RSN Fundraising Banner
FB Share
Email This Page
add comment
Politics
Bernie's First Political Revolution Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=43875"><span class="small">Branko Marcetic, Jacobin</span></a>   
Friday, 13 December 2019 14:14

Marcetic writes: "In 1981, Bernie Sanders achieved the unthinkable - dethroning a deeply entrenched city establishment in Burlington, Vermont, with an upset victory in the city's mayoral race that no one saw coming."

Bernie Sanders campaign. (photo: Bernie Sanders)
Bernie Sanders campaign. (photo: Bernie Sanders)


Bernie's First Political Revolution

By Branko Marcetic, Jacobin

13 December 19


In 1981, Bernie Sanders achieved the unthinkable — dethroning a deeply entrenched city establishment in Burlington, Vermont, with an upset victory in the city’s mayoral race that no one saw coming. His methods were familiar: a populist, working-class message, door-to-door grassroots organization, and a dogged refusal to bow to elite pressure.

self-described socialist in the seat of executive power. A campaign of obstruction meant to destroy him. A riled-up activist base determined to enact change. A moribund Democratic establishment clinging to power.

This is not a vision of 2021. This was Burlington, Vermont, forty years before, when a thirty-nine-year-old Bernie Sanders created a local political earthquake by becoming mayor of Vermont’s largest city, and attempted to forge a version of his “political revolution” at the municipal level. Through interviews, archival documents, and newspaper accounts of the time, Jacobin retells the story of Sanders’s years in Burlington, where his political ascent began, and where his vision of change was first tested. Part one is here.

“I think I’d make a good candidate.”

It had been a little over a week since Bernie Sanders decided to run for mayor of Burlington. Now, with these seven words, he was trying to ward off a rival challenger.

The man he was trying to persuade was Greg Guma, fellow left-wing activist and journalist whose own quiet plans to run had been unexpectedly outed by the Burlington Free Press a week before Sanders made his Halloween night decision to launch his own. The two had first crossed paths during Sanders’s 1972 Senate run, when Guma made the mistake of asking Sanders to tell him about himself. That meeting had concluded with Sanders brusquely telling Guma he didn’t want his vote.

Eight years later, upon learning of Guma’s plans to challenge five-term incumbent Gordon Paquette, Sanders phoned him and arranged a sit-down. The two met downtown in Burlington’s Fresh Ground Coffee House — long a place of interest in the FBI’s investigations into local “extremists.”

As Guma recalls, the meeting was less a conversation than a “test of wills.” Over the course of the meeting, Sanders made clear he would be going forward with his campaign no matter what. Guma could either step aside or split the progressive vote and likely sink them both.

For Guma, the choice was easy, if unpalatable. His highest priority was smashing the city’s staid political establishment, and he already had a job editing a weekly paper, one he was likely to lose if he ran for mayor. Sanders, by contrast, had no job and was a natural politician, a confident speaker able to connect with voters and adept at turning every question and topic to his stock talking points. And as Guma would later tell the Washington Post, “he’s six-two and I’m five-five, and that makes a difference.”

Guma officially bowed out on November 11, telling the Free Press he didn’t “really want to be in a position of dividing progressives looking for an alternative to Paquette.” But his frustration at letting Sanders head a movement he had played a leading role over the preceding years in building was clear. “I don’t think he represents what the majority of people want,” he told the paper.

Today, Guma says the episode encapsulates something about Sanders’s leadership style.

“He makes his own decisions, he only consults with a few advisors, he trusts his gut, and once he makes the decision, you’re not going to make him change it,” he says. “Ever.”

Sanders, for his part, made clear to the public he would be playing to win this time. “What I don’t want people to believe is that this is a similar effort” to his Liberty Union campaigns, he told the press. He saw his campaign as a mini version of the political revolution that would become a staple of his speeches.

“The goal must be to take political power away from the handful of millionaires who currently control it through Mayor Paquette, and place that power in the hands of the working people of the city,” he said.

And unlike his Liberty Union campaigns, Sanders would eschew talking about national issues and foreign policy, focusing instead on building a voter coalition through speaking to local needs and issues. Before he could do that, however, he would have to figure out exactly what those were.

