The Forest and The Trees:
The United States In Afghanistan

By Stephen Eric Bronner, Reader Supported News

26 September 10

Reader Supported News | Perspective

eneral David Petraeus, who commands American forces in Afghanistan, recently stated that he would not preside over a "graceful exit" from that beleaguered country and that he might oppose withdrawal (The New York Times, August 16th, 2010). His words echoed the sentiments expressed time and again by Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon about Vietnam. These presidents, too, did not wish to lose a war that could not be won. [1] Vanity and misguided political calculation again confront the national interest. While Iraq is written off, though bombings and attacks are still frequent, the same assumptions that guided the earlier debacle are retained in American policy toward Afghanistan. Shards of criticism about this or that mistake or defeat or miscalculation appear every other day. Day after day there are reports concerning the offensive stalled in places like Maruja, the decline in security, the growth of corruption, the election gone sour. But the overview is rarely articulated. It is a matter of the forest, not the trees.

The stage was set for the present conflict in 1979 when the United States supported the Mujahedeen in its struggle against the Soviet Union. That phase of the conflict ended when the Soviet Union collapsed, and from 1989 until 2001 the United States found itself jockeying for influence by entering into temporary and complex coalitions with certain warlords - among them current president Hamid Karzai - for control of the country. Ultimately, however, the Taliban seized power. And so matters stood until 9/11/2001. President George W. Bush initially entered into negotiations with the ruling Taliban in order to secure the capture of Osama bin Laden, who had masterminded the attack against the World Trade Center. Rumors persist to this day that the criminal had been cornered and that he escaped only because of bureaucratic infighting over which military or political leader would claim credit for the catch. In any event, however, the invasion of Iraq led the United States to shift its priorities. Warlords once again fought for power in Afghanistan while Osama went into hiding, and the Taliban regrouped. The failure of the Iraqi invasion left the United States without a secure foothold in the region, and in 2009, copying the "surge" policy employed in Iraq, President Barack Obama decided to deploy 30,000 new troops over the next six months in anticipation of a withdrawal 18 months later.

Afghanistan borders Pakistan and provides a pathway into Iran and the host of nations known as "the -stans." Oil interests - as usual - come into play: an oil pipeline capable of connecting different parts of the region would run through Afghanistan. But that oft-discussed prospect lies far down the road. Considerations about the geo-political importance of Afghanistan and the thought of the Taliban once again in power - right now - led President Obama his new policy with the American national interest. Afghanistan is not the only country, however, in which the United States is currently engaged. Fifty thousand soldiers remain stationed in Iraq, and American military intervention is also taking place in Somalia and Pakistan. The United States is still arming Israel and pondering whether to bomb Iran. The US Defense budget has jumped from $291.1 billion in 2001 to 663.8 billion in 2010. US taxpayers have anted up another $338 billion to fund the war and occupation. When factoring in Afghanistan and Iraq, military bases and the like will result in $1-3 trillion on its war machine - more than four times the amount the US spent on fighting the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. [2] These costs are fortified by the existence of 800 US military bases throughout the world - far more than the rest of the world combined - and particularly by the use of hired mercenaries. The United States now has bases in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Even more ominously, goods and materials in Afghanistan are now 70 percent outsourced through private companies like Xe (formerly known as Blackwater), with military commodities supplied by Kestral Technologies. Alan Gilbert of the Korbel School for International Studies at the University of Denver has correctly called them "Cadillac mercenaries." Osama bin Laden is still a political prize worth capturing, but the real aim now is to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat - or even marginalize - the Taliban. In order to accomplish either goal not only must the United States employ its military-industrial complex to reconstruct this devastated nation from the bottom up, but Pakistan must also be drawn into the mix and transformed as well. There is little doubt that such a reconstruction is desirable: it is unnecessary here to list the much-publicized brutalities and prejudices of an extremist Islamic movement fueled by a medieval vision of society. But that begs the question: Is the current policy feasible?

