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When Humanitarianism Became Imperialism Print
Saturday, 17 September 2016 14:17

Afinogenov writes: "In 1980s Afghanistan, two world powers converged on each other, obliterating the national borders that stood in their way. The first was the Soviet state, bent on defending the precarious gains of a 1978 Communist coup d'etat that it had actively tried to prevent."

Pashtun fighters. (photo: Nasar/Flickriver)
Pashtun fighters. (photo: Nasar/Flickriver)


When Humanitarianism Became Imperialism

By Gregory Afinogenov, Jacobin

17 September 16

 

How the failed politics of “humanitarian intervention” were born in 1980s Afghanistan.

n 1980s Afghanistan, two world powers converged on each other, obliterating the national borders that stood in their way. The first was the Soviet state, bent on defending the precarious gains of a 1978 Communist coup d’état that it had actively tried to prevent. The second, caught in an even more painful paradox, was an uneasy alliance of foreign-funded jihadists, Western intelligence, and NGOs like Doctors Without Borders.

The way we remember the Afghan War today is as a kind of prologue. We care that the United States (along with, far more importantly, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) helped fund jihadists because those insurgents would later turn against the United States, serving as the ultimate indictment of Reaganite Cold War politics. We care that the Soviet Union failed in Afghanistan because that failure foreshadowed the Afghan quagmire of today. We care about the Afghan War because it spawned Osama bin Laden.

Timothy Nunan’s new book, Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan, shows how incomplete this retrospective, US-centric view is. Though he does not venture beyond the 1990s, his argument is essential for understanding the world of imperial warfare today.

Afghanistan did not create the Islamic State, but it did serve as the laboratory in which the destruction of Third World sovereignty came to be fitted with justifications rooted both in human rights and in regime security — the recipe for modern “humanitarian interventions.”

Sovereignty in Afghanistan, Nunan explains, was troubled from the beginning. In 1893 the British and Afghan governments created the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan, slicing through the homelands of Pashtuns and other ethnic groups who lived there.

Despite confirmation by successive international treaties, the line existed largely on paper, ignored by local residents whose connections across the borders were far stronger than they were either to Kabul or to Islamabad.

Nonetheless, the Durand Line became central to the geopolitical imaginaries of both countries. Pakistan saw the line as a buffer against the Soviet Union, as well as an opportunity to extend its influence northward through the Afghan Pashtuns. Afghan leaders — themselves generally Pashtuns or heavily influenced by Pashtun elites — tried to use development aid from both the Soviet Union and the West to create a purified ethnonational Pashtun state sealed off from Pakistani influence.

After the 1978 coup, the Pashtun Khalq faction within the Afghan Communist party — the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) — quickly dispatched its rival Parcham faction and began to pursue ethnic nationalist policies, while Pakistan mobilized the Pashtun and Baluch populations on its side of the line to fight an insurgent campaign to the north.

But this conflict over the future of “Pashtunistan” and the Afghan presence along the line became an ideological conflict as well. As they had done for decades, Afghan leaders appealed to socialist values and internationalist goals to pressure the Soviet Union into maintaining its support for Kabul, while Saudi financing (coming in part from the windfall generated by the 1970s oil crisis) turned the southern insurgency into a worldwide Islamist project.

Why Washington jumped on an opportunity to strike a blow at the Soviet Union is not hard to figure out. But why were they joined so enthusiastically by idealistic Western humanitarians? As Nunan argues, the modern international NGO moment, at least its European side, owes its existence to the disillusion of the Left after 1968.

The legacy of opposition to the Vietnam War combined with the lack of revolutionary progress in the West produced a new kind of ethos among European leftists. Solidarity with suffering people targeted by state repression, whether in right-wing Nigeria during the Biafran War or in newly communist Vietnam during the “Boat People” crisis, came to take precedence over grudging support for either Soviet or Chinese-aligned governments. This was the moment that gave birth to Doctors Without Borders in France and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan in Sweden.

Both groups opposed Soviet intervention as imperialist and, eventually, supported the Islamist insurgency as a genuine expression of the popular will. Their powerful lobbying in their home countries and the United Nations meshed neatly with US foreign policy priorities, expressed most concisely in Carter national security adviser Zbygnew Brzezinski’s words, “we now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.” But the NGOs also helped the mujahidin directly, providing them with industrial equipment and embedding with them to spread their message to sympathetic Western audiences.

Today, of course, the United States and its NATO allies routinely instrumentalize human rights in the service of empire. Before the war in Afghanistan, however, such considerations were secondary: although anticommunists always emphasized the atrocities committed by Communist governments, this was just one of the many reasons to prop up a right-wing dictator or a military junta.