A Left-Wing Tax Revolt

Sanders had always had his eye on the governor’s office, acknowledging privately that “national and state issues are more my thing.” Though he had gestured vaguely at a platform when he was still mulling running for mayor, telling the Free Press he wanted more housing for low- and middle-income Burlingtonians, he and many of his allies were unfamiliar with local politics.

“We were interested in the battle of rich versus poor, military imperialism, etcetera, etcetera,” says Terry Bouricius, a friend from their Liberty Union days who by then had joined the newly formed left-wing Citizens Party. “Running for local office was a stepping-stone. We wanted to build a movement.”

Some of the ideas Sanders would champion came from that November sit-down, as Guma, who been involved in battles against Paquette over development issues, outlined what would have been his own platform.

“If I was running, I would run on this and this and this,” he recalls telling Sanders.

Others came from the informal kitchen cabinet of advisors Sanders quickly assembled, several of them old friends and allies. Advising on strategy and tactics were two of the men who had convinced Sanders to run in the first place: University of Vermont (UVM) professor of religion Richard Sugarman, and public defender John Franco, who had known Sanders from the Liberty Union days. Dick Sartelle, the low-income advocate who had helped them persuade Sanders, would also feature. Others included friends like Bouricius, Michael Kupersmith, an attorney, and Stanley “Huck” Gutman, a UVM English professor who would later serve as Sanders’s chief of staff in the US Senate.

Managing the campaign would be Linda Niedweske. Niedweske had moved from New Jersey to Vermont for college in 1973. Though she had known of Sanders through her cousin, who had worked for him making film strips, Sugarman, her former professor, suggested that she join the campaign.

“I thought it would be interesting, and I thought it was a time for a change in Burlington,” she says. “It was kind of the crossroads for Burlington as to how it was going to go, and the Democratic Party at that time had it all locked up.”

A latecomer was David Clavelle, the former city manager of neighboring Winooski, and a part-time researcher for and “close personal friend” of Democratic Sen. Patrick Leahy, whom Sanders had run against in 1974. In early 1981, Clavelle received a call from Franco, a friend, asking him to get involved.

“I came in and assisted Linda and Bernie in developing a strategy for the last few weeks,” he says.

One key member was Jennie Stoler, a thirty-four-year-old economics professor at St Michael’s College in nearby Colchester. Stoler had befriended Sanders while working at UVM, in whose library he had been a “fixture,” she said. Though members of Sanders’s inner circle remember little about Stoler today, the Free Press painted her at the time as integral to the campaign, reporting that she had “provided the theories for Sanders’ economic and taxation campaign issues.” (Stoler could not be reached for this article).

Through this brain trust, the Sanders campaign came up with a slate of issues that gradually unfurled over the course of the election.

Sanders’s major bugbear was the “regressive and unfair” property tax, which governments statewide had come overwhelmingly to rely on. He was hardly the first, nor the last, municipal politician to oppose property taxes; one of his 2020 Democratic rivals, Julián Castro, was proud of his ability to lower the property tax rate while mayor of San Antonio. But while politicians like Castro paired this policy with other forms of regressive revenue-raising, giveaways to businesses and austerity, Sanders sought to shift the tax burden away from the property tax paid by the majority of Burlingtonians and onto businesses and the city’s well-off.

Sanders pushed for a new real-estate assessment, charging it was “incredible and grossly unfair” that one hadn’t been carried out in more than two decades, and he floated a change to the property tax that would put higher rates on business and industry. The local New England Telephone Company, he said, whose parent company had earned record profits the year before, should pay more in tax than “a widow who owns a small house and lives on Social Security.”

He called for downtown businesses to repay the $1.5 million Church Street Marketplace bond, passed in 1979 to fund the construction of a shopping district downtown. If they refused, he would propose an “immediate reappraisal of business inventory and equipment,” which were subject to tax by the city. He insisted that tax-exempt institutions like UVM and its Medical Center Hospital chip in an annual contribution of $250,000. In the long term, he suggested a city income tax of 5 percent and 8 percent of federal rates for those earning more than $25,000 and $50,000, respectively (around $73,000 and $146,000 in today’s dollars).