Why should the Afghan people consider the United States as anything other than a new imperialist invader? From Alexander the Great to the British to the Russians and now to the United States – Afghanistan has been under attack and threat of invasion. [3] Supporters of American policy essentially insist that the United States is less an invader than a partner and that the Taliban is now weaker than before. The United States has stated its willingness to work with virtually any leadership and its "counter-insurgency" program is less preoccupied with military victory than reconstructing Afghan society. [4] To date, according to the Afghan government, it received $35 billion in grants and loans from donor nations, with the United States disbursing some $23 billion of it. [5] But it is the same whether discussing risk-of rape-assessments, childhood mortality or drug addiction. Malnutrition was the condition of seven million Afghan in 2001, for example, while 7.4 are experiencing it today: "Pick a measurement affecting ordinary Afghans and the record since November 2001 when Kabul fell to Allied forces is likely to show stagnation or setbacks and, almost invariably, suffering." [6]

Constructing a new civil society in Afghanistan is predicated on renovating the army and the police forces. But the attempt is already faltering: Taliban infiltration is a constant worry and incompetence is an even bigger one; drug addition is rampant; 1 in 10 policemen are illiterate and "many cannot even read a license plate" (New York Times February 3, 2010). All this has led to increasing troop levels further in the military and police and instituting anti-corruption courts. The Afghan military is seen as ultimately comprising a force of 171,000 and the police as comprising 109,000. Add 100,000 private contractors, 50,000 American troops and 45,000 NATO troops, and a vision of Afghanistan takes shape. [7] The numbers don't lie. The need for such an abundance of troops testifies to the strength of the Taliban. The United States is less engaged in reconstructing civil society than creating an armed camp. Afghanistan lacks a bureaucratic infrastructure and 90 percent of its state spending is funded by foreign assistance. Estimates from 2008 indicate that upwards of 70 percent of the citizenry is illiterate; 36 percent live below the poverty line; and 35 percent are unemployed. [8] Corruption is beyond rampant: elections are plagued by fraud and payoffs to voters; the central bank just failed in spite of repeated warnings about irregularities; and that the families of the president and vice-president are taking massive bribes is an open secret. The Atlantic Council Report of March 2008 states that only 10 percent of American aid is actually being distributed to the Afghan. Can a republic take root under such circumstances?

American foreign policy is caught between seeking to defeat the Taliban by military means even while engaging in nation-building. The contradiction is palpable. Even while creating the armed camp the United States is attempting to stabilize entire regions of Afghanistan rather than just towns and villages. A successful counter-insurgency strategy, however, requires a reliable political partner committed to building a democratic state. But that is precisely what does not exist. Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry has stated that President Karzai "is not an adequate strategic partner," and that his legitimacy is not such as to strengthen the sovereignty of Afghanistan (NY Times January 26, 2010). That only makes sense. First installed as the leader of an interim government in 2001, Karzai served as a kind of bagman or - more generously - mediator between the United States and the more important warlords in Afghanistan. Even General Petraeus has said that elements of the Karzai government constitute something "like a crime syndicate" (NY Times December 6, 2009). The opium trade comprises 25 percent of the GNP; 14 percent of the citizenry is involved in this enterprise; and 90 percent of the world's supply is produced in Afghanistan. [9] But there is a deeper issue. American policy still begins with the assumption that a traditional agrarian society with non-western roots can simply be transformed into a modern society along the western model. Afghanistan rests on insular tribal and kinship systems and everyday politics is local in the most extreme sense. Thirty languages and dozens of dialects are spoken in Afghanistan, and the country is composed of seven major ethnic groups. The Tajiks, Uzbeks and Pashtuns are the most prominent, with the latter controlling roughly 40 percent of the country and serving as the base for the Taliban. General David Richards, who led NATO's international security force, spoke about religious and tribal divisions being manipulated by "anarcho-warlords" (The Guardian July 22, 2006). There is no functioning bureaucracy, the existing state lacks a monopoly over the means of coercion, and only 5 percent of Afghan citizens keep their money in banks (The New York Times September 19, 2010). National solidarity exists as a form of negative integration - or, more simply, as a source of opposition to the imperialist enemy. Religion is the only ideology capable of positive integration in a traditional society. Is the United States taking this seriously enough?

American foreign policy has consistently underestimated the power of ideology in general and religion in particular when dealing with the non-western world. That is surely the case with respect to the Taliban. Offer some cash, build some infrastructure, distribute some commodities, make some alliances, break some alliances, wheel and deal, and buy some loyalty. Military power is only part of the story in dealing with the Taliban: Human nature being what it is they can supposedly still be made to see the light. Counter-insurgency is predicated on the assumption that it will prove possible to "flip rather than fight" the regional commanders, soldiers and everyday supporters of the Taliban: their only real concern is supposedly with "being on the winning side." [10] American advisors have suggested various tactics. Publicity campaigns might be introduced to highlight the patriotism of the obviously corrupt government led by President Hamid Karzai. But, then, capturing the heart might also be helped by filling the wallet. It might also be possible to offer bribes to military leaders, higher wages for all government employees, and payments to farmers willing not to produce opium. It should also be remembered that each ethnic minority has its own "specific needs." And, if all of this fails, then it is still possible to send in more troops.