Afghanistan fundamentally altered this logic. Popular insurgencies were once assumed to be left-aligned; now Western interventions are almost always undertaken against a state on behalf of its people, from the Contras to the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Ideological arguments are no longer fashionable: in the face of state repression, we’re not expected to dig too deeply into the politics of Ahmed Chalabi in Iraq or the National Transitional Council in Libya, though the post-Afghan experience has required that such groups have at least a nominal claim to be “moderates.”

Instead, what justifies intervention is solidarity between human beings as suffering victims of repression, a claim so powerful and universal that it is held to override any talk about the efficacy of past interventions or the plan for what happens after a regime is overthrown.

It is no coincidence that the absence of any such plan is the defining characteristic of Western intervention since Afghanistan. The aim of the anti-Soviet insurgency was, from the beginning, to undermine Afghan sovereignty over the Durand line. On this Pakistanis, Saudis, and Americans could all agree: the Pakistanis because it expanded its power in the region, the Saudis because it could fuel an ever more transnational Islamist movement in its interests, and the Americans because it could weaken and destabilize the Soviet Union.

Ideologies that emphasized cross-border, antigovernment solidarity — whether Islamist or humanitarian — were an ideal fit for this project. But once the Soviets withdrew, what this strategy left in their place was a failed state. Its horrors led to the swift departure of the very Westerners who had helped to midwife it in the first place — a situation now playing out throughout the Middle East and once again in Afghanistan itself.

The alternative that the Soviet Union offered to the transnational ideology of the NGOs and Islamists was an authoritarian socialism-in-one-Third-World-country, in this case the Kabul government. Nunan makes clear how flawed this vision, too, proved to be. Not only did this implicate the Soviets in the atrocities committed by the Pashtun-supremacist Khalqi government; it was also routinely violated by the Soviets themselves.

In a memorable example, the Soviet Border Force effectively pushed the Soviet border south into Afghanistan by a hundred kilometers, creating a zone of lawless killing in a newly established frontier region. Even as the Soviet Union mouthed platitudes about sovereignty, it was helping to destroy the fragile territorial integrity of the Afghan state.

If the logic of transnational solidarity became the basis for Western interventions after Afghanistan, the logic of the Soviet alternative has been reproduced in many of today’s left-wing responses to these interventions, even as the regimes in whose name they are issued have less and less in common with socialism.

Though the extreme version of the argument  — that we must support any regime that resists US imperialism, no matter how authoritarian, or, increasingly, neoliberal — is uncommon, we are routinely asked to stand in solidarity with Assad and Yanukovych. This echoes all the perversities of the Soviet stance: the defense of sovereignty is held to justify territorial annexation, partition by proxy forces, and the mass killing of civilians.

If we are to overcome the legacy of the Soviet war in Afghanistan, we can no longer pretend that the PDPA and the Soviet occupation forces were a viable alternative to the mujahidin. The only politics that offers a way out of the dilemma of contemporary Third World sovereignty is an internationalism that recognizes that its subjects are political actors, not just suffering subjects; that the repression launched by struggling secularist regimes undermines secularism just as it invites intervention; that the beneficiaries of Western intervention are to be found in Moscow, Riyadh, Arlington, and Islamabad, not Homs and Benghazi; and that the struggles of global refugee diasporas are coextensive with the domestic political communities they were forced to leave behind.

A politics that demands we think about interests and outcomes before we allow ourselves to be pressed into action by urgent moral appeals would restore politics to a climate long dominated by the depoliticizing discourse of suffering. It would also mean paying attention to who is being addressed. A demonstration about Syrian intervention is not, fundamentally, about Syria: it is about what our domestic security states plan to do there.

That gap, between internationalism and national politics, is what the former ‘68ers missed as they tried to put their dream of solidarity into practice in Afghanistan. In tracing that dismal story, Humanitarian Invasion says little about the events of the last two decades, but it is essential for understanding how they came to be.

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FOCUS | Jorge Ramos: Trump's Populism Is Reminiscent of a Latin American Dictator Print
Saturday, 17 September 2016 11:50

Rathbone writes: "He's the face of the news for the US's 55m Hispanics but for English-speaking Americans he is mostly known for taking on Donald Trump. Over chiles en nogada in Florida, the anchorman talks about hate, hope - and why he's always been a rebel."

A poster of Donald Trump in the backyard of a supporter. (photo: AFP)
A poster of Donald Trump in the backyard of a supporter. (photo: AFP)


Jorge Ramos: Trump's Populism Is Reminiscent of a Latin American Dictator

By John Paul Rathbone, Financial Times

17 September 16

 

hose of us with roots in Latin America know that timekeeping isn’t one of our most celebrated characteristics. There had also been a tropical rainstorm in the morning, leaving Miami’s steaming roads thick with traffic. But Jorge Ramos, who has made puncturing Latino stereotypes something of his life’s work, arrives at 1pm with the on-the-second punctuality of a practised television broadcaster.

