Afghanistan: A Tragic Return to a War With No End

By Tom Bowman, NPR

07 July 16

 

he Afghan army commander said the treacherous road to Marjah, in Afghanistan's southern province of Helmand, was now safe. His forces had driven out the Taliban a few days earlier, he added.

"The road is open, so no problem," said Lt. Gen. Moeen Faqir. "Of course I hope you go there and find the reality and reflect it."

Photojournalist David Gilkey and I traveled to Afghanistan many times. In our trip to eastern Afghanistan last year, we found an Afghan army willing to fight, but it was taking heavy casualties and still in need of considerable help. We wanted to find out what, if anything, was changing in a war America has largely forgotten since most U.S. forces left at the end of 2014.

What my colleagues and I encountered was both a horrifying personal tragedy and a microcosm of the larger war in Afghanistan.

To sum it up, the war is not going well. The Taliban are still strong in parts of the south and east. And the Afghan army, while improving, still needs a lot of help from the Americans. One of the top U.S. trainers, Col. John Kline, said if the American troops stopped advising the Afghans in Helmand, it would be a struggle for them to do the job.

That's quite different from the rosy forecast painted in the early years of this "war of necessity" launched while smoke was still rising from the shattered World Trade Center towers.

Back then, American leaders said Afghanistan could become a stable, peaceful place where violence was curtailed, opium was no longer the leading crop, and girls, not just boys, would go to school. Instead, the combat remains intense, the poppy business still finances the Taliban, and in some parts of the country going to school is risky business.

A Taliban stronghold

Helmand province has always been a Taliban stronghold. We felt this was the best place to get a real sense of how the war is playing out today.

With assurances from the Afghan commander, we headed out in three armored Afghan Humvees for a drive with his forces from Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province, to Marjah, an area long considered one of the most dangerous parts of the country.

The road was clogged with traffic, including cars and trucks, donkey carts and motorcycles. Then it opened up as it ran into the countryside, but the road also brought the signs of war, including destroyed trucks and pits created by improvised explosive devices.

Suddenly, a gunshot. Then machine gun fire from the left.

Rounds fired from mud huts off in the distance began to hit our convoy. A soldier mounted on the .50-caliber machine gun in the lead vehicle returned fire. Mortars dropped in nearby. The Taliban attacked with rocket-propelled grenades and other weapons.

The three vehicles in our convoy became separated and lost sight of each other. No one was physically hurt in the lead vehicle, which was carrying a one-star army general, NPR producer Monika Evstatieva and me.

But in another Humvee, Gilkey, Afghan journalist and interpreter Zabihullah Tamanna and an Afghan soldier were killed. Other Afghan soldiers were injured.

A sign of the wider war

This terrible moment in Helmand province reflects the current state of the Afghan war. Time and again, the Afghans, with American help, push insurgents out. Then the insurgents come back. Then the Americans increase their help for the Afghan government forces.

"When I got here, success was holding Helmand — just don't let Helmand fall. The first few weeks, it was rough," said Kline, the top American trainer in Helmand — the latest in a long line.

Kline came to southern Afghanistan with hundreds of troops from the 10th Mountain Division to serve as advisers and trainers. Their aim was to rebuild the local Afghan army unit that lost ground to the Taliban starting last year, when the situation was bleak.

The combat power of the Afghan unit in Helmand fell to about 35 percent. Casualties and desertions climbed. The U.S. had to intervene with airstrikes by F-16 fighters and AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, in a desperate effort to push back the Taliban.

In the meantime, the Afghan government replaced the top general in Helmand, accusing him of corruption involving government funds. Others were found simply incompetent, lacking a will to fight.

The new leadership is making a difference, Kline says, as American soldiers train Afghan troops to do everything from clear buildings to fire mortars.

From 100,000 to 10,000 Americans

"I think the model is actually pretty good," says Kline.

That model is for a much smaller number of U.S. trainers and advisers to help the Afghans.

At the peak of the American involvement, more than 100,000 U.S. troops were deployed across Afghanistan. U.S. combat operations formally ended 18 months ago, but nearly 10,000 Americans are still in Afghanistan, training and advising Afghans and providing support from the air.

U.S. and Afghan commanders give generally upbeat assessments, but it's clear the Taliban remain a potent force. They are able to conduct deadly hit-and-run attacks throughout the country and even took a large city, Kunduz, for several days last fall.

President Obama has authorized American commanders to use airstrikes more aggressively to help with Afghan offensives, and also for the U.S. to post advisers with regular Afghan army units, not just elite units like the commandos. Obama wanted to withdraw the remaining U.S. forces before he left office, but there's no sign that will happen.

