Written by Kris Merschrod   

ANNEX - Review, from a cultural perspective, of the strategies, goals, “pillars,” intermediate results, and the assumptions as stated or implied in Gen. McChrystal's Assessment.

This annex contains a series of comments on the major points of the Assessment. The purpose is to highlight the relevance of culture in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of the Assessment so that the proposed alternative can be appreciated. The indented paragraphs in small type are quotations directly from the Assessment.

Goals as stated in the Assessment:

In the “Commander's Summary” (p.1-1) There three results sought are sought: 1) the removal of al Qaeda by a strategy of “disrupt and , dismantle;” 2) Establish stability of the government (defined as keeping the Taliban out of governance and also being able to counter transnational terrorists); and 3) that Afghanistan never again to become a base for terrorism. Over all the end result would be “stability” in the form of the Afghan government. We have to assume that government is the one defined and structured by the Afghan constitution.

Commander's Summary
The stakes in Afghanistan are high. NATO's Comprehensive Strategic Political Military Plan and President Obama's strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually defeat al Qaeda and prevent their return to Afghanistan have laid out a clear path of what we must do. Stability in Afghanistan is an imperative; if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban – or has insufficient capability to counter transnational terrorists – Afghanistan could again become a base for terrorism, with obvious implications for regional stability.

The New Strategy:

There are two major parts to the new strategy. Part I are the changes needed in the ISAF and ANF, and Part II is the four pillars. First the ISAF and ANSF:

The key take away from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way that we think and operate.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) requires a new strategy that is credible to, and sustainable by, the Afghans. This new strategy must also be properly resourced and executed through an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign that earns the support of the Afghan people and provides them with a secure environment.

To execute the strategy, we must grow and improve the effectiveness of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and elevate the importance of governance. We must also prioritize resources to those areas where the population is threatened, gain the initiative from the insurgency, and signal unwavering commitment to see through to success. Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.

Part I: Changing ISAF Operational Culture:

Accomplishing the mission demands a renewed emphasis on the basics through a dramatic change in how we operate, with specific focus in two principle areas:

1. Change the operational culture to connect with the people. I believe we must interact more closely with the population and focus on operations that bring stability, while shielding them from insurgent violence, corruption, and coercion.

OK, this is what COIN is all about as explained by Petraeus and Kilcullen

2. Improve unity of effort and command. We must significantly modify organizational structures to achieve better unity of effort. We will continue to realign relationships to improve coordination within ISAF ans the international community.

p. 1-3 OK, restatement of the above. The disunity in ISAF and the shifting roles played by the partners have been issues since the beginning and it needs to be addressed.


Behind the new strategy is the assumption that the following intermediate results can be achieved:

1) properly resourced;
2)the effectiveness of the ANSF can be grown and its effectiveness improved;
3)the importance of governance can be elevated;
4)ISAF operational culture can be changed;
5)Prioritization can allocate resources where and when the population is threatened;
6)The initiative can be taken away from the insurgency; and
7)that the ISAF and GiRAoF can signal unwavering commitment to see it through.

This is a long list of substantial intermediate results before the goal of Stability in Afghanistan can achieved. The assumption that they can be accomplished is a leap of faith.


Part II of the New Strategy – the four pillars – Focus on the Population:

The four pillars in this part of the strategy are additional intermediate results that might lead the mission of stable government (p. 1-3).

Getting the basics right is necessary for success, but it is not enough. To accomplish the mission and defeat the insurgency we also require a properly resourced strategy built on four main pillars:

1. Improve effectiveness through greater partnering with the ANSF. We will increase the size and accelerate the growth of the ANAF, with radically improved partnership at every level, to improve the effectiveness and prepare them to take the lead in security operations.

2. Prioritize responsive and accountable governance. We must assist in improving governance at all levels through both formal an traditional mechanisms.

3. Gain the initiative. Our first imperative, in a series of operational stages, is to gain the initiative and reverse the insurgency's momentum.

4. Focus Resources. We will prioritize available resources to those critical areas where vulnerable populations are most threatened.

Although the “focus” is to be on the population the four pillars still see the government as the means to the population. There really is not a strategy such as decentralization, local participation, district councils or other means of engaging the population that might implement pillar #2. Pillar # 4 is not new and “most threatened” population seems to be all of the East and South of Afghanistan.