We are lunching at Talavera, a Mexican restaurant in Coral Gables, Florida, and today the man sometimes described as “the most influential news anchor in the Americas” wears a casual jacket, plain dress shirt open at the collar, and jeans. Slight and trim, Ramos greets me with a handshake and slings a backpack on to the bench on his side of the booth. “It’s my son’s favourite Mexican local,” the 58-year-old says, his boyish face crinkling into an easy smile.

Ramos occupies an unusual position in US media. Born in Mexico City, for the past three decades he has been based in Miami and has co-anchored the flagship evening news of Univision, the largest Hispanic broadcaster in the US. Watched by 2m households, his 6.30pm show has comparable ratings to equivalent primetime broadcasts on English-language stations such as CBS and Fox. It has also made Ramos probably the most recognised and trusted face among the 55m Hispanics in the US — their Walter Cronkite, although George Clooney may be more apt given Ramos’s movie-star looks and Nice Guy reputation. (The Venezuelan-American Uber driver who delivered me to the restaurant said he considered Ramos “muy señor”, a gentleman.)

Despite the accolades — eight Emmys and a bucketful of journalism awards — most of English-speaking America only discovered Ramos after he was thrown out of a Donald Trump news conference last year. “Go back to Univision,” Trump had retorted when Ramos persistently questioned his plans to deport 11m undocumented immigrants. Security escorted Ramos out shortly after. The scene, premeditated by Ramos, made great TV — “The most artificial medium imaginable,” as he admits. With a long record of defending immigrant rights on television and in print, it also cemented Ramos’s reputation for “giving voice to the voiceless”. More controversially, it kicked off a media storm that impugned Ramos as a partisan anti-Trumper who had abandoned journalistic neutrality, so making his points of view invalid.

“I’ve never seen an election like this before, so I am glad to be 58 now,” Ramos says as soon as he sits down. “I have the confidence and technique to cover it. I mean, what do you do when confronted with a figure like Trump? He seems to me to be one of those cases where you have to take a stand. If you don’t, and Trump is elected US president, you will regret it.”

?…?

Ramos’s childhood nickname was “pote”, short for potrillo or “colt”, and he has been rushing around ever since. Alongside a day job that involves stunts such as strapping a GoPro to his chest and swimming across the Rio Grande, he writes a weekly syndicated column, co-hosts two weekend news reviews in Spanish and in English, and writes books (12 so far).

He talks fast and with directness unusual among Mexicans, better known for ceremonial circumlocution. To try and slow things down a bit, I order a tequila with a “sangrita” rider of spicy tomato juice, and ask Ramos to join me. “Thank you but no,” he says. “I have to drive to work. There is also the show. I have to be careful.” So I sip my smoky Don Julio alone and suggest we order food.

To my delight, chiles en nogada is on the menu. Invented by Mexican nuns 200 years ago, the recipe consists of a green poblano pepper stuffed with finely chopped meat, covered in a walnut-based cream sauce, sprinkled with pomegranate seeds. Ramos modestly suggests the fixed lunch menu but gives in to my enthusiasm. The waiter takes our order (“¿Qué tal, Jorge?” he asks familiarly). We agree on a shared entrée of guacamole, and press on.

I ask Ramos if Trump reminds him of any populist Latin American presidents he has interviewed. “I first met Hugo Chávez in 1998, when he was still wearing a suit and tie. Yes, they do share a populist touch,” Ramos replies. “Of course, it is impossible to imagine a dictatorship in the US. Still, everything Chávez said even then centred around his strength, himself. He said ‘I’, ‘I’, ‘I’ a lot. You see some of that in Trump.”

At this, Ramos discloses that his daughter Paola, from his first marriage, works on Hillary Clinton’s campaign. He then comments that a distinguishing feature of this US election is its “total lack of transparency, from both sides,” from Clinton’s emails and health to Trump’s unreleased tax returns and lies.

Ramos has always considered himself to be a rebel. Growing up, he stood up against the authority of his middle-class father, an architect; at school, he disobeyed the monks who taught him; and in the early 1980s, he resigned in protest from his first job as a cub reporter at Televisa. Mexico’s biggest broadcaster had long been a flattering mouthpiece for the Institutional Revolutionary party, which wielded total power in Mexico for 71 years before losing the presidency in 2000, and when Televisa producers asked Ramos to censor a critical piece that he had put together on Mexican attitudes to power, he erased the tape before it could be broadcast.