In this way, Sanders tailored a left-wing version of the anti-tax message that had just taken Ronald Reagan to the presidency, the culmination of a growing sentiment that had swept the country in the late 1970s. But while Reagan would use the so-called Taxpayers Revolt as a way to start dismantling the New Deal welfare state, Sanders would use it as part of a political form of class warfare, to more heavily tax the city’s wealthiest and pour the proceeds into a more active city government. And though members of his team today say there was nothing conscious about this inversion of the Reagan agenda, it’s clear he himself recognized the dynamic.

“In Vermont, we’ve reversed the struggle over property taxes,” he would later tell the New York Times. “In California it was a right-wing revolt against property taxes, but here it’s the left that supports a cut in property taxes, to help the poor.”

Taxes weren’t the only issue that defined Sanders’ platform, however. At their November meeting, Guma had outlined several specific issues he had been planning to run on, a number of which made their way into Sanders’ campaign. One was opposition to a Southern Connector bypass, due to cut through a low-income community that looked to become another victim of the incumbent administration’s pursuit of “urban renewal.” Another was a waterfront development proposal along Lake Champlain put forward by local real estate maven Antonio Pomerleau, which Sanders labelled an “enclave for the wealthy.”

“The waterfront belongs to all of our citizens and not just a few who can pay enormous prices for their housing,” he said.

Demanding that the city’s growth “benefit the average worker and homeowner,” Sanders opposed new downtown malls and hotels “which would be used almost exclusively by the wealthy and which often pay their workers minimum wage.”

Finally, Sanders took a strong stance on renters issues. He backed the idea of rent control, as Guma had planned to do, a measure aggressively fought for by the city’s neighborhood organizations who were then in the middle of a petition drive for a special election on the matter, and vehemently opposed by the city’s elite, even as 1975 City Report and a 1980 task force endorsed the idea. He also praised the mayor’s Housing Task Force’s decision to establish a fair housing commission to hear rental disputes — one that the mayor himself would soon drop his support for — and pledged to appoint citizens to it “who would vigorously represent the interests of tenants.”

Besides this, Sanders called for higher salaries for city workers, many of whom fumed at Paquette over years of austerity. And he criticized a $77 million redevelopment plan for the Medical Center Hospital, money he charged would be better spent on “preventative health care, housing, and the development of productive jobs.” As he would in his future campaigns, he tried to find a balance between pursuing his socialist politics and stitching together a potential coalition of support.

A Party of One

On the face of it, the emergence of the Citizens Party — formed in Vermont by disillusioned Democrats, former Liberty Unionists, and various left-wing activists —should have meant the arrival of a natural ally for Sanders, who would need not just the mayor’s office, but a cooperative council of aldermen to govern. Yet despite Bouricius’s presence in the campaign’s inner circle, Sanders would be waging this fight separate from the party.

Sanders and the Citizens Party had unspecified “tactical disagreements,” he told the press. He decided to organize his own “Independent Coalition” of aldermanic candidates, though he would only manage to recruit two, one of which was Sartelle. Though the Citizens Party would run three aldermanic candidates, it dutifully kept the mayoral lane clear for Sanders, to have the best chance to knock Paquette off. Yet party members were “miffed,” said one, at Sanders’s plan “to get a coalition of progressives and ignore our existence.”

“There was some concern raised as to him having unilaterally made that decision to run without any approval of others,” recalls Niedweske.

Sanders’s decision to forego the party started a pattern that has endured to today. For the rest of his political career, Sanders would stubbornly remain an independent, refusing to hitch himself to any party, even those with whom he was ostensibly allied. It was, says Bouricius, a product of Sanders’s deep mistrust of party activists, evident in his departure from Liberty Union three years earlier.

“He acknowledges the importance of building mass-base, independent political movement, and that it’s going to inevitably be a party,” he says. “But he’s always had the view that all of the political parties on the Left have been a bunch of self-selected, college-educated know-it-alls who feel like they have figured out the world and they have almost no real connection with the working class and labor unions.” Sanders, he says, didn’t want those self-selected types with the leisure time and income to attend and argue at party meetings to “tell him what positions he should take on issues,” nor be beholden to a steering committee that handcuffed him to any bad decisions it made.”