Is the Taliban movement alien to the culture? - Another assumption in “The Basis of Assessment: Analysis and Experience”(p. 1-3)

My conclusions were informed through a rigorous multi-disciplinary assessment by a team of accomplished military personnel and civilians and my personal experience and core beliefs. Central to my analysis is a belief that we must respect the complexities of the operational environment and design our strategic approach accordingly. As we analyzed the situation, I became increasingly convinced of several themes: that the objective is the will of the people, our conventional warfare culture is part of the problem, the Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency, we cannot succeed without significantly improved unity of effort, and finally, that protecting the people means shielding them from all threats.

Most of these points are reflected in the four pillars and the other intermediate results stated before. The assumption built into this paragraph is revealed in “the Afghans must ultimately defeat the insurgency.” Herein lies an assumption or perception of the insurgency as alien to or separate from the population.

This is a powerful and significant assumption that, while convenient, facile, and politically correct, will lead to blindness and counterproductive tactics and strategies.

On the whole, isn't this a continuing civil war between the tribal/rural Pashtun and the urban Pashtun allied with the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras? This civil war was played out in the march of the Taliban into Kandahar, then against the Hazaras and Uzbeks, and finally against the Tajiks in Kabul during the 1990s. I would offer an alternative perspective; that the Taliban is not an alien force; it is a Pashtun movement or reaction against forces trying to exert control over them and their traditionally dispersed and ever changing tribal alliances mentioned in the Assessment. Accordingly I would assume that the Taliban is trying to re-establish the territorial influence that it had at its peak in the late 1990s. It may also be trying to re-establish the glories of the Durrani Tribal Federation of the 1700s when they controlled both major routes of the old Silk Road and the mountain links between what is now Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Kabul-Kandahar and the Peshawar-Quetta axes have been Pashtun controlled for centuries. Other ethnic groups, and the British, have tried to intervene.

As noted in the introduction, the Assessment calls for an increased understanding of the culture, yet prepares a strategy that ignores the cultural base of the Taliban as a nativistic movement.

More Cultural Attributes - Local power and Tribal Structure:

We must redouble efforts to understand the social and political dynamics of areas of all regions of the country and take action that meets the needs of the people, and insist that GIRoA officials do the same.

Again, correctly, the Assessment recognizes the need to comprehend the local culture, i.e., recognizes that it, the ISAF, does not understand the context yet. If the analysis does not comprehend needs in terms of local power and tribal structure and autonomy and, instead, thinks that needs are material, then they are missing the cultural aspect. The effort to impose a centralized government upon activities, culture and the function of tribes is probably one of the main reasons that some local leadership, in Pashtun areas at least, side with the Taliban.

The local culture of autonomy and tribal structure should not be seen as the antithesis of governance, but, instead, it should be grasped as the basis for a style of decentralized governance that could defuse the insurgency. The next section of the Assessment sheds more light on this angle (p. 2-6).

Insurgent Strategy and Campaign Design
The insurgents have two primary objectives: controlling the Afghan people and breaking the coalition's will. Their aim is to expel international forces and influences and to supplant the GIRoA.

This is an underestimate and poor comprehension of the objectives of the Taliban; again it is implied that the Taliban are not the same as the local population. The ISAF Goal is to control the Afghan people via the GIRoA . What is the difference between the ISAF and the Taliban? (I am not saying this flippantly. The Taliban may also be seen as a defensive rather than offensive action.) Perhaps the difference is that the Taliban works on maintaining the culture or appealing to older traditional values; where as the ISAF and the GIRoA are trying to inculcate new, non-tribal values for a modern society.

Some local leaders do not like the Taliban leaders from outside of their area and tribe, but the overall movement may be at one with the local population – the maintenance of “Pashtunwali” and the structure of tribal power. The “mission,” all along, has been to change the tribal structure for centralized power and to modernize and challenge the traditional culture of non-urban, and to some degree, the urban Pashtun.

The Assessment does show cultural understanding, but has a biased interpretation:(Pp. 2-7&2-8)


Social/Economic. The QST and other insurgent groups have deliberate social strategies that exacerbate the breakdown in Afghan social cohesion. They empower radial mullahs to replace local leaders, undermine or eliminate local elders and mullahs who do not support them, and consistently support weaker, disenfranchised, or threatened tribes or groups. They erode traditional social structures and capitalize on vast unemployment be empowering the young and disenfranchised through cash payments, weapons, and prestige.