Even with respect to everyday people, more is involved than money. Their resistance is fueled by national pride born of hatred for the invader, religious convictions, local allegiances, and an anti-Western animus. Technocratic policies evince a cynicism that is ultimately self-defeating because it obscures the overarching ideological context for action. It ignores, for example, the force behind the oath of loyalty extended to Mullah Omar, their leader, by all founding members of the Taliban. There is a reason why no Taliban commander has yet betrayed the whereabouts of Mullah Omar who, like Osama bin Laden, is still in hiding. Perhaps it is also worth mentioning that the German Army also swore an oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler that played a real role in hindering opposition even when the war was lost. For the Taliban, moreover, the war is not lost. Quite the contrary: it has shadow governors in thirty-three out of the thirty-four provinces of Afghanistan. [11] President Karzai exerts little control outside of Kabul. Noxious and intolerant as the Taliban might be, indeed, its power is real. Part of the reason derives from its treatment by Pakistan. That begs the question: Is the Afghan policy being pursued by the United States strengthening or weakening the Pakistani state?

Current thinking is predicated on a new version of the "domino theory" that so many embraced during the Vietnam War. With little exaggeration, it was suggested that, should Saigon fall to the Communists, the rest of Southeast Asia would follow, next would come Australia, and - soon enough - California would be subject to attack. A more sober variant of this clearly paranoid kind of thinking is now in play: Should the Taliban gain control of Afghanistan the next country to fall would be Pakistan. Further intervention is being justified by various reports from the National Intelligence Council, and the CIA suggests that by 2015 Pakistan might yet become another failed state. With its 70-90 nuclear missiles, courtesy of the Bush administration, this would have serious implications for the region and the world. The existence of Taliban bases in Pakistan can be legitimately seen as constituting a threat to any government in Afghanistan. In seeking to prevent a victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, American policy might itself be contributing to the destabilization of Pakistan. A five-year package approaching $7.5 billion in overwhelmingly military aid was provided in 2009 for Pakistan, which bodes ill for improving its civil society, even while the United States has strengthened its alliance with India. But this has raised suspicions regarding American intentions and, though India has given $1 billion in aid to the beleaguered regime of President Karzai, Pakistan has traditionally seen Afghanistan as an element of its India policy. It is therefore plausible to assume that Pakistan will count on the Taliban as a potential ally against India once the United States leaves the region. Meanwhile, the almost daily drone attacks on Taliban and al Qaeda bases in ever-expanding areas of Pakistan, as well as in North and South Waziristan, have generally been interpreted as an attack upon Pakistani sovereignty. Enough experts have asserted that the rise of Pashtun nationalism, the new prominence of the Taliban, and even the increase in suicide bombings, is a direct function of the growing American presence in the country. [12] Splits between Shia and Shiite Muslims have also produced ongoing tensions between Afghanistan and Iran. The situation is fluid, incalculable and complex. The question naturally arises: Is the current policy toward Afghanistan in the American national interest?

With his speech at West Point in December of 2009, President Obama stated that the United States was now involved in "a war of necessity." By the same token, however, he does not envision an open-ended war and he has also stated that he wants American troops home before the 2010 elections. If this is indeed a war of necessity, however, what happens if the Taliban has not been subdued by then? The exit strategy encourages the Taliban to hang on until the United States leaves even as it encourages Pakistan to maintain its relations with militants opposed to India in Afghanistan, Baluchistan and Kashmir. Billions of dollars have already been spent, and in 2009 over 2,400 Afghan civilians were killed and more than 3,500 were wounded. American and NATO casualties doubled to 520. Should the United States cut its losses, or pour more good money after bad? The truth is that the United States finds itself in a double bind: if it leaves then it appears as weak, and if it stays it appears as imperialistic. Should the United States withdraw from Afghanistan there is a danger of national implosion. Remaining in the country, however, will require increased troop levels and enmesh the United States in a widening abyss. The costs make it highly unlikely that the current policy will retain the backing of the American public. The various justifications are vague at best and the political dangers are palpable. Escalating involvement and troops in Afghanistan will: 1) identify the United States with the Karzai regime; 2) undermine the sovereignty of Afghanistan; 3) create the attitude of "in for a penny in for a pound"; and 4) make withdrawal more difficult.