There are signs, however, that the Afghan military is making progress.

At an American base in Kandahar, northeast of Helmand, U.S. Army trainer Maj. Kevin McCormick and international soldiers are putting Afghan troops through a specialized course in the use of mortars and indirect fire. On a recent visit in Kandahar, McCormick was pleased with what he was seeing.

"They did very well," he said. "We had a group on top of the berm identifying enemy location. They successfully called for fire and the mortar shot off three rounds that landed on target."

Indirect fire is vital for the Afghan or any army. Troops need to be able to hit and overwhelm enemies at safe ranges, often when adversaries are concealed or too far away for a mortar team to see. That means forward spotters must call in the location of the target, mortar troops must dial it in before firing, and all the troops must work together to make the next round more precise.

"It takes a long time. It is not a short process," McCormick said. "These skills are perishable. They require continuous training to be proficient."

Troops that come and go

McCormick and his fellow NATO instructors were wrapping up their seventh class of the year for the Afghan army's 205th Corps. Each one lasts 14 days, but the training can quickly evaporate. The Afghan army is suffering high numbers of dead and wounded. Many other soldiers simply quit or desert.

Another challenge is that many Afghans are illiterate — and not just the rank-and-file soldiers, said Afghan army 1st Lt. Hayatullah Froton.

"Leadership is very important," he said. "If my brigade commander ... does not know how to lead us, use us, what can I do? It is the most unfortunate problem we have in our military and our country."

A soldier's limited education can make the technical aspects of operating artillery even more difficult. A firing team must be able to calculate the correct coordinates, correct for wind, select the right fuze and other such tasks — quickly.

That's why Afghan troops need practice and instruction from allied soldiers such as Romanian Master Sgt. Mihail Costel, who has learned a few words of Dari to help with the training.

On a recent training day on the range outside Kandahar, Costel assembled his firing team of four Afghan soldiers standing in a line. The men took a water bottle and passed it from one to another until, at last, the final soldier dropped it into the firing tube to simulate a mortar being loaded.

Urgent need for skills

Costel might have time, but the Afghan government does not. The Taliban fighting season is now in full swing, and those artillery skills will be needed in the field.

The Taliban continue to have a deep reservoir of resources, financed in large part by the opium trade, which allows the group to remain well-stocked with weaponry. Despite repeated efforts by the U.S. to greatly reduce or eliminate the opium, any progress has proved temporary.

The Americans are no longer in position to prevent the country's opium production, which has been at or near record levels in recent years.

The Americans are also helping by providing the Afghan forces in Helmand with equipment that no other Afghan units have, including attack helicopters, night vision goggles and a small drone.

The new Afghan officer overseeing all this is the officer we mentioned at the beginning of this story, Lt. Gen. Faqir, a man with slicked-down hair who likes to grow rows of flowers outside his headquarters. When he arrived from his previous job as a staff officer in Kabul, Faqir found a 215th Corps in shambles.

"The morale of our soldiers was weak. They were pulling back in several parts of the province. Enemies were gaining ground with high morale," he said. "Then we finally stopped the enemies."

Faqir's troops focused first on taking control of the major highways, then the larger towns in the province. They got a lot of help, he acknowledged, from elite Afghan soldiers, the commandos, who are not a part of his unit. They've been used all over Afghanistan when local forces were not up to the task at hand.

"They're very fast," Faqir said. "I love them. ... By conducting day and night operations, the Afghan commandos have broken and demoralized the enemies so now they cannot get together in some areas. Except for one or two of them together, they cannot stay in groups."

Unanswered questions

Still, questions remain about the 215th Corps: Can the unit push out the Taliban in a fighting season that stretches all the way to October? Can they do so without help from the aggressive Afghan commandos? And can they do so without the continued help of American combat power?

Kline, the American commander, said the outlook is improving.

"I think we're in a pretty good position right now with Afghanistan to sustain or achieve a level of success," he said.

Helmand's provincial governor, Hayatullah Hayat, is another optimist. He's a graduate of George Mason University in Northern Virginia and is in his 30s. He chatted eagerly about his plans and his mandate from Kabul. The government expects him to help clear the Taliban and then build up the province with an initial seed fund of about $2 million.

"The clearance operations will be taken in a systemic way that will actually facilitate the way for people to live normally," he said, "for the schools to be open, the clinics to be open, and also all the other basic things for living."