Ramos sold his VW Beetle, moved to Los Angeles, studied journalism at an extension course at UCLA and began working at a small Hispanic station, Canal 34, filing up to three stories a day from the street. “It was a wonderful school,” he once wrote.

In 1986, to his surprise, Ramos became the Miami-based anchor of the evening news show he still co-presents. Since then he has been elbowed in the ribs by Fidel Castro’s security detail after he pressed the Cuban dictator, asking him if it wasn’t time to call elections. He has received death threats in Colombia after he questioned then-president Ernesto Samper over allegations his campaign had been financed with drug money. More recently, he has variously taken Clinton and Bernie Sanders to task, while Barack Obama squirmed in his seat during a 2014 interview in which Ramos described him as the US’s “deporter in chief” for expelling 2m migrants. “All I now do in English is what I’ve been doing in Spanish for decades,” Ramos insists. “I ask questions.”

The guacamole arrives, a handy visual prompt. Ramos turns to his mantra: the Latinisation of the US. He is an enthusiastic cheerleader for this demographic shift, both as an immigrant who became a US citizen in 2008, and as the star of a private-equity-owned Latino company rumoured to be seeking a listing. The purchasing power of the Hispanic market is already estimated to be $1.4tn and it is growing every day.

“By 2044 whites will be a minority in the US,” Ramos says. “They sense this, they feel fearful, and that is why Donald Trump is their symbol, the man who will keep the ‘others’ out. But that’s not the future. This is,” Ramos says, pointing around the restaurant, busy with bilingual custom. “Trump will be the last person to seek the presidency with only the white vote.”

His plate has a barely touched tortilla chip with a dollop of chilli sauce on top. Then the main course arrives: I survey the dish with pleasure but it tastes bland and has no aroma. Ramos shrugs: his senses of taste and smell are impaired after a botched operation on a broken nose. “Can you smell anything? I can’t,” he says. “My mother would probably make it differently,” he adds courteously.

?…?

Ramos’s latest project, a documentary co-produced with HBO that explores hate in America, has taken him around the country. I wonder if in his reporting he found Trump to be a symptom or a cause of the US’s seething resentment? “An important part of the US population is afraid and angry,” he says. I ask if this simply makes Trump the voice of a community that feels threatened, just as Ramos is among Hispanics? “That is just what the Ku Klux Klan said,” is his surprising answer. “They told me: you give your point of view, we give ours. What’s the difference?”

Ramos pauses and presses his forefinger on the table to emphasise the point. “The answer to that question is important. They want to exclude us. We don’t want to exclude them.” Then he adds: “Hate is contagious. It is always the same?…?In difficult times, immigrants get the blame?…?here or in Europe.”

We talk about Latin America. Ramos is optimistic, as am I. “It’s the millennials who are pushing change. They are much less ideological, more pragmatic” than their parents. He applauds recent government changes in Argentina and Brazil as signs that “people will no longer stand for” corruption and mismanagement. He cites Venezuela, where despite government repression “hundreds of thousands of people march for change”. He calls Colombia’s peace deal with Marxist rebels “a pearl”. He is even somewhat optimistic on Mexico: “Rising criticism on social media is a sign of growing independence.”

What about Enrique Peña Nieto’s big blunder last month, I ask. Mexico’s most unpopular president in decades had hosted a private meeting with Trump, Mexico’s most disliked man. It comes as no surprise that, after the sweeping visit of the real estate magnate who has slandered Mexicans as “rapists” and “criminals” and who says he will build a wall along the US border, Peña Nieto’s ratings fell even further. “Peña thought he could win. He wanted to change the narrative,” says Ramos. “His chance was at the press conference [afterwards] when Trump said there had been no conversation about building walls. That was the TV moment. But Peña was meek — or maybe did not understand Trump’s English. Either way, he blew it.”

?…?

At Univision, Ramos has covered the fall of the Berlin Wall, the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, as well as conflicts in the Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan. His range and experience suggests a bigger, more worldly role than his current job. He has considered going into politics but, in the end, figured he had more influence as a journalist. He says he is occasionally headhunted but, “like a Japanese salaryman”, does not want to leave Univision. “We have ridden the Latin wave together?…?and no owner has ever told me what to say.”

Meanwhile, Univision’s sister network, Fusion, allows him to cross over into the Anglo-Saxon world, following the demographic shift into English by Hispanic millennials and keeping him fresh. His simple secret of television success, Ramos suggests, is to be able to appear natural under lights while wearing make-up. In person, his body language is therefore much as on screen: relaxed and aware. His face is open. He talks in the crisp sentences of TV news and, while his English is accented, his deracinated Spanish no longer locates him as Mexican: Ramos has lived in Miami longer than Mexico.