“I think Bernie always felt he wanted to be an independent,” says Clavelle. “He felt there was more flexibility at that time, particularly in the local elections.”

“Although emotionally he wanted to have a party, no party will ever meet the criteria of being the party that he wants it to be,” says Bouricius.

So Sanders and the Citizens Party ran parallel, uncoordinated campaigns, each in the service of the same broad goal, but stubbornly apart. An early sign of the kind of conflicts that could have developed between the two came in the party’s first caucus in January. While approving resolutions supporting a nuclear-weapons freeze and a delay in the Southern Connector highway, both positions Sanders agreed with, the party objected to a resolution on the need for better pay for police officers, charging that higher salaries wouldn’t improve neighborhood protection or the police department’s relationship with the community — and clashing with Sanders’s own call for higher pay for city workers.

Both campaigns were fighting an uphill battle. The Citizens Party had only just been formed in Vermont, and Sanders, despite his Liberty Union campaigns, was still an unknown with little name recognition and an under-resourced operation that couldn’t pay for advertising. Each embarked on campaigns of furious, sole-eroding door-knocking in the stinging cold of Vermont winter.

“I started knocking on doors in January and found lots of support,” Sanders reflected nine years later. “I figured either people were being very polite or I’m losing it.”

“The strategy was basically to knock on every door several times,” says Niedweske. “We had written pieces that we handed out to people, and it was mainly just on the ground, speaking to people, fielding phone calls, and just being out there and being visible. We were just out there constantly making his presence known and making his positions known.”

This scrappy, boots-on-the-ground approach had all but vanished from the political culture of a Burlington firmly under Democratic control for years, where it had long been the case that whoever was chosen as the candidate by the party caucus was the de facto winner.

“We printed up leaflets and went door to door. I knocked on every door in my district twice, and then would go back,” says Bouricius, who would leave Sanders’s fliers along with his own in homes that he visited.

“The issues were there so it really became a question of turnout,” says Clavelle. “Everything from getting leaflets developed and distributed, to some voter registration, to some phone calls — traditional voter turnout efforts.” To this end, the campaign reached out to the community groups and organizations that had sprung up around issues like waterfront development or connector highway.

“We did a lot of voter registration,” says Bouricius, who recalls aggressively registering those whose doors he knocked on. “I wouldn’t even wait ‘til they got to the ‘Yes.’ I’d say, ‘So spell your first name.’ I would start filling in that part, and by asking them to spell their name, in the end I’d get their phone number, and then we would call them: ‘Tomorrow’s election day, you need a ride to the polls?’”

A Divided Establishment

Sanders and his allies may have taken the race seriously, but that didn’t carry over to local political observers. In January, two months before the election, Sanders wasn’t considered a serious contender, with the Free Press even calling for the GOP to run a candidate to ensure a true citywide debate happened. The Republicans decided, just as they had the previous three elections, not to run anyone, a sign of Paquette and the Democrats’ stranglehold on Burlington politics.

Nor was Sanders taken seriously by his opponent. Paquette regularly referred to him as “Saunders” and, like many firmly established incumbents, declined his challenge to a series of debates. He would be too busy campaigning and “selling issues” that were on the city ballot in March to do so, Paquette claimed. Sanders called it “arrogant and irresponsible.”

Yet several factors made Paquette extra vulnerable going into 1981. Having run for years on having “kept the taxes down,” Paquette would now be pushing a contentious 65-cent increase to the property tax rate, a hike of 30 percent. He had made himself an easy target of Sanders’s left-wing anti-tax campaign.

Meanwhile, the Democratic Party had alienated the local Italian-American community. In theory, the Burlington Democrats were an alliance between the city’s three prevailing Catholic immigrant groups: the French, Irish, and Italians. But bitter memories lingered of an urban renewal project pushed by the party in 1963 that had bulldozed a working-class Italian neighborhood to make way for a mall, razing 300 buildings and displacing 157 households.

Then there was the fateful decision by fellow Democrat and restaurateur Richard Bove to launch his own challenge to Paquette. Bove, a member of a prominent political family, had earlier served as the city’s Fire Commissioner before being ousted in 1975 by a closed-door caucus of Democratic aldermen.

