Written by Winston P. Nagan   

The Ukrainian crisis has exploded on the global arena with alarming speed and great frustration for all major participators in the problem and this is a problem triggered by a demand by a coalition of Ukranian interest groups that the existing government of that country should give up its role in governing. After resisting demonstrator demands, the President found his position untenable and escaped to Russia. Russia shares a long territorial border with the Ukraine. It clearly has interests in what happens in the Ukraine and the question is how it can secure its own interests without alienating the rest of the planet. The period leading up to the change in the Ukraine involves Russia providing significant incentives for that country to remain within the Russian sphere of influence. On the other hand, a sizeable part of the demonstrators, were significantly partial to locating the Ukraine in the Western European sphere of influence.
It would be useful to glance at the complex history of the Ukraine in terms of its cultural identity and ideological orientation. The history of the Ukraine (which means borderland) has confronted the ebb and flow of history with often extreme consequences. Historically the Ukraine was at one time both a European power and a weakened abused territory. It was a rich breadbasket and an astonishing poor community. The Russian relationship with the Ukraine is complicated. At one time Ukraine was the heartland of Russian culture, religion, and orthography. Indeed, Kiev was at one time a more important cultural capital for Russia than Moscow. Wars of Russian national identity were furiously fought in the Crimean Wars of the 1850s and in the desperate resistance to Germany aggression in the 1940s. Stalin’s communistic nationalism created a massive and traumatic genocide by deliberate starvation in the 1930s. The tartars who ruled the Crimea were in fact, deported to Central Asia and only a small group has returned to the Crimea.
The Ukraine was also a part of the Polish empire and the Polish nobility used Jews to manage their estates. Ukranian peasants saw Jewish mangers as oppressors and anti-Semitism became rooted in Ukranian culture. It is widely held that the Khazar Empire that ruled the Ukraine a thousand years ago all converted to Judaism and the Ashkenazi Jews are their descendants. The Ashkenazi is probably a majority of the Israeli population today. This means that Israel has a majority of Ukrainian population.
When we examine the Russian level of intervention in the Crimea, it would be useful to suspend our judgment of whether a technical breach of the territorial integrity and a partial diminishing of the political independence of the Ukrainian state constitute technically an act of aggression. Putin has suggested that his actions are matters of humanitarian intervention. A quick analysis of international law implies that if we say this is aggression than there is an expectation that something should be done, possibly even of a coercive military nature to repel the aggression. This suggests the Cheney notion of challenge in possibly nuclear weapons terms such as establishing missiles on the borders of Poland facing Russia and other provocative measures.
It is possible that we can provide a more insightful and comprehensive lens to understand the problem and to possibly come up with solutions that are not provocative of nuclear confrontations. The first guideline for policy makers should be a more careful consideration of the relative size and power of Russia in relation to the Ukraine in the context of its ostensibly impermissible involvement in the Ukraine. Certainly, the size and power of Russia may give us an insight into its real motivations rather than its presumed motivations with regard to its objectives. This may determine whether coercion is necessary to secure the interests of Russia and what other strategies may be more acceptable. For example, Reagan gave Gorbachev an assurance that NATO would not extend bases into countries newly liberated from the USSR. Russia has vivid memories of Poland being used as a Nazi base to attack the Russian motherland. Obama and the powers of the European Union could provide an assurance that NATO does not intend to set up shop in the Ukraine. At least without Russian consent. We could possibly extend this idea in a different direction. An out of the box suggestion would be to hold out Russian membership in NATO. In an ideal world, Russia has many similar interests in security to those of the Western powers, Russia would be more secure inside NATO, and the West would be more secure with Russian as a participator in peace and security as well. This suggestion requires that we have a deeper appreciation of the subjectivities of decision makers in Russia and understand their objectives in the world community.
When we examine the characteristics of the Ukrainian participators, three key elements stand out. A previously corrupt and unpopular regime now displaced but claiming a patina of constitutional legitimacy. A group of political agitators whose orientation is directed at the West rather than Russia. Another group of political agitators that represents the worst of Ukrainian society, these are the neo-Nazi racist totalitarians. The West has to be far more discriminating about the support it is willing to give to this uneasy coalition. It must maintain that the Western oriented participators must unequivocally repudiate the neo-Nazi collaborators. Additionally, the regime must establish itself as also a juridically sanctified regime. It must therefore organize elections and ensure that all are able to participate, even the elements of the old regime, elements of the neo-Nazi demonstrators, as well as the larger population. The new regime should at the earliest possible time assure Russia that it does not seek anything other than normal friendly relations and cooperation. It must assure Russia that its territory will not be a safe haven for terroristic right-wing extremists. It may also insist that as sovereign state it wants to enjoy friendly relations and cooperation under UN Charter values with the rest of the world including the West and the USA.
The status of Crimea is vexing. It was largely historically, a part of Russia given casually to the Ukraine by Khrushchev. Additionally, it has a Russian-speaking majority and it is the base of a significant part of Russian naval defenses. Clearly, Russia has an important interest touching important security values. It is possible that the Ukrainian government can reaffirm its commitment to Russian security in this context. Indeed, they could consider a shared suzerainty over the Crimea with shared competences over interests vital to each participator.
The interests of the Western powers like those of Russia are not advanced by promoting another Cold War and the inevitable threats of nuclear confrontations, which might even be launched by mistake. From what I have indicated, there is ample ground for real discussion about real interests but these issues require mature reflection from all the participators.