This paragraph shows a grasp of the social/cultural dynamic, but the interpretation needs analysis and careful consideration. The opening statement on breaking down the Afghan social cohesion is expressed like a negative impact when done by the Taliban because this breakdown causes the people to fall into Taliban hands. But the modernization and centralized governance process that the GIRoA represents is perceived as a threat to the traditions. This process has been going on since the effort to support the Mujahideen with the Saudi, Oman, and Kuwaiti support via Wahhabi-based madrassas, it is not a recent, but a continuing process of the last 25 years. It is also important to keep in mind that the radicalization continues among the migrant workers from Afghanistan and Pakistan who go to the Wahhabi Gulf states. We need to note that this religious and nativistic ferment was used against the Russians and then, later, against the corrupt warlords, and that ferment brought the Taliban to power. It, the ferment, is being used against the ISAF and the GIRoA.

That being said, the next concept in the paragraph, that is, “supporting weaker, disfranchised, and threatened tribes and groups, plus the support payments to the unemployed youth,” is precisely the positive role that a central government would be expected to play but has not. This route to conquest, i.e., via weak or oppressed tribes is as old as conquest itself all over the World. This is one of the “initiatives” that this Assessment has not identified as one initiative that needs to be taken from the Taliban.

The noted role of the Taliban resolving local disputes, establishing governance (albeit parallel), using Shari'a law for justice, etc. are roles that the central government has not been able to establish because of corruption as well as a lack of organization and the over-all idea that governance can be imposed from the top-down. Note that the Taliban approach is quite decentralized and local.

Although polls reveal that less than half of the population agree with the Taliban, there is the other approximate half that seems to admit that the Taliban has brought order. Could that half be the disenfranchised, the weaker tribes, the oppressed? If so, then the Taliban have a substantial base and have taken the initiative in support of younger men, younger mullahs as a generational difference as well as the difference between the weak and the traditional powerful tribes such as the ones that Karzai's strength came from.

In the case of insurgencies, the tactic of taking the side of the exploited is a time honored one for those seeking change against entrenched establishments.

To put the breakdown of traditional culture into perspective; if the Taliban breakdown of the traditional hierarchy of leadership and mullahs is considered by the people to be negative, then why would they welcome the breakdown of those same values by the ISAF? After all, “modernization” by outside forces has been one of the main “complaints” of the Pashtun (in both Pakistan and Afghanistan) and has fueled the Taliban movement.

More bias in the interpretation of “Insurgent Enablers and Vulnerabilities.” (p.2-8)


Criminal networks. Criminality creates a pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents and contributes to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. Extensive smuggling diverts major revenue from GIRoA. Criminality exacerbates the fragmentation of Afghan society and increases its susceptibility to insurgent penetration. A number of Afghan Government officials, at all levels, are reported to be complicit in these activities, further undermining GIRoA credibility. (p.2-8)

Narcotics and Financing. The most significant aspect of the production and sale of opium and other narcotics is the corrosive and destabilizing impact on corruption within GIRoA. Narcotics activity also funds insurgent groups, however the importance of this funding must be understood within the overall context of insurgent financing, some of which comes from other sources. Insurgent groups also receive substantial income from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups 'tax” the local population through check points, demanding protection money, and other methods. Eliminating insurgent access to narco-profits – even if possible and while disruptive – would not destroy their ability to operate so long as other funding sources remained intact. (p.2-8)

These two paragraphs are troublesome because both the GiRoA and the Taliban are involved in the same types of activities. The point is that the problem of illicit activity is interpreted as a corrosion of the GiRoA and a strength for the Taliban. The Taliban taxes at check points on the usual smuggling then goes between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the GiRoA border patrols also do the same. This taxation by the tribes goes back to the era of the silk road. It was one of the reasons that the Taliban was supported by the trucking interests in Pakistan against the warlords.

On p. 2-17,18 the Assessment comes back to the taxation theme at the border and one would have to ask, “Just how would that be different from the Taliban?” The Assessment goes on to encourage tax reform and, as one of the ways to strengthen the GIRoA advocates “expanding the revenue base through improved border control and custom collection.”

Traditionally, local, tribal leadership has collected fees from truckers and the smugglers. Where is the solution or initiative in the four pillars to tackle this “taxation” problem so that the people would support a central Afghan government or the NATO in the meanwhile? Where is the “gain”for the local leaders?

In this same vein, the Taliban seems to be a modernizing force, that is, ombudsman, to investigate the abuse of power:

The QST's establishment of ombudsmen to investigate abuse of power in its own cadres and remove those found guilty capitalizes on this GIRoA weakness and attracts popular support for their shadow government.(p.2-9)

This positive aspect of the Taliban system certainly links well with the previous observation of their support of the weak tribes.