Not everyone shares that outlook. One local official said the surge in Taliban attacks on police checkpoints in Helmand could threaten the provincial capital itself, Lashkar Gah.

Faqir brushed that aside.

"This is his personal opinion. We have a saying in Afghanistan: 'Listening is not equal to seeing something.' "

Leaker, Speaker, Soldier, Spy: The Charmed Life of David Petraeus

By Nick Turse, Tom Dispatch

06 July 16

 

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Here’s an oddity: Americans recognize corruption as an endemic problem in much of the world, just not in our own.  And that’s strange.  After all, to take but one example, America’s twenty-first-century war zones have been notorious quagmires of corruption on a scale that should boggle the imagination.  In 2011, a final report from the congressionally mandated Commission on Wartime Contracting estimated that somewhere between $31 billion and $60 billion U.S. taxpayer dollars were lost to fraud and waste in the American “reconstruction” of Iraq and Afghanistan (which undoubtedly will, in the end, prove an underestimate).  U.S. taxpayer dollars were spent to build roads to nowhere; a gas station in the middle of nowhere; teacher-training centers and other structures that were never finished (but made oodles of money for lucky contractors); a chicken-plucking factory that never plucked a chicken (but plucked American taxpayers); and a lavish $25 million headquarters that no one ever needed or bothered to use.  Thanks to tens of billions of U.S. dollars, whole security forces were funded, trained, armed, and filled with “ghost” soldiers and police (while local commanders and other officials lined their pockets with completely unspectral “salaries”).  And so it went. 

Of course, all that took place in another galaxy far, far away where corruption is the norm.  In the U.S.A. itself, corruption is considered un-American (though don’t tell that to the denizens of Ferguson, Missouri).  This is, of course, largely a matter of definition, as Thomas Frank made vividly clear at TomDispatch recently when he laid out the scope of the “influence” industry in Washington.  You know, the hordes of lobbyists who live the good life and offer tastes of it to government officials they would like to influence -- none of which is “corrupt.”  It’s completely legit, a thoroughly congenial way of operating among Washington’s power brokers.

In its 2010 Citizens United decision, the Supreme Court offered its own redefinition of corruption in America, ensuring that dollars by the barrelful could be piped directly into the political system with remarkable ease to influence (not to say buy) politicians and elections.  Only the other day, it spoke up again with a unanimous decision in favor of corruption as a perfectly acceptable way of life.  It overturned the conviction of Virginia Governor Bob McDonnell for “using his office to help Jonnie R. Williams Sr., who had provided the McDonnells with luxury products, loans, and vacations worth more than $175,000 when Mr. McDonnell was governor.” (Lest I seem too gloomy on the subject, let me mention one small sign of something different. Anti-corruption scholar and activist Zephyr Teachout just won the Democratic nomination for a congressional seat in New York State. Will wonders never cease?)

That American knack for banishing corruption from our lives without banishing the activities that normally go with it came to mind again today because TomDispatch's managing editor, Nick Turse, has a look at a former general who successfully navigated America’s war zones of corruption, and whose post-official life could -- depending on your viewpoint -- be seen as pure as the driven snow, or as corrupt as can be imagined. You choose. Tom

-Tom Engelhardt, TomDispatch

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Leaker, Speaker, Soldier, Spy
The Charmed Life of David Petraeus

ran into David Petraeus the other night. Or rather, I ran after him. 

It’s been more than a year since I first tried to connect with the retired four-star general and ex-CIA director -- and no luck yet. On a recent evening, as the sky was turning from a crisp ice blue into a host of Easter-egg hues, I missed him again. Led from a curtained “backstage” area where he had retreated after a midtown Manhattan event, Petraeus moved briskly to a staff-only room, then into a tightly packed elevator, and momentarily out onto the street before being quickly ushered into a waiting late-model, black Mercedes S550. 

And then he was gone, whisked into the warm New York night, companions in tow.

For the previous hour, Petraeus had been in conversation with Peter Bergen, a journalist, CNN analyst, and vice president at New America, the think tank sponsoring the event. Looking fit and well-rested in a smart dark-blue suit, the former four-star offered palatable, pat, and -- judging from the approving murmurs of the audience -- popular answers to a host of questions about national security issues ranging from the fight against the Islamic State to domestic gun control. While voicing support for the Second Amendment, for example, he spoke about implementing “common sense solutions to the availability of weapons,” specifically keeping guns out of the hands of “domestic abusers” and those on the no-fly list.  Even as he expressed “great respect” for those who carried out acts of torture in the wake of 9/11, he denounced its use -- except in the case of a “ticking time bomb.”  In an era when victory hasn’t been a word much used in relation to the American military, he even predicted something close to it on the horizon.  “I’ve said from the very beginning, even in the darkest days, the Islamic State would be defeated in Iraq,” he told the appreciative crowd.