Upset by Paquette’s tax hike, feeling the mayor had “been there a long time,” and unhappy with the nonexistent benefits of his “urban renewal” projects, Bove first (unsuccessfully) challenged Paquette for the Democratic nomination before launching his own run. He thus created the three-way race that Burlington’s left had recognized as a precondition for defeating Paquette — one that by late February became a four-way race, when Joseph McGrath, a North End resident and distant relative of Paquette’s, threw his own hat in the ring.

As the campaign proceeded, Sanders hammered the vulnerable incumbent, particularly over taxes. He charged Paquette lacked the “vision and the guts” to fight for new city revenue. He called Paquette’s warnings that a failure to pass his proposed 65-cent tax increase on homeowners would put city workers’ jobs at risk a “repugnant” strategy of “divide and conquer.”

“The only idea he can come up with for raising new revenue is to increase the tax on homeowners,” said Sanders.

He accused Paquette of failing to see a crisis in kids turning to crime, in the elderly who had no voice in City Hall, and in people on low and medium incomes who were falling behind on taxes. The city should “tax those who can pay and get off the backs of the people who can’t,” he said.

Sanders proposed measures that signaled a more vigorous conception of what City Hall could do. He pledged to lead a delegation of city officials and citizens to the state legislature to protest the governor’s proposed gas tax hike. Favoring a “more human and less costly approach” to fighting crime, Sanders suggested setting up programs like an athletic league and opening gyms in the afternoon to keep kids occupied.

Perhaps most important was Sanders’s announcement in mid-February that he would make reorganizing the city’s police department his top priority. The police had long had a contentious relationship with Paquette, chafing at his budget cuts. Sanders called the resignation of a quarter of the force in the previous year a “catastrophe” and promised to fire Police Commission chairman Pomerleau — the same Pomerleau whose waterfront development he’d made a target of his campaign.

“This Is a Problem”

Sanders’s first victory came when Paquette was finally forced to properly acknowledge his existence. Paquette stopped mispronouncing his name and, under pressure from Sanders and the other two mayoral candidates, agreed to three candidates’ forums, the closest thing there would be to debates.

After having physically avoided Sanders at an event the two had appeared at only weeks earlier, Paquette took the fight to his challenger. Paquette charged Sanders with talking like “Robin Hood” (“It didn’t work for Robin Hood,” he added), accused him of wanting to be “elected dictator,” and pitched himself as an insider with the clout to get things done, while Sanders and the rest would need to be “trained.” He also took exception to Sanders’s characterization of him as cozy with business and the wealthy. “I’m not a money man,” Paquette complained. (For good measure, Paquette also accused Bove of having been too “busy making spaghetti” to attend city meetings).

Sanders fired back. He thundered that people were being squeezed by rising costs and taxes, and said that “the thrust of who I am as a human being is totally different” from Paquette. Reagan’s election briefly made its way into the race, with Sanders declaring he was “extremely concerned” with the budget the president was soon to pass with the help of Congressional Democrats.

“In virtually every area that has received help since the time of FDR there will be cuts,” warned Sanders. “There are people out there buying cat food and they don’t have cats.” Paquette denied the budget would have much impact on the city.

One of the key turning points came in late February, when Sanders received the Burlington Patrolmen’s Association’s endorsement, not long after granting Paquette a hostile reception at a private meeting. Sanders was the only candidate “in a long time” to show interest in the police, said its president, Joseph Crepeau, and had “constructive ideas for cutting down juvenile crime.” At a time when police around the country had rallied around a hard-right ideologue in the form of Reagan, they were backing an avowed socialist in Burlington.

More endorsements trickled in shortly before the election, such as the University of Vermont faculty. By March, even the Citizens Party threw their backing behind Sanders, saying they supported his positions “just about down the line.”

Meanwhile, the forums did not go well for Paquette. At a February 25 event sponsored by seven Burlington neighborhood groups and broadcast on the radio, Paquette opened by immediately insulting the hosts, saying, “some of these organizations I didn’t know existed until three weeks ago”; he quickly apologized after being chided by Sanders. (In fairness to Paquette, some really had only been active for a few months). Paquette charged that Sanders would turn Burlington into his hometown of Brooklyn, which he disparaged as rundown and unsafe; the audience hissed back and the line received an angry rebuke in the letters section of the Free Press. Several audience members lobbed criticisms at him.