He calls this city surrounded by swamp and sea his trinchera, or foxhole, and is grateful that it has welcomed him. “Everyone here is from somewhere else, so in a way we all understand each other.” He shares a house with his partner, Chiqui Delgado, a former TV host and Venezuelan beauty queen, her two children, and his teenage son from a second marriage (with an always-available bedroom for his daughter). He exercises a lot and leaves his email inbox empty at the end of every day. Despite the magic trinity of salud, amor y pesetas — good health, love and success — Ramos’s sense of home remains elusive, as it does among many émigrés. In his memoir he wrote that his favourite song is the plaintive 1970 classic by Facundo Cabral: “No soy de aquí, ni soy de allá” (I am neither from here nor there). I mention that my Cuban mother considers this her theme song too and ask Ramos if he believes, like her, that “Ser feliz es mi color de identidad” (To be happy is my identity’s colour)?

Ramos is only momentarily taken aback by the gambit. “I’d say I am more of a preguntón, a nosy busybody. I am also very independent: I grew up in a big family,” he says. “As for home, as a physical presence my old house in Mexico is long gone — but I can assure you that in my house I am rarely alone.” Like all good news anchors, he then brings the show back to script. “Well, I did feel alone when I confronted Trump.”

Ramos notices I’ve not eaten the green poblano pepper, so I chomp it down as the waiter returns. “Dessert?” Ramos chooses a flan. I take a marzipan-based pastry and espresso. Ramos says no coffee for him; “It’s a Cuban habit I’ve not picked-up.”

As the bill arrives, our conversation returns to Trump. In the background a waiter has climbed a stepladder to hang a Mexican flag by the window, ahead of independence day on September 16. Ramos’ face lights up at the dramatic possibilities of the shot. “Trump supporters would hate it, but that is what the ‘us’ is,” he remarks. “Recognising ‘the other’ may only be an idea of French philosophers,” Ramos adds. “But if you do not recognise the other, they will not recognise you. Donald Trump does not do it. Immigrants have to: their survival depends on it.” (Yes, TV presenters can be deep too.)

Ramos shows how exactly backwards Trump is when he slanders immigrants — it’s the best that usually come. Any aspiring journalist should read Ramos’s Pringle Lecture at Columbia University. He is enthusiastic about new technologies without being glib, and convincing, without being earnest, of the need for sensitivity to different accents in an increasingly varied world.

For all his strong opinions, though, Ramos is perfectly polished and rehearsed. There is even something of a boy scout to his earnestness. As one of the most prominent Hispanics in the US, he guards his reputation carefully and is scrupulous to a fault. We discuss the bill, usually paid for by the FT, but split it on ethical grounds. Before we leave, he graciously gives me a copy of his latest book, Take a Stand: Lessons from Rebels, and writes inside, “John Paul: may your voice never go out.”

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FOCUS: Stop Whining About 'False Balance' Print
Saturday, 17 September 2016 11:00

Taibbi writes: "News media outlets are increasingly coming under fire for the sin of 'false balance' or 'false equivalency.' The New York Times, one of the outlets most often accused of this offense, recently defined the term."

Hillary Clinton speaks with reporters as she departs a luncheon gathering with Senate Democrats at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, July 14th, 2016. (photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)
Hillary Clinton speaks with reporters as she departs a luncheon gathering with Senate Democrats at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, July 14th, 2016. (photo: Jonathan Ernst/Reuters)


Stop Whining About 'False Balance'

By Matt Taibbi, Rolling Stone

17 September 16

 

Everyone wants to blame reporters for the rise of Donald Trump. How about the media consumer?

ews media outlets are increasingly coming under fire for the sin of "false balance" or "false equivalency." The New York Times, one of the outlets most often accused of this offense, recently defined the term:

"The practice of journalists who, in their zeal to be fair, present each side of a debate as equally credible, even when the factual evidence is stacked heavily on one side."

The crime of The Times, according to some of its readers, has been its coverage of the Clinton email and Clinton Foundation stories. As one Times reader put it, "There's too much at stake in this election for the media to stoke the belief that Hillary's mistakes (which she has definitely made) are even close to par with Trump's."

When Times public editor Liz Spayd essentially told readers that her paper was just doing its job and that readers should just suck it up and deal, she was hit with a torrent of criticism.

A pack of pundits – one might call them the false-equivalency priesthood – lashed out through pieces like "Why the Media Is Botching the Election," "Media Should Stop Treating Trump and Clinton as Equals," "Does the New York Times Have a False Balance Problem?" and countless others. 

