is saved to the phone. Users between 13 and 17 years old will similarly receive a warning notification, but a notification about this action will not be sent to their parent’s device.

This means that if—for instance—a minor using an iPhone without these features turned on sends a photo to another minor who does have the features enabled, they do not receive a notification that iMessage considers their image to be “explicit” or that the recipient’s parent will be notified. The recipient’s parents will be informed of the content without the sender consenting to their involvement. Additionally, once sent or received, the “sexually explicit image” cannot be deleted from the under-13 user’s device.

Whether sending or receiving such content, the under-13 user has the option to decline without the parent being notified. Nevertheless, these notifications give the sense that Apple is watching over the user’s shoulder—and in the case of under-13s, that’s essentially what Apple has given parents the ability to do.

It is also important to note that Apple has chosen to use the notoriously difficult-to-audit technology of machine learning classifiers to determine what constitutes a sexually explicit image. We know from years of documentation and research that machine-learning technologies, used without human oversight, have a habit of wrongfully classifying content, including supposedly “sexually explicit” content. When blogging platform Tumblr instituted a filter for sexual content in 2018, it famously caught all sorts of other imagery in the net, including pictures of Pomeranian puppies, selfies of fully-clothed individuals, and more. Facebook’s attempts to police nudity have resulted in the removal of pictures of famous statues such as Copenhagen’s Little Mermaid. These filters have a history of chilling expression, and there’s plenty of reason to believe that Apple’s will do the same.

Since the detection of a “sexually explicit image” will be using on-device machine learning to scan the contents of messages, Apple will no longer be able to honestly call iMessage “end-to-end encrypted.” Apple and its proponents may argue that scanning before or after a message is encrypted or decrypted keeps the “end-to-end” promise intact, but that would be semantic maneuvering to cover up a tectonic shift in the company’s stance toward strong encryption.

Whatever Apple Calls It, It’s No Longer Secure Messaging

As a reminder, a secure messaging system is a system where no one but the user and their intended recipients can read the messages or otherwise analyze their contents to infer what they are talking about. Despite messages passing through a server, an end-to-end encrypted message will not allow the server to know the contents of a message. When that same server has a channel for revealing information about the contents of a significant portion of messages, that’s not end-to-end encryption. In this case, while Apple will never see the images sent or received by the user, it has still created the classifier that scans the images that would provide the notifications to the parent. Therefore, it would now be possible for Apple to add new training data to the classifier sent to users’ devices or send notifications to a wider audience, easily censoring and chilling speech.

But even without such expansions, this system will give parents who do not have the best interests of their children in mind one more way to monitor and control them, limiting the internet’s potential for expanding the world of those whose lives would otherwise be restricted. And because family sharing plans may be organized by abusive partners, it's not a stretch to imagine using this feature as a form of stalkerware.

People have the right to communicate privately without backdoors or censorship, including when those people are minors. Apple should make the right decision: keep these backdoors off of users’ devices.

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America Faces Cascading Crises. Democrats Must Act. Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=24522"><span class="small">Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post</span></a>   
Thursday, 05 August 2021 12:43

Vanden Heuvel writes: "Will America finally begin to address the cascading crises it faces? This week will provide an initial test."

Bipartisan group of Senators who created a infrastructure bill. (photo: J. Scott Applewhite/AP)
Bipartisan group of Senators who created a infrastructure bill. (photo: J. Scott Applewhite/AP)


America Faces Cascading Crises. Democrats Must Act.

By Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Washington Post

05 August 21

 

ill America finally begin to address the cascading crises it faces? This week will provide an initial test. First up is the Senate’s vote on the bipartisan infrastructure deal. Too many media voices have already begun celebrating the “courage” of the negotiators, with Sen. Kyrsten Sinema (D-Ariz.) taking plenty of bows. Progressives in the House and Senate are warning, however, that the infrastructure bill won’t get to the president’s desk unless Sinema and Sen. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.) help pass a budget reconciliation bill that addresses vital unmet needs. This is portrayed as a conflict pitting the left against the center but, in this battle, progressives represent the real center — the broad majority of Americans demanding action — and carry the last best hope for Democrats, and perhaps democracy itself to survive the next elections.

While the infrastructure deal’s architects are hailing it as proof that bipartisan cooperation is possible, in fact, the deal is both inadequate and disingenuous. Its inadequacy is illustrated by the hundreds of millions of dollars cut from the original administration proposal: no more funding for research and development, for U.S. manufacturing, for public housing, schools and child-care centers, for home and community-based care, or for clean-energy tax credits. The bill also cuts proposed funding for public transit by half, for electric vehicles by 90 percent and for broadband by a third.

The bill is disingenuous both on the spending side and on the revenue side. To lower the bill’s price tag without totally gutting the programs, the bill uses a five-year timeline as opposed to the eight years in the original Biden plan. Because Republicans refuse to consider raising taxes on the rich and the corporations — which most Americans sensibly favor — or even empowering the IRS to collect taxes that the wealthy already owe, the bill offers gimmicks such as collecting unpaid taxes on cryptocurrencies and reclaiming past coronavirus aid funds. Almost half of the supposed $1 trillion price tag is from money already authorized.

The result is that any serious effort to alleviate the real crises facing Americans will depend on progressives corralling Democratic unity around the $3.5 trillion budget resolution that has been put together under the leadership of Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.). That bill will authorize crucial funding left out of the bipartisan deal — clean energy, research and development, manufacturing aid, housing and schools, child care — as well as sustaining the child tax credit and expanding Medicare coverage.

But to pass the reconciliation bill, Democrats need the votes of all 50 caucus members, and Sinema and Manchin have indicated that they may balk at the $3.5 trillion price tag. (Sinema has even said that she won’t allow any votes to interfere with her vacation plans. If she were to carry out that threat, she could torpedo both bills on her way out the door.) Once again, these so-called centrists are standing in the way of Congress addressing catastrophic climate change, investing in civilian research and development, boosting domestic manufacturing vital to our economy, and alleviating inequality and the pressures on working families. Also at stake are the chances Democrats have to retain their majorities in both the House and Senate in the 2022 elections, for their vote will surely be depressed by a failure to deliver.

It’s not that Sinema or Manchin have a specific, principled stance. They just want less. If there is a final agreement, it will probably be reached just like the infrastructure deal, by lowering the total price tag while sustaining most of the annual level of spending by reducing the number of years the programs are authorized. That will give the programs less time to take effect and make them more vulnerable to repeal.

With record wildfires, a terrible pandemic starting to revive, extreme inequality and an economy that doesn’t work for working families, most Americans increasingly realize that it is time for bold action. Yet, we have a Republican Party consumed by delusions and dedicated to making the administration fail. For all the bipartisan blather, Democrats must get it done on their own — despite having only a one-vote margin in the Senate (counting the vice president breaking a tie) and a three-vote margin in the House. And that requires Sinema, Manchin and others to get with the program.

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