I went to the event hoping to ask Petraeus a question or two, but Bergen never called on me during the Q & A portion of the evening. My attendance was not, however, a total loss. 

Watching the retired general in action, I was reminded of the peculiarity of this peculiar era -- an age of generals whose careers are made in winless wars; years in which such high-ranking, mission-unaccomplished officers rotate through revolving doors that lead not only to top posts with major weapons merchants, but also too-big-to-fail banks, top universities, cutting-edge tech companies, healthcare firms, and other corporate behemoths.  Hardly a soul, it seems, cares that these generals and admirals have had leading roles in quagmire wars or even, in two prominent cases, saw their government service cease as a result of career-ending scandal.  And Citizen David Petraeus is undoubtedly the epitome of this phenomenon.

Celebrated as the most cerebral of generals, the West Point grad and Princeton Ph.D. rose to stardom during the Iraq War -- credited with pacifying the restive city of Mosul before becoming one of the architects of the new Iraqi Army.  Petraeus would then return to the United States where he revamped and revived the Army's failed counterinsurgency doctrine from the Vietnam War, before being tapped to lead “The Surge” of U.S. forces in Iraq -- an effort to turn around the foundering conflict.  Through it all, Petraeus waged one of the most deft self-promotion campaigns in recent memory, cultivating politicians, academics, and especially fawning journalists who reported on his running stamina, his penchant for push-ups, and even -- I kid you not -- how he woke a lieutenant from what was thought to be an irreversible coma by shouting the battle cry of his unit. 

A series of biographers would lionize the general who, after achieving what to some looked like success in Iraq, went on to head U.S. Central Command, overseeing the conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  When the military career of his subordinate General Stanley McChrystal imploded, Petraeus was sent once more unto the breach to spearhead an Afghan War surge and win another quagmire war.

And win Petraeus did.  Not in Afghanistan, of course.  That war grinds on without end.  But the Teflon general somehow emerged from it all with people talking about him as a future presidential contender.  Looking back at Petraeus’s successes, one understands just what a feat this was.  Statistics show that Petraeus never actually pacified Mosul, which has now been under the control of the Islamic State (ISIS) for years.  The army Petraeus helped build in Iraq crumbled in the face of that same force which, in some cases, was even supported by Sunni fighters Petraeus had put on the U.S. payroll to make The Surge appear successful.   

Indeed, Petraeus had come to New America’s New York headquarters to answer one question in particular: “What will the next president's national security challenges be?”  Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, Iraq, Afghanistan: precisely the set of groups he had fought, places he had fought in, or what had resulted from his supposed victories. 

Retired Brass, Then and Now

“What can you do with a general, when he stops being a general? Oh, what can you do with a general who retires?” 

Irving Berlin first posed these questions in 1948 and Bing Crosby crooned them six years later in White Christmas, the lavish Hollywood musical that has become a holiday season staple.

These are not, however, questions which seem to have plagued David Petraeus.  He retired from the Army in 2011 to take a job as director of the CIA, only to resign in disgrace a year later when it was revealed that he had leaked classified information to his biographer and one-time lover Paula Broadwell and then lied about it to the FBI.  Thanks to a deal with federal prosecutors, Petraeus pled guilty to just a single misdemeanor and served no jail time, allowing him, as the New York Times reported last year, “to focus on his lucrative post-government career as a partner in a private equity firm and a worldwide speaker on national security issues.”

In the Bing and Berlin era, following back-to-back victories in world wars, things were different.  Take George C. Marshall, a five-star general and the most important U.S. military leader during World War II who is best remembered today for the post-war European recovery plan that bore his name.  Fellow five-star general and later president Dwight Eisenhower recalled that, during the Second World War, Marshall “did not want to sit in Washington and be a chief of staff. I am sure he wanted a field command, but he wouldn't even allow his chief [President Franklin Roosevelt] to know what he wanted, because he said, ‘I am here to serve and not to satisfy personal ambition.’”  That mindset seemed to remain his guiding directive after he retired in 1945 and went on to serve as a special envoy to China, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. 