It's getting ridiculous. Two quick thoughts:

1) The people complaining about "false balance" usually seem confident in having discovered the truth of things for themselves, despite the media's supposed incompetence. They're quite sure of whom to vote for and why. Their complaints are really about the impact that "false balance" coverage might have on other, lesser humans, with weaker minds than theirs. Which is not just snobbish, but laughably snobbish. So, shut up.

2) One of the main reasons the news media has been dumbed down over the years is because audiences have consistently rejected smart, responsible journalism in favor of clickbait stupidities like "Five Things You Didn't Know About John McCain's Penis" and "Woman Strips Naked in Front of Police Officers. You Won't Believe What Happened Next." The Bachelor and Toddlers and Tiaras crush Frontline. And people wonder why Donald Trump gets a lot of coverage? 

No doubt about it, the country is in a brutal spot right now. We are less than two months from the possibility of one of the dumbest people on the planet winning the White House. And it seems that all anyone's talked about this week, whether around the water cooler or on TV news, Twitter or Facebook, is the lung capacity of Hillary Clinton.

That sucks. But it's not all the media's fault. This is classic horse-race stuff, and if you're getting it, it's at least in part because you spent decades asking for it.

The campaign has devolved over time into an entertainment program, a degrading and vicious show where the contestants win the nuclear launch codes instead of a date with a millionaire.

Under the rules of this reality series which media consumers turn into a gigantic hit every four years, collapsing in front of a cell-phone camera at a 9/11 memorial service is more important than a dozen position papers.

It just is. You proved it when you clicked on that video of the episode last weekend and didn't read a compare-and-contrast piece on, for instance, the candidates' banking policies.

Trump himself is feeling the business end of that dynamic right now, having just reversed himself on the birther question in spectacular fashion. His "Yes, Obama was born in America, but Hillary started the birther controversy and I ended it" routine is dumb enough and full of enough lies to keep reporters busy for a good news cycle or so, until the next fiasco.

An important news story or 10 will likely die on the vine while the country obsesses over Trump's latest foot-in-mouth episode. That's the paradox with this candidate. Even the people who wish he didn't exist can't take their eyes off him. No amount of "contextualizing" or pointing out his flaws and deceptions can walk back his gravitational pull on audiences.

This is true of a lot of dumb things that take up space in the news pages, from Joe Arpaio to the Kardashians. One could argue that the users of the public's airwaves have a higher responsibility to properly inform the public that outweighs the need to chase ratings and give airtime to clown acts, but that ship sailed a long time ago.

Ask any reporter who's tried to make the news less stupid at any time over the past 40 years. Most of those people end up begging ProPublica for lunch money, while the horse-racers and celebrity-humpers get panel shows.

Ask reporters like Juan Carlos Frey, who struggled to get anyone to pay attention when he reported on mass graves of undocumented immigrants discovered along the border of Texas. 

Such stories about the mass deaths of foreigners or minorities usually get less ink than a cat stuck in a tree or a model who falls off a runway.

But lack of "balance" doesn't seem to bother too many people in that instance. It only seems to come up when the victim is a major political party with basically unlimited ability to buy its own publicity.

Media consumers voting with their eyeballs for ever-dumber political coverage creates the biggest imbalance in reality, but the "false equivalency" debate is mostly over a separate, more parochial issue of journalistic ethics.

The essence of that debate is whether or not it's appropriate to write negative things about Hillary Clinton when there's a possibility that Donald Trump might become president. Or, rather, we may say negative things about Clinton, but only if we always drape reporting in plenty of context about the worse-ness of Trump, or something.

There's not much to say about this debate apart from the fact that it's phony and absurd and that the people shrieking for "balance" are almost always at heart censors who are really concerned with keeping a view of the world with which they disagree out of the news.

There are two basic ideas of how the press is supposed to operate. One is that the system works best when reporters are free, independent and annoying, giving the public as much information as possible, so that people may sort things out for themselves.

The other is that information is inherently dangerous, and the public is too stupid to be trusted with too much of it. Throughout history there has always been a plurality of people who will believe this.

Whether it's keeping "Fuck the Police" off the airwaves or news of the collectivist famine out of Pravda, the idea is the same: People can't handle stuff.

The giveaway in this latest "false balance" debate is the language. There are people wailing about a "weaponized" media that just this once needs to be leashed a bit, given the circumstances. This is classic "information is dangerous" rhetoric.

There are even people in our business using this high-pressure situation to argue for less access and transparency, in the name of keeping future generations of politicians safe from the prying eyes of the public! Most reporters view their jobs as being basically the opposite of that.

In truth, the media landscape is massive and there's room to cover everything. It's worth noting that the exploration of Trump's iniquities and unfitness for office in the last year has been truly awesome, both in terms of raw volume and vehemence of tone.

