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Bronner writes: "As President Donald Trump prepares his second reactive missile strike against President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, whose chemical attack on Duma left 42 dead and dozens more wounded, a tragic seven-year civil war is on the verge of turning into an international conflagration - or worse."

Donald Trump with National Security Advisor John Bolton. (photo: Getty)
Donald Trump with National Security Advisor John Bolton. (photo: Getty)


America's Syrian Challenge

By Stephen Eric Bronner, Reader Supported News

12 April 18

 

s President Donald Trump prepares his second reactive missile strike against President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, whose chemical attack on Duma left 42 dead and dozens more wounded, a tragic seven-year civil war is on the verge of turning into an international conflagration – or worse. The intensity of the strikes will determine the strength of the response by Assad’s Russian ally. No matter how devastating the attack, however, it will have no relation to any end-goal. There has never been any connection between tactics and strategy, or means and ends, when it comes to the role of the United States in the Syrian conflict. That is also the case with regard to the current debate. Besieged by personal scandal, fearing indictment or impeachment over “collusion” with Russia, the president (like other presidents before him) will employ a dramatic international action to deflect from his domestic problems and, without compromising himself, show that he is being tough on his one-time friend, President Vladimir Putin. Nor are Trump’s critics in the Democratic Party all that vocal. Imbued with “humanitarian” interventionist sentiments, and anti-Russian views inherited from the Cold War, their leaders and media pundits all insist that “something must be done” – what, of course, remains unspecified. Sleaze and incompetence are not the possession of any one political party. That missile strikes against Syria will have anything to do with the American national interest is more than doubtful. Such action is an emotional response with the most cynical and self-serving undertones and will do nothing to further a positive end to the conflict.

Syria is now entering the seventh year of a civil war that began in 2011 and that has become one of the bloodiest humanitarian tragedies of the still young twenty-first century. The numbers are staggering: 400,000 are dead, far more have been wounded, over five million are in foreign exile, and over six million are internally displaced persons. When the organized rebellion began in 2011 against the regime of President Bashir el-Assad, who took power in 2000 and has maintained a state of emergency ever since, more than two dozen groups (including three main Kurdish factions) formed the Syrian National Coalition and a Free Syrian Army. Inspired by the Arab Spring and infuriated by its suppression, they called for the removal of the despot. But there was not a single civilian leader of national stature among the rebels and, increasingly horrified by the brutality of Assad’s response, the overwhelmingly Sunni coalition was unwilling to enter into negotiations with him. Worse: the army lacked any centralized command structure or organized hierarchy.

The United States nominally entered the conflict in order to quell the spread of ISIL, whereas Russia, suspicious of American motives while fearful of Sunni extremism infecting the “–stans” along its southern borders, chose to support Assad. What legitimated ISIL originally, however, were developments within the Syrian National Coalition. Without legitimate national leaders, and with numerous bitter organizational rivals competing for power, the most organizationally disciplined and ideologically unified groups tend to win out – in this case, al-Qaeda and (its spin-off) the al-Nusra Front. Worth considering is that these extremist Sunni organizations have a natural affinity with ISIL as well as the Wahhabi faction of Saudi Arabia that gave rise to Osama bin Laden. Bitter rivalries in the coalition made it difficult to articulate any strategy for the future: Should Syria remain a nation state and, if so, how would it without including Assad and his supporters among Alawites, Christians, and non-Sunni denominations who distrusted and feared the opposition? Should Syria instead devolve into distinct regions and principalities governed by rival tribes and religious organizations, along with a rump-state ruled by Assad, which would necessarily strengthen neighboring nations and their territorial ambitions? Or, finally, should Assad and the opposition both accept becoming puppets of foreign “allies” so long as the other side was prevented from winning the war?

With the setbacks dealt ISIL by the United States, but also by the Alawite/Shiite regime of Assad and its Russian ally, the need to choose between these alternatives will only loom larger. The issue is not simply whether the United States will withdraw its troops and support but whether other interventionist states will do likewise. Trump’s missile strikes can only complicate matters further. Arms will still flow across Syria’s borders, not only from Iran and Russia but also from Iraq and Libya. There is no reason to believe that, given worsening relations with the United States, either Iran or Russia will depart. Nor will Saudi Arabia, the new favorite of the United States, whose hatred of Assad’s Shiites is combined with a certain sympathy for Sunni extremist groups. And Turkey is also enmeshed as it fights both Assad and its anti-Assad Kurdish minority. Frustrated by Western condemnation for its authoritarian turn and lack of support for either of its efforts, Turkey is threatening to leave NATO, which would obviously lead to closer ties with Russia.

The only way to deal with these complicated and interconnected dynamics is through (back-channel) negotiations, not only with Russia but also with Iran, in line with what were once successful cooperative efforts in mitigating the war in Afghanistan. But given President Trump’s views on the US-Iran nuclear deal, and his bellicose rhetoric, that appears unlikely. Some policy-makers have suggested that the United States withdraw from the conflict and allow Saudi Arabia and Israel, which already engaged in military strikes against Assad with American approval, should take its place. But that is the worst option. Not only would the two most hated states in the region become associated with the anti-Assad war effort but tensions could easily become inflamed with Iran, leading to an expansion of the Syrian conflict into an even more dangerous and genocidal war.

Should the United States stay in Syria? Not if it seeks to become the agent of regime change without a new sovereign or of reconstruction when it is not even clear what that means. Even the target of $200 million in American aid, which is a drop in the bucket, remains undetermined. In concert with new attempts at international and multilateral negotiations with Russia and Iran, moreover, it is becoming increasingly necessary to think outside the box and forward new and more radical suggestions, even if they are purely speculative. These might include an arms ban or treating the currency in military sales no differently than the trade in drugs. With its huge budget increase, of course, the American military establishment would not exactly prove enthusiastic supporters of this idea. And if dealing with the staggering refugee crisis in humanitarian terms calls for refinancing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which was defunded by the Trump administration, the new American contempt for multilateral action makes it difficult (if still necessary) to begin thinking about the prospects for a regional rescue. Having said all of this, now more than ever it is necessary to curb the American addiction to military strikes as the answer to every problem. It is easy to talk about collateral damage when the perpetrators do not pay the price. We need to place the Syrian people at the forefront of our policies, link tactics to strategy, and think outside the box with more imagination and less rigidity.



Stephen Eric Bronner is Board of Governors Distinguished Professor of Political Science and Director of Global Relations for the Center for the Study of Genocide and Human Rights at Rutgers University. His most recent work is The Bitter Taste of Hope: Ideals, Ideologies, and Interests in the Age of Obama.

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