Sanders, by contrast, was applauded at the forum for calling for more public participation in city affairs. “Listeners heard Paquette booed and Sanders cheered by more than one hundred people,” wrote the Free Press. He received praise in its letters section from one enamored reader. Former Vermont governor Philip Hoff, whose 1962 election had heralded the state’s leftward shift and who backed Paquette, commended Sanders for saying “significant things” and fulfilling a “valuable educational function” by raising the issues he had.

“We had learned, if you create the opportunity, we’ll bring the audience,” says Guma. “A debate can be a dog-and-pony show if there’s no debate. But if you’re prepared to really compete for the audience, then you can change the playing field.”

“It was filled with low-income renters, and the place was solidly pro-Bernie,” says Bouricius. “And Paquette, you could see a look of amazement, and, not quite terror, but ‘This is a problem.’”

Still, there was no way Sanders could win. The sixty-four-year-old Paquette hadn’t lost an election in twenty-three years. He’d never received less than 54 percent of the vote. He’d never even lost a single ward since his first race in 1958. “The consensus from a variety of sources,” reported the Free Press‘ Alan Abbey shortly before the election, “is Paquette will receive 56 percent, Sanders 24 percent.” And it didn’t help that the first Tuesday of March, voting day, would be bitterly cold.

“That day may have been below zero,” Clavelle recalls. “I remember standing outside holding signs at intersections encouraging people to vote, and it was really cold out.”

“By election day, I felt one of two things would happen,” Sanders said years later. “Either I was going to win by a landslide or I’m going to get killed. I actually did not expect a cliffhanger.”

“Sanders Stuns”

The result on March 3 was not just stunning; for many in Burlington, it was unimaginable.

“Bernard Sanders sent Burlington’s political establishment reeling,” opened the March 4 cover story in the Free Press, next to a photo of a triumphant, grinning Sanders, arms raised above his head in victory.

The unofficial tally was 4,035 to Sanders vs. Paquette’s 4,023; Sanders had won by only twelve votes, adjusted later to twenty-two. He’d won half the city’s six wards, winning easily in Wards Two and Three, the city center and Old North End. In the heavily Democratic Ward One, he won by two votes. In the rest, he came remarkably close.

“Neighborhood activists, renters and the poor — for years the traditional Democratic constituency — bolted the party to vote for Sanders,” the Free Press‘ Scott Mackay later wrote.

These margins weren’t an accident. Wards Two and Three were filled with precisely the kind of forgotten Burlingtonians Sanders had spoken about, and his campaign had worked hard pounding the pavement in those districts. His campaign also appeared to have boosted voter turnout: Sanders and Paquette’s tallies alone outnumbered the 6,594 Burlingtonians who had voted two years earlier. The turnout in Ward Three, declining for years, had suddenly spiked. Sanders’ campaign had succeeded in bringing out non-voters.

“A lot people had never voted in local elections,” says Clavelle.

Paquette’s support, meanwhile, had rested mostly on the city’s Republicans, with his biggest margins coming from the mostly Republican Wards Four and Six. Yet even in Ward Four, Paquette’s home ward, his margin fell short of previous elections. Sanders, it appeared, had won over a substantial number of GOP voters. And crucially, Bove and McGrath had sapped away 1,090 and 138 votes, respectively, from the mayor.

“I was the dark horse who put Bernie Sanders in office,” Bove said a decade later, with Sanders agreeing.

The next morning, a sleepless and conciliatory Sanders held a press conference. “I want to see a rebirth of the human spirit in the largest city in the most beautiful state,” he said, warning that he would make mistakes from inexperience. He warned, too, that “it will be impossible for me single-handedly to bring about change,” and pledged to involve “people who have not felt a part of government.” He proposed creating a mayor’s advisory council to give voice to the groups that had put him in office.

Yet the incoming mayor was starting from a precarious position. Voters had soundly rejected Paquette’s 65-cent tax hike, dumping a fiscal crisis on Sanders’s desk a month before he’d even have a chance to occupy it. The following month, they would reject several rent review proposals Sanders had backed. This, together with the narrow victory margin, didn’t suggest across-the-board enthusiasm for the new mayor and his vision.