Anyone who tries to argue that there's insufficiently vast documentation of Trump's insanity is either being willfully obtuse or not paying real attention to the news. Just follow this latest birther faceplant. The outrage is all out there, in huge quantities. It's just not having the predicted effect.

So media consumers are reduced to blaming the closeness of the race on a species they've practically made extinct with their choices over the years: investigative reporters.

The irony is, the Clinton Foundation thing is a rare example of an important story that is getting anything like the requisite attention. The nexus of elite connections that sits behind tales like Bill Clinton taking $1.5 million in speaking fees from a Swiss bank (and foundation donor) while that same bank is seeking relief from Hillary Clinton's State Department is exactly the kind of thing that requires the scrutiny of reporters.

This is particularly true since the charity is a new kind of structure, with seemingly new opportunities for conflicts, and an innovation that is likely to be replicated in the future by other politicians – perhaps even a future President Trump himself.

Such investigative reports on the mechanics of political influence are also exactly the sort of thing that media audiences routinely ignore, unless by some lucky accident they happen to be caught up in the horse-race drama of a Campaign Reality Show.

So if your complaint about these reports is, "Why now, at this crucial moment?" there's a very good answer. If these stories came out at any other time, you'd be blowing them off! And probably in favor of The Biggest Loser, or a show about people eating bugs for money. Which brings us back to the key point in all of this.

I'm as worried as anyone else about the possibility of Trump getting elected. But if it happens, it's not going to be because The New York Times allowed a few reporters to investigate the Clinton Foundation. It'll be because we're a nation of idiots, who vote the same way we choose channels: without thinking. 

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Trumponomics Is Almost as Cruel a Joke as Trickle-Down Economics Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=36361"><span class="small">Robert Reich, Robert Reich's Facebook Page</span></a>   
Saturday, 17 September 2016 08:46

Reich writes: "Donald Trump's economic speech this morning to the Economic Club of New York was incoherent at best, nuts at worst. His 'more detailed' economic plan would: Explode the deficit, Isolate the United States, Scrap many environmental, health, and safety regulations in order to pursue economic growth, And wouldn't even bring back manufacturing to the United States, as he asserts."

Former Clinton labor secretary Robert Reich. (photo: Steve Russell/Toronto Star)
Former Clinton labor secretary Robert Reich. (photo: Steve Russell/Toronto Star)


Trumponomics Is Almost as Cruel a Joke as Trickle-Down Economics

By Robert Reich, Robert Reich's Facebook Page

17 September 16

 

onald Trump’s economic speech this morning to the Economic Club of New York was incoherent at best, nuts at worst. His “more detailed” economic plan would:

  1. Explode the deficit. Trump still wants to reduce taxes, mostly on the wealthy and on corporations. He says his tax cut would cost $4.4 trillion over 10 years, and the money would come from economic growth. Yet he’d also spend like mad on the military and on infrastructure. His numbers are wildly out of whack. (I’m no deficit hawk, but I’m not a deficit humming bird. This is insane.)

  2. Isolate the United States. He’d cut off much of trade with China, Mexico, and other current trading partners – thereby inviting trade retaliation, causing consumer prices to rise in the U.S., choke off growth in developing nations, and repeat the disastrous mistakes of Congressmen Smoot and Hawley who, in the 1930s, withdrew the U.S. from the global economy.

  3. Scrap many environmental, health, and safety regulations in order to pursue economic growth. This is borderline insanity. Growth is not an end in itself. A higher standard of living is. If our air and water are unsafe, if we’re subject to more floods and draughts, if our workplaces are unsafe and unhealthy, and our food is unsafe, our standard of living drops.

  4. And wouldn't even bring back manufacturing to the United States, as he asserts. Today’s factories are automated. Numerical-controlled machine tools and robots are replacing humans even in China.

Trumponomics is almost as cruel a joke as trickle-down economics.

What do you think?

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Why Obamacare Didn't Work Print
Saturday, 17 September 2016 08:35

Day writes: "News broke late last month that yet another of the nation's largest health insurers, Aetna, is pulling out of state health exchanges in 2017. The company's action marks the failure of every market-based reform included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA)."

A Medicaid patient in Colorado looks over paperwork with a doctor. (photo: Craig F. Walker/Denver Post)
A Medicaid patient in Colorado looks over paperwork with a doctor. (photo: Craig F. Walker/Denver Post)


Why Obamacare Didn't Work

By Benjamin Day, Jacobin

17 September 16

 

Obamacare has failed, and so will other market-based plans. We need a socialized system.

ews broke late last month that yet another of the nation’s largest health insurers, Aetna, is pulling out of state health exchanges in 2017. The company’s action marks the failure of every market-based reform included in the Affordable Care Act (ACA).