On Pp. 2-17,18 the Assessment comes back to the taxation theme at the border and one would have to ask, “Just how would that be different from the Taliban?” Central tax collection would be resisted by the local leadership that has traditionally collected fees from the truckers and the smugglers.


The Taliban as a Pashtun movement:

The following paragraph (p.2-8) does not offer much in the way of an analysis of vulnerabilities – perhaps the redacted section provides more:

Insurgent Vulnerabilities. The insurgents have important and exploitable shortcomings; they are not invulnerable. Command and control frictions and divergent goals hamper insurgent planning and restrict coordination of operations. … REDACTION... Insurgent excesses can alienate the people. Moreover, the core elements of the insurgency have previously held power in Afghanistan and failed. Popular enthusiasm for them appears limited, as does their ability to spread viably beyond Pashtun areas. GIRoA and ISAF have an opportunity to exploit the insurgent's inability to mobilize public support.

As with the previous paragraphs, how could the GiRoA exploit the shortcomings listed above when they are also the shortcomings of the GiRoA? Unfortunately, the ISAF also had disunity problems as point out above in, “Part I: Changing ISAF Operational Culture. The statement that “core elements of the insurgency have previously held power and failed” is not comforting when one considers that the NATO effort in 2002 simply drove them from power in the cities but not from the rural areas. They have been ruling the countryside, from whence they came, for 7 years. The “viability beyond Pashtun areas” is an important observation and puts the focus on the Taliban as, essentially, a Pashtun movement. So, when making the statement that “the Taliban cannot mobilize public support” there is a blurring of analysis. It also highlights the long hostility between the Pashtun and the other ethnic groups that, of course, the Taliban have not been able to mobilize (Tajik, Uzbeq and Hazara). However, to support these other groups in a struggle against the Pashtun would only open the country for continued civil war and would not pave the way for a federation of tribal and ethnic regions as one country. Recall that both the Russians and the US used the Northern Alliance (Tajik and Uzbek) against the Pashtun. Also recall that the Pashtun tried to subdue those groups by brutal military operations during the Taliban era. The point is that the Taliban movement is a Pashtun movement and although their territorial aspiration was beyond the Pashtun area, they are capable, ethnically, only in the South and East of the Kandahar – Kabul axis.

Top-Down and Centralization Issues:

GIRoA State Weakness. There is little connection between the central government and the local populations, particularly in rural areas. The top-down approach to developing government capacity has failed to provide services that reach rural communities. GIRoA as not developed the means to collect revenue and distribute resources. Sub-national officials vary in competency and capability and most provincial and district governments are seriously undermanned and under resourced.

The Afghan Government has not integrated or supported traditional community governance structures -- historically an important component of Afghan civil society – leaving communities vulnerable to being undermined by insurgent groups and power brokers. The breakdown of social cohesion at the community level has increased instability, made Afghans feel unsafe, and fueled the insurgency.(p.2-9)

These paragraphs describe the situation, but the four pillars do not address it. The nitty-gritty of the whole conundrum is summed up in, “the top-down approach ….” and in “the Afghan Government has not integrated or supported traditional community governance structures...” The constitution was designed to provide a strong central presidency whose power would be projected through appointed governors and police/army officers. From them control and development efforts would flow outward. Yet, the tribal traditions and ethnic rivalry have only been stable when the centers of power were dispersed and those local tribal rivalries kept the local leaders occupied and the traditional conflict resolution mechanisms (Jirgas) kept order.

The mission to enforce the centralized structure of the present constitution is culturally impossible. It sets up a winner take all situation in comparison with traditionally dispersed power. This mission is beyond the means of the coalition, indeed, military effort is not the appropriate means to culture change.

Reintegration and Decentralization:

Reintegrating communities and individuals into the political system can help reduce the insurgency's virulence to a point where it is no longer and existential threat to the GIRoA. (p.2-11)

Reintegrating communities, if it is interpreted to mean integrating tribal systems and leadership, is in keeping with the centralized governance concept stressed through our the Assessment, but, in reality, the approach should be to decentralize, to delegate responsibility and authority to those tribal systems irregardless of the political/ideological slant of those leaders. This will mean that there will be Taliban areas among the Pashtun, but if they buy into a strategy of decentralization it would obviate the need to “occupy and hold” areas.