Marshall reportedly refused a number of lucrative offers to write his memoirs, including the then-princely sum of a million dollars after taxes from Time and Life publisher Henry Luce.  He did so on the grounds that it was unethical to profit from service to the United States or to benefit from the sacrifices of the men who had served under him, supposedly telling one publisher “that he had not spent his life serving the government in order to sell his life story to the Saturday Evening Post.”  In his last years, he finally cooperated with a biographer and gave his archives to the George C. Marshall Research Foundation on “the condition that no monetary returns from a book or books based on his materials would go to him or his family but would be used for the research program of the Marshall Foundation.”  Even his biographer was asked to “waive the right to any royalties from the biography.”  Marshall also declined to serve on any corporate boards. 

Marshall may have been a paragon of restraint and moral rectitude, but he wasn’t alone.  As late as the years 1994-1998, according to an analysis by the Boston Globe, fewer than 50% of retiring three- and four-star officers went to work as consultants or defense executives.  By 2004-2008, that number had jumped to 80%.  An analysis by the Washington D.C.-based nonprofit group, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, found that it was still at a lofty 70% for the years 2009-2011.

Celebrity generals like Petraeus and fellow former four-star generals Stanley McChrystal (whose military career was also consumed in the flames of scandal) and Ray Odierno (who retired amid controversy), as well as retired admiral and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, don’t even need to enter the world of arms dealers and defense firms.  These days, those jobs may increasingly be left to second-tier military luminaries like Marine Corps general James Cartwright, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, now on the board of directors at Raytheon, as well as former Vice Admiral and Director of Naval Intelligence Jack Dorsett, who joined Northrop Grumman. 

If, however, you are one of the military’s top stars, the sky is increasingly the limit.  You can, for instance, lead a consulting firm (McChrystal and Mullen) or advise or even join the boards of banks and civilian corporations like JPMorgan Chase (Odierno), Jet Blue (McChrystal), and General Motors (Mullen).

For his part, after putting his extramarital affair behind him, Petraeus became a partner at the private equity firm Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. L.P. (KKR), where he also serves as the chairman of the KKR Global Institute and, according to his bio, “oversees the institute's thought leadership platform focused on geopolitical and macro-economic trends, as well as environmental, social, and governance issues.”  His lieutenants include a former chairman of the Republican National Committee and campaign manager for President George W. Bush, as well as a former leading light at Morgan Stanley.

KKR’s portfolio boasts a bit of everything, from Alliant Insurance Services and Panasonic Healthcare to a host of Chinese firms (Rundong Automobile Group and Asia Dairy, among them).  There are also defense firms under its umbrella, including TASC, the self-proclaimed “premier provider of advanced systems engineering and integration services across the Intelligence Community, Department of Defense, and civilian agencies of the federal government,” and Airbus Group’s defense electronics business which KKR recently bought for $1.2 billion. 

KKR is, however, just where Petraeus's post-military, post-CIA résumé begins.

A Man for Four Seasons

“Nobody thinks of assigning him, when they stop wining and dining him,” wrote Irving Berlin 68 years ago. 

How times do change.  When it comes to Petraeus, the wining and dining is evidently unending -- as when Financial Times columnist Edward Luce took him to the Four Seasons Restaurant earlier this year for a lunch of tuna tartare, poached salmon, and a bowl of mixed berries with cream. 

At the elegant eatery, just a short walk from Petraeus’s Manhattan office, the former CIA chief left Luce momentarily forlorn.  “When I inquire what keeps him busy nowadays his answer goes on for so long I half regret asking,” he wrote.

I evidently heard a version of the same well prepared lines when, parrying a question from journalist Fred Kaplan at the New America event I attended, Petraeus produced a wall of words explaining how busy he is.  In the process, he shed light on just what it means to be a retired celebrity general from America’s winless wars.  “I’ve got a day job with KKR.  I teach once a week at the City University of New York -- Honors College.  I do a week per semester at USC [University of Southern California].  I do several days at Harvard.  I’m on the speaking circuit.  I do pro bono stuff like this.  I’m the co-chairman of the Wilson Institute’s Global Advisory Council, the senior vice president of RUSI [Royal United Services Institute, a research institution focused on military issues].  I’m on three other think tank boards,” he said. 

In an era when fellow leakers of government secrets -- from National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower Edward Snowden to CIA whistleblower John Kiriakou to Army whistleblower Chelsea Manning -- have ended up in exile or prison, Petraeus’s post-leak life has obviously been quite another matter. 