What’s more, Sanders’s Independent Coalition candidates, or what few of them he ultimately cobbled together, had been obliterated by their incumbent opponents. Only one prospective ally won a seat on the thirteen-person board of aldermen: Bouricius, who upset the Democrat in Ward 2 to become the first ever Citizens Party candidate elected to office.

“I extend the olive branch,” Sanders said at his press conference. “I do not want to go to war with anybody. I do not want to fight every step of the way, and hope we will work in cooperation.” While affirming that city decisions would “not be made in the offices of banks and big businesses anymore,” he insisted he would work in “as cordial a relationship” as possible.

Whatever surprise Sanders may have felt about winning was nothing compared to the city establishment, which was left stupefied and dismayed. Herluf Olsen, president of the Medical Center Hospital whose expansion Sanders had campaigned against, said he nearly drove off the road upon hearing the news over the radio. Sanders had little chance of having a “significant, rapid effect” on life in Burlington, insisted Hilton Wick, president of the Chittenden Trust Co., the city’s largest commercial bank. “A lot of people downtown are alarmed,” said one downtown merchant.

The city’s Democrats were particularly devastated. Their victory celebration was described as more akin to a wake than a party. “I’m a little numb, I guess,” said Joyce Desautels, the Democratic alderman for Ward 1, and lifelong friend of Paquette. “I’m still depressed,” she added two days later. A pall blanketed City Hall as workers tried to adjust to the new reality. A despondent Paquette answered calls from apologetic friends and issued terse answers to the press.

“I know what it means,” he said. “I’m probably the only guy who does.”

Yet even as Sanders extended his hand in cooperation, the response from defiant Democrats hinted at what was to come. Aldermen, who had generally granted Paquette their full support, now talked about asserting their independence and authority. They predicted Sanders would find it tough to keep his promises, such as giving the police a raise. “If this guy is for real, and he wins, I’ll run against him two years from now,” Democratic state senator Thomas Crowley had vowed.

“If they want a state of siege, they might pull it off,” Franco told the Free Press.

The campaign had, as Sanders put it, “pulled off something no one thought we could do.” He had shocked Burlington by challenging its political establishment and beating an unbeatable mayor. He was about to find out that was the easy part.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
FOCUS: The Real Purpose of Trump's Executive Order on Anti-Semitism Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=46742"><span class="small">Masha Gessen, The New Yorker</span></a>   
Friday, 13 December 2019 12:24

Gessen writes: "Donald Trump has a knack for taking some of humanity's most problematic ideas and turning them on their head to make them even worse. He has done it again."

Donald Trump MAGA yarmulke. (photo: Tom Brenner/Reuters)
Donald Trump MAGA yarmulke. (photo: Tom Brenner/Reuters)


The Real Purpose of Trump's Executive Order on Anti-Semitism

By Masha Gessen, The New Yorker

13 December 19

 

onald Trump has a knack for taking some of humanity’s most problematic ideas and turning them on their head to make them even worse. He has done it again. On Wednesday, he signed an executive order that will allow federal funds to be withheld from colleges where students are not protected from anti-Semitism—using an absurdly defined version of what constitutes anti-Semitism. Recent precedent and the history of legislative efforts that preceded the executive order would suggest that its main targets are campus groups critical of Israeli policies. What the order itself did not make explicit, the President’s son-in-law did: on Wednesday, Jared Kushner published an Op-Ed in the Times in which he stressed that the definition of anti-Semitism used in the executive order “makes clear what our administration has stated publicly on the record: Anti-Zionism is anti-Semitism.”

Both Kushner and the executive order refer to the definition of anti-Semitism that was formulated, in 2016, by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance; it has since been adopted by the State Department. The definition supplies examples of anti-Semitism, and Kushner cited the most problematic of these as the most important: “the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity”; denial to “the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g. by claiming that the existence of a state of Israel is a racist endeavor”; and comparing “contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” All three examples perform the same sleight of hand: they reframe opposition to or criticism of Israeli policies as opposition to the state of Israel. And that, says Kushner, is anti-Semitism.

