Kutler writes: "We can ill afford the casualties and treasure resulting from mistakes based on the premise of John F. Kennedy's inaugural address."
(photo: Sgt. Rupert Frere RLC/PA)
26 December 13
ifty years not-so-long ago, under the umbrella of the Cold War, we were embroiled in the quicksand-"quagmire" was the term of choice-of Vietnam. By 1965, with upward of half a million troops "in-country," skeptics and critics began to seriously question the war. The U.S. government, however, countered with the "domino theory," contending that unless stopped in Vietnam, hordes of Chinese-led communists would overrun Southeast Asia, leapfrog to Japan, the Philippines, and eventually Hawaii and the beaches of La Jolla. But no dominoes fell.
The government's response nevertheless proved effective, and such arguments are used today, foisted on a passive, apathetic public, and serviced by a compliant media. The rationale is as bankrupt as 50 years ago.
Historical analogies are treacherous, yet the past can inform subsequent events. In Vietnam, we had Nguyen Ngo Diem-"the George Washington of Southeast Asia"-and his family as our allies, but more often than not resistant to our will. Afghanistan's Hamid Karzai, for peculiar reasons of his own, likes to appear as an ingrate, adept at ignoring our advice, and undoubtedly corrupt. Most of all, both interventions have had little to do with our national interests.
Continue Reading: Why Are We in Afghanistan?