The new counter-insurgency strategy attests to what has become common knowledge: a purely military victory over the Taliban is unobtainable. By the same token, however, the prospect of winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people seems equally daunting. Given what will prove a worsening military situation, the costs, and the obstacles to nation-building, it seems obvious that the United States should withdraw its troops. This is not a happy solution. There will be costs for the policy clumsily pursued first by the Bush administration and then by President Obama. The Taliban will be emboldened by an American withdrawal. Extended civil war and the dangers of implosion are real possibilities for Afghanistan with potentially disastrous consequences for the region. Withdrawal will call for negotiating with the Taliban, and in turn that will mean taking the names of Taliban leaders like Mullah Omar off the UN list of terrorists drawn up following 9/11. It would also be prudent for the United States to call upon Muslim nations in the region to broker peace talks in Afghanistan. With talks already underway between President Karzai and President Asif Ali Zadari of Pakistan the next step for the United States is to reign in the drone strikes and covert activities of private companies that offer the government plausible deniability. [13] President Obama might also expand the mandate of Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke to raise the question of Kashmir and rekindle talks between Pakistan and India. Nevertheless, these are purely intermediate and tactical proposals that are of consequence (or not) to policymakers.

American policy in Afghanistan shows the importance of having clear goals in the pursuit of the national interest. Either the United States is engaged in a genuine "war of necessity," or the necessity of that war is questionable. President Obama is actually waffling between these two positions. His war of necessity was contrived by those who knew little of what they were doing and less of where they were doing it. There is a moral and a material element to all of this. The United States is showing its weakness, conceptually as well as militarily. There is no conviction animating this struggle. American allies in Afghanistan have been bought.

Embracing the lesser evil against the Taliban is a foolish when the chances for success are meager, the costs are so great, genuine support is lacking, and corrupt tribal loyalties are in play. American geo-political interests have never been clarified. Either geo-political interests can be stated clearly and simply, without artifice, or they are probably not real interests at all. The degree to which such interests can be stated simply and clearly, without artifice or lying, is the degree to which a citizenry might support them. The only real American interest in the course currently being pursued in Afghanistan is that of the military and the parasitical companies and advisors that leech off it. They know it and, increasingly, the American public knows it as well. The growing disillusionment concerns not only the conduct of the war, but also its lack of material and moral purpose. In the aftermath of Iraq, and perhaps since Vietnam, the American government can no longer presuppose a quiescent public for its foreign adventures. Critique has a new role to play. Speaking truth to power now rests not merely upon cultivating political knowledge, but a clear sense of political purpose.

References:

[1] Perhaps that has something to do with ongoing academic efforts in international relations to revise history and "prove" that the United States actually won the Vietnam War. Note the critical discussion by Kurt Jacobsen, "Pacification and Its Discontents" (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009).

[2] William Hartung, "Obama and the Permanent War Budget" in Foreign Policy in Focus (December 23, 2009).

[3] See Seth G. Jones, "In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan" (New York: Norton, 2009);
Ahmed Rashid, "Descent Into Chaos: The US and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia" (New York: Penguin, 2009).

[4] "Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Year 2001" (February 7, 2000)
- http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=2306
and "DoD Releases Fiscal 2010 Budget Proposal" (May 7, 2009)
- http://defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12652.

[5] "Donor Financial Review," Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Ministry of Finance. November 2009, pg. 3.

[6] Nick Turse, "How Much 'Success' Can the Afghans Stand?" in TomDispatch (12 September 2010)

[7] Andre Fedyashin, "US Withdrawal From Iraq: Ending or Outsourcing?" Eurasia Review (August 16, 2009).
http://www.eurasiareview.com/201008157005/us-withdrawal-from-iraq-ending-or-outsourcing-war.html.

[8] http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html

[9] Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Counter Narcotics. September 2009, pg. 8.
Also see http://www.un.orgapps/news/stroy.asp?NewsID=33727&Cr=afghan&Cr1.

[10] Fontini Christia and Michael Semple, "Flipping the Taliban" in Foreign Affairs (July/August, 2009), pgs. 34ff.

[11] Ahmed Rashid, "A Deal With the Taliban" in the New York Review of Books (February 25th, 2010), pg. 36ff.

[12] David Kilcullen, "The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Middle of a Big One" (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009)

[13] Jeremy Scahill, "The Secret US War in Pakistan" in The Nation (December 21/28 2009), pg. 18.

Stephen Eric Bronner is Distinguished Professor (PII) of Political Science and Director of Global Relations: Center for the Study of Genocide, Conflict Resolution. The Senior Editor of Logos: A Journal of Modern Society and Culture, his numerous works include "Peace Out of Reach: Middle Eastern Travels and the Search for Reconciliation." (The author would like to express his thanks to his research assistant, Beth Breslaw, for her help with this article.)

Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News.