The experience of former NSA senior executive Thomas Drake who shared unclassified information about that agency’s wasteful ways with a reporter is more typical of what leakers should expect.  Although the Justice Department eventually dropped the most serious charges against him -- he pled guilty to a single misdemeanor -- he lost his job and his pension, went bankrupt, and has spent years working at an Apple store after being prosecuted under the World War I-era Espionage Act.  “My social contacts are gone, and I’m persona non grata,” he told Defense One last year. “I can’t find any work in government contracting or in the quasi-government space, those who defend whistleblowers won’t touch me.”

Petraeus, on the other hand, shared with his lover and biographer eight highly classified “black books” that the government says included “the identities of covert officers, war strategy, intelligence capabilities and mechanisms, diplomatic discussions, quotes and deliberative discussions from high-level National Security Council meetings, and defendant David Howell Petraeus's discussions with the President of the United States of America.”  Petraeus was prosecuted, pled guilty, and was sentenced to two years of probation and fined $100,000.

Yet it’s Petraeus who today moves in rarified circles and through hallowed halls, with memberships and posts at one influential institution after another.  In addition to the positions he mentioned at New America, his CV includes: honorary visiting professor at Exeter University, co-chairman of the Task Force on North America at the Council on Foreign Relations, co-chairman of the Global Advisory Committee at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, member of the Concordia Summit’s Concordia Leadership Council, member of the board of trustees at the McCain Institute for International Leadership, member of the National Security Advisory Council of the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition, and a seat on the board of directors at the Atlantic Council.

Brand Petraeus

About a year ago, I tried to contact Petraeus through KKR as well as the Macaulay Honors College at the City University of New York, to get a comment on a story.  I never received a reply.

I figured he was ducking me -- or anyone asking potentially difficult questions -- or that his gatekeepers didn’t think I was important enough to respond to.  But perhaps he was simply too busy.  To be honest, I didn’t realize just how crowded his schedule was.  (Of course, FT’s Edward Luce reports that when he sent Petraeus an email invite, the retired general accepted within minutes, so maybe it’s because I wasn’t then holding out the prospect of a meal at the Four Seasons.)

I attended the New America event because I had yet more questions for Petraeus.  But I wasn’t as fortunate as Fred Kaplan -- author, by the way, of The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War -- and wasn’t quite speedy or nimble enough to catch the former general before he slipped into the backseat of that luxurious Mercedes sedan.

Irving Berlin’s “What Can You Do With A General?” ends on a somber note that sounds better in Crosby’s dulcimer tones than it reads on the page: “It seems this country never has enjoyed, so many one and two and three and four-star generals, unemployed.”

Today, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff retiring after 38 years receives a pension of about $20,000 a month, not exactly a shabby unemployment check for the rest of your life, but one that many in the tight-knit fraternity of top officers are still eager to supplement.  Take General Cartwright, who joined Raytheon in 2012 and, according to Morningstar, the investment research firm, receives close to $364,000 per year in compensation from that company while holding more than $1.2 million in its stock.  

All of this left me with yet more questions for Petraeus (whose pension is reportedly worth more than $18,000 per month or $220,000 per year) about a mindset that seems light years distant from the one Marshall espoused during his retirement.  I was curious, for instance, about his take on why the winning of wars isn’t a prerequisite for cashing in on one’s leadership in them, and why the personal and professional costs of scandal are so incredibly selective. 

Today, it seems, a robust Rolodex with the right global roster, a marquee name, and a cultivated geopolitical brand covers a multitude of sins.  And that’s precisely the type of firepower that Petraeus brings to the table.   

After a year without a reply, I got in touch with KKR again.  This time, through an intermediary, Petraeus provided me an answer to a new request for an interview.  “Thank you for your interest, Nick, but he respectfully declines at this time,” I was told.

I’m hoping, however, that the retired general changes his mind.  For the privilege of asking Petraeus various questions, I’d be more than happy to take him to lunch at the Four Seasons. 

With that tony power-lunch spot closing down soon as part of a plan to relocate elsewhere, we’d need to act fast.  Getting a table could be tough. 

Luckily, I know just the name to drop.

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Nick Turse is the managing editor of TomDispatch, a fellow at the Nation Institute, and a contributing writer for the Intercept.  He is the author of the New York Times bestseller Kill Anything That Moves: The Real American War in Vietnam. His latest book is Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead: War and Survival in South Sudan. His website is NickTurse.com.

Follow TomDispatch on Twitter and join us on Facebook. Check out the newest Dispatch Book, Nick Turse’s Next Time They’ll Come to Count the Dead, and Tom Engelhardt's latest book, Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single-Superpower World.