On p.2-12 the idea of “investing in the institutions of governance” implies the constitutional structure of governance, while, at the same time ignoring the structures of local governance that already exist in the culture. This is a an error. However, the “step forward with local solutions” is a positive tactic to development local stability in a post-conflict situation.

III. Getting the Basics Right (p.2-11):

ISAF will change its operating culture to pursue a counterinsurgency approach that puts the Afghan people first. While the insurgency can afford to lose fighters and leaders, it cannot afford to lose control of the population (p.2-11)

This is a very general statement, but it stands out because it implies that the ISAF has control over the population and it cannot afford to lose that. In fact, the task and the strategy, is to gain that which the ISAF and the GiRoA have never controlled. Not recognizing this basic fact is, again, substituting desires for reality.

Hard-earned credibility and face-to-face relationships, rather than close combat, will achieve success. This requires enabling Afghan counterparts to meet the needs of the people at the community level through dynamic partnership, engaged leadership, decentralized decision making, and a fundamental shift in priorities. (p.2-12)

The term “meeting the needs of the people” seems to refer to the security and material needs of individuals and families, but one of the needs of the people in tribal collectivities is the integrity of their power vis a vis other tribes. The recognition of those leaders and the decentralization of responsibility and authority to them, instead of trying to exercise control over them, would by a major change in tactic.

The decentralization, reintegration and reconciliation themes (p.2-12) are important, but continue to be in reference to central government and ISAF control instead of delegation of responsibility and authority to local, tribal leaders. Also, the approach specifically excludes high-level local leadership and only provides political space for middle and lower level combatants. It should be assumed that high level leaders in the Taliban are also high-level tribal leaders and not all foreign. The needs of local leadership include power and the exercise of ascribed and earned authority. This political or power understanding of local needs is one of the cultural gaps in the Assessment. Furthermore, around the world, where post conflict reconciliation has been successful, the old leadership has been incorporated as part of the negotiation process and in some of the places (El Salvador and Iraq) they have become constructive, elected members of government. Where old rebel leaders have been excluded or eliminated after they came in, civil conflict has continued, e.g., Colombia after the M-19 joined the political process they were killed by government or paramilitary forces and the other rebel forces continued on.

IV A Strategy for Success (p. 2-14):

Knowing when Success has been achieved:

Success will be achieved when GIRoA has earned the support of the powerful Afghan people and effectively controls its own territory.(p.2-14)


If the definition of “effectively controls its own territory” means that the agents of the central government and its military exert control directly, then success will be difficult to achieve by the process of military action. It would be more realistic is to recognize the “powerful Afghan people” as the strong tribal structure that has maintained it for centuries, and if those tribal structures effectively control their territory in the sense of law and order and the exclusion of foreign agents that would be a success. If the central government were to gain the respect of those tribal structures it could be in the form of just mediation between tribes, the supply of resources, and the delegation of responsibility. But this is a role that has not been played since the days of the Durrani Tribal Federation and, perhaps, the rule of the Shah.

Note that the Assessment notes that the mediation role is part of the reason for the Taliban success.

Transparency and Accountability. ISAF must work with UNAMA and the international community to build public finance mechanisms that enable GIRoA to create credible programs and allocate resources according to the needs of the Afghan people. (p.2-18)

The transparency chore, aimed at both the ISAF, GiRoA, and UN agencies is substantial, but why not abandon that and focus on the local, tribal level for these projects. True, often tribal leaders and power brokers will siphon off funds, but the projects could be made transparent to empower the people in the tribe to provide the oversight. This would be grass roots development for greater participation and ownership rather than an unlikely top down enforcement system.

The Rule of Law section of the Assessment also reflects both faith in a centralized system and a lack of cultural knowledge. A more productive approach would be the formalization of the jirga. Apparently the Taliban have reinforced the jirga (as well as overridden it). What is clear from the Pakistani case in FATA is the the rule of law based on British common law is easily corrupted, and the formal, central system of judges is not accessible in rural, small village situations. Also, common law depends upon trained lawyers who are expensive. The Jirga in Pashtun culture has jurisprudence and tradition which could be formalized more easily than establishing rule of law via British common law. Again, this would be more culturally appropriate.


The purpose of these commentaries is to highlight the cultural implications of the assumptions, proposed actions, and for the strategies outlined in the Assessment. Based on a cultural appreciation of the context, it should be clear that the only way out of the present conundrum is by means of the local culture.
(END of ANNEX)