My personal work has been with social change and development projects. Thus from this perspective I will be “thinking outside of the box” from which the authors wrote the Assessment. My purpose is to offer a way out of the present conflict in Afghanistan and to swiftly move on to reconciliation and reconstruction.

Although I have not worked in Afghanistan, I have read substantial background material on the history of the conflicts and the culture of the people. I did conduct a survey of perceptions in the Pashtun area called “FATA” in Pakistan in early 2008. That survey included thousands of males and females of three generations as well as group interviews with male and female elders on social and economic conditions, social status and their opinion of governance and development efforts. It is from this perspective that the following critique is offered with the hope that policy makers will rethink the strategies and funding for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

After introducing the cultural aspects, this essay ends with a recommended solution and alternative strategy, that are based on the culture and the Afghan constitution. The Annex has additional commentary on clippings from the Assessment; its purpose is to provide the reader with more detail behind the review. The page numbers are in reference to the page used in the redacted Assessment.

Cultural Aspects:

The missing comprehension in the McChrystal Assessment is cultural. Indeed, the Assessment states that the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has shortcomings, “Afghan social, political, economic, and cultural affairs are complex and poorly understood. ISAF does not sufficiently appreciate the dynamics in local communities, nor how ...” Two pages later the Assessment states, ”ISAF – military and civilian personnel alike – must acquire a far better understanding of Afghanistan and its people.”

In the section called “The Nature of the Conflict,” the Assessment states, “To be effective the counterinsurgent cannot risk credibility by substituting the situation that they desire for reality.”

Precisely because the ISAF does not grasp the cultural context, they do not recognize the dynamics of the tribal and ethnic collectivities. Hence they ignore reality in favor of the end that they desire. As a result, mission failure is assured for two reasons: 1) the goals do not fit cultural reality, and, 2) military action is not designed for culture change.

The Annex reviews the goals, “pillars,” intermediate results, and the assumptions as stated or implied in Gen. McChrystal's Assessment.

The Game Changer - A Cultural and Constitutional Solution:

One of the themes of the Assessment and this review of the Assessment has been the cultural theme. The Assessment has noted that the culture needs to be understood, and this review has noted that the constitution based on a strong-presidency and centralized governance does not match the culture. Fortunately the constitution does have a cultural solution built into its provisions to meet the present crisis.

One of the constitutional provisions is based on the very mechanism that was used to make the constitution and the first elections possible. That provision is the Loya Jirga. The Loya Jirga can be called by the Afghan Congress or tribal leaders in the time of crisis to resolve the issue at hand. The electoral crisis would be one good reason and the military conflict could be another reason. The Jirga as a mechanism for conflict resolution (conflict in the sense of both military as well as civil dispute) is an important cultural attribute well understood and respected by all ethnic groups in Afghanistan.

The fourth pillar of the Assessment is a focus on resources. Although the term “resource” has been generally understood to be material, troops and the organization of the ISAF effort, the overlooked resource is the culture of Afghanistan and its possibilities for a political solution.

In deed, in late 2008 Prime Minister Hamid Karzai made overtures to King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to obtain his help in a negotiated solution. Since then various indications of willingness to negotiate, albeit, with conditions, have been expressed. This attitude toward negotiations is a major break through and has the potential for a peaceful way out instead of the proposed solution through overwhelming military force.

There are cultural aspects to the effort by P.M. Karzai which should be understood. In the Pashtun culture when there are conflicts between parties one of the parties can attempt to resolve the issue by appealing to what is known as a Jirgamaar. The Jirgamaar is a person who is known to be a just peace maker and, importantly, is respected by the parties to the conflict. The larger the groups in conflict, the higher the level of appeal and stature of the Jirgamaar must be.

In the present case of the conflict in Afghanistan, King Abdullah is the guardian of two of the most sacred places of Islam. The House of Saud is also Sunni as are most of the Taliban. The Saudis, since the war against the Russians, have supported the Pashtun with funds and also, importantly, in the development of the Madrassas and the training of teachers and religious leaders with Wahhabi/ Sunni thought. Their version of Sunni Islam is similar to the leadership of the Taliban and also Al Qaeda. Importantly, it is generally believed that the King of Saudi Arabia has important economic and political links, as well as influence, to the US and members of NATO and its political affairs. These characteristics make King Abdullah an ideal Jirgamaar.

The role of the Jirgamaar is to contact each side in the conflict to see if they will submit to the process of a Jirga (This is similar to binding arbitration). If so, then the Jirgamaar will convoke a team of leaders respected for being just to listen to the case. Both sides will state their position, complaint, and expectations to the team or Jirga. The Jirga will endeavor to reach a judgment that will result in a settlement with which both sides of the dispute can live. The cultural goal is to avoid conflict and to find a solution which both sides can live and also move on to a constructive relationship (reconciliation). The goal is also to save face all around while serving justice and moving on to a functional society.

Accordingly, the ISAF could support both a new overture by P.M. Karzai to ask King Abdullah to play the role of Jirgamaar and also any Afghan congressional or tribal motion for the formation of Loya Jirga.

Enabling the Cultural and Constitutional Game-Changer:

Given this opportunity to negotiate a solution, a general ceasefire and safe conduct provision could be established to facilitate the inclusion of all tribal and regional leaders. Judging from past Afghani governance, a probable solution would include a decentralized form of government instead of the present centralized government; this would meet the ethnic and tribal power needs. Probably the result would include the requirement that foreigners disengage and leave. Disengagement would provide the space and basis for the proposed civilian reconstruction effort that the Assessment correctly identified as crucial (p.2-21) for provincial and district development.

The Game-Changer in Relation to the Pillars:

This type of a solution would be a means to implementing pillar # 2 responsive and accountable governance though the jirga response and decentralized governance. Most importantly, this type of a solution obviates one of the most problematic pillars ( #1) described in the Assessment – improved effectiveness of the ANSF.

It would be a “game changer” and be a form of implementing pillar # 3 of “gaining the initiative.” It would be a distinct “jump” called for (p.1-3) to bring about success.

The game-changer will provide NATO member governments with a constructive solution that will be politically more appealing than funding war, and will also be more realistic than the envisioned 12-24 months for “strategic consolidation” at the end of which the hope is negotiation from a position of military superiority. The game-changer would provide the “space” needed for the civilian initiative called for.