The insurers that remain in the exchanges find themselves with unprecedented leverage to demand double-digit premium increases next year, which will leave eleven million patients with few options. The collapse of policies designed to increase competition between health insurers should serve as a lesson in an election year when both candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, have been running on the promise of even more such reforms.

The first market-based reform to collapse was the introduction of CO-OPs, new consumer-owned health insurers designed to compete with large commercial plans. Of the twenty-three CO-OPs launched for 2014, sixteen have already closed their doors or been shut down by state regulators. The CO-OPs failed in part because they expected government subsidies that never arrived, but more importantly they didn’t have the size or leverage to negotiate rates with large hospital and physician groups, paying more for the same patient care than the dominant insurers they were competing with.

Most countries put hospitals on fixed budgets under a universal health-care system, but the few with private health insurers set uniform rates so market power doesn’t matter for the price of care. The Wild West capitalism that characterizes health care in the United States actually works against competition, rewarding mergers and consolidation by both insurers and providers, and undermines competition-based policy initiatives like the CO-OPs.

The exchanges themselves are an additional lesson in the ACA’s failed competition policies. The promise of the exchanges was to replace insurance brokers, who traditionally helped small businesses and individuals shop for health insurance, with a single marketplace that makes plans easier to compare (the bronze, silver, gold, and platinum tiers).

The reality from study after study is that very few people are able to select the plan that’s best for them (including one that found only Columbia MBA students chose insurance plans better than randomly picking a plan out of a hat would). The vast majority choose the plan with the lowest premium in a tier, the plan that’s listed first on the website, or the plan they’re already enrolled in, even if it will leave them with higher total costs or poor access to care they’ll need.

Insurers have capitalized on patients’ inability to identify plans that are better for them by pushing lower upfront costs (premiums) but much higher uncertain costs and costs at the point of care (deductibles, co-pays, out-of-network care, uncovered benefits, etc). Fully 90 percent of enrollees in the exchanges have picked high-deductible plans, compared with 24 percent in employer-sponsored insurance. Limited provider networks are now used by about half of the exchange plans, which has led to the complete exclusion of some specialist care (14 percent of plans) and an explosion of “surprise medical bills” from out-of-network care that patients think is in-network when they receive it.

Learning from the failure of market-based reforms is particularly important since both Trump and Clinton have promised to further increase insurance competition, albeit in the context of drastically different health-care platforms.

Trump has taken up a common Republican proposal to allow purchase of health insurance across state lines. “By allowing full competition in this market,” Trump’s campaign page promises, “insurance costs will go down and consumer satisfaction will go up.”

The plan is doomed to fail because out-of-state insurers have very little power to negotiate low rates with providers where the patient actually lives. Georgia, Maine, and Wyoming have all enacted legislation allowing the purchase of out-of-state health insurance, but not a single out-of-state insurer chose to enter those markets.

Ironically, although Trump has called for repeal of the ACA, the ACA itself contains a provision enabling the purchase of health insurance across state lines: “health-care choice compacts.” States were supposed to be allowed to establish compacts starting this year, but the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has yet to issue regulations for this portion of the law. If and when HHS does, it will mark the third and final failure of the ACA’s market-based reforms.

Clinton has promised to revive the Democratic campaign for a “public option,” a publicly administered health insurance plan that would compete with private insurers on the exchanges. If a new public insurance plan must negotiate with providers while trying to attract new enrollees, it’s likely to meet the same fate as the CO-OPs.

If allowed to use Medicare’s provider network and Medicare’s payment rates, a public option would have a tremendous advantage over private insurers since Medicare pays lower rates and few providers can afford to opt out of accepting Medicare patients. A weak public option that has to negotiate health-care costs as a small startup plan will fail, while a strong public option allowed to pay Medicare’s low rates is more likely to replace private insurers than compete with them.

The last gasp of the ACA’s market-based reforms reveals an uncomfortable truth about our health-care system: we cannot afford to expand or even maintain our current access to care without cost controls, and health-care costs cannot be controlled with competition or markets.

The only cost control that works without undermining access to care is also the kind that Republican and Democratic leadership have foresworn this election: public budgeting and rate-setting through a single-payer system, or regulations that force nonprofit insurers to act like a single-payer.

When we visit a doctor, we fully expect that we’ll be treated with evidence-based health care. This year some eleven million patients in the exchanges will experience the personal impact of health-care policy based on ideology and profits instead of evidence, which will lead to unnecessary illness, financial ruin, and in some cases death. We owe it to them and ourselves to end the free market’s dominance in American health care, and finally achieve public, universal care.

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