To be sure, some people who are critical of Israeli policies are opposed to the existence of the state of Israel itself. And some of those people are also anti-Semites. I am intimately familiar with this brand of anti-Semitism, because I grew up in the Soviet Union, where anti-Zionist rhetoric served as the propaganda backbone of state anti-Semitism. The word “Zionist,” when deployed by Pravda, served as incitement to violence and discrimination against Soviet Jews. All of this can be true at the same time that it is also true that Israel has effectively created an apartheid state, in which some Palestinians have some political rights and the rest have none. Human-rights organizations such as Breaking the Silence and B’Tselem—Israeli groups, founded and run by Jews—continue to document harrowing abuse of Palestinians in Israel, the occupied West Bank, and Gaza.

In August, I went on a tour designed by Breaking the Silence that aims to show Israelis and foreigners what the occupation looks like. This particular tour ended in a Palestinian village which has been largely overtaken by an Israeli settlement that is illegal under international law. One of the Palestinian houses ended up on territory claimed by the settlers, so the settlers built a chain-link cage around the house, the yard, and the driveway. A young Palestinian child, who is growing up in a house inside a cage, waved to us through the fencing. Comparing this sort of approach to Nazi policies may not make for the most useful argument, but it is certainly not outlandish. The memory of the Holocaust stands as a warning to humanity about the dangers of dehumanizing the other—and invoking that warning in Palestine is warranted.

One does not have to be an anti-Semite to be an anti-Zionist, but one certainly can be both an anti-Semite and an anti-Zionist. Trump, however, has inverted this formula by positioning himself as a pro-Zionist anti-Semite. He has proclaimed his support often for the state of Israel. His Administration’s policies, which have included moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem and, more recently, declaring that the U.S. does not view Israeli settlements in the West Bank as illegal, have pleased the state of Israel, especially its most militantly expansionist citizens. Over the weekend, however, at the Israeli American Council National Summit, in Florida, Trump gave a speech that brimmed with Jewish stereotypes: Jews and greed, Jews and money, Jews as ruthless wheeler-dealers. “You’re brutal killers, not nice people at all,” he said. It was the kind of stuff that requires no definitions, op-eds, or explanations—it was plain, easily recognizable anti-Semitism. And it was not the first time that Trump trafficked in anti-Semitic stereotypes. The world view behind these stereotypes, combined with support for Israel, is also recognizable. To Trump, Jews—including American Jews, some of whom vote for him—are alien beings whom he associates with the state of Israel. He finds these alien beings at once distasteful and worthy of a sort of admiration, perhaps because he ascribes to them many of the features that he also recognizes in himself.

It should come as no surprise that anti-Semitic incidents in the U.S. increased by sixty per cent during the first year of Trump’s Presidency, according to the Anti-Defamation League. The current year is on track to set a record for the number of anti-Semitic attacks. The latest appears to have occurred on Tuesday, when shooters reportedly connected to a fringe group targeted a kosher supermarket in Jersey City, killing four people.

The new executive order will not protect anyone against anti-Semitism, and it’s not intended to. Its sole aim is to quash the defense—and even the discussion—of Palestinian rights. Its victim will be free speech.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
FOCUS: Why Bernie Sanders Is No Jeremy Corbyn Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=47634"><span class="small">Franklin Foer, The Atlantic</span></a>   
Friday, 13 December 2019 11:54

Foer writes: "Even though the polls always suggested the likelihood of Jeremy Corbyn's defeat in yesterday's British elections, his continued presence as the head of the Labour Party filled me with a great sense of foreboding."

Sen. Bernie Sanders. (photo: Nati Harnik/AP)
Sen. Bernie Sanders. (photo: Nati Harnik/AP)


Why Bernie Sanders Is No Jeremy Corbyn

By Franklin Foer, The Atlantic

13 December 19

 

ven though the polls always suggested the likelihood of Jeremy Corbyn’s defeat in yesterday’s British elections, his continued presence as the head of the Labour Party filled me with a great sense of foreboding. The local press excavated from Corbyn’s not-so-distant past videos that revealed him to be, at best, indifferent to anti-Semitism: as he vouched for the moral character of an imam who had accused Jews of drinking the blood of children; as he championed a mural artist who’d painted a cabal of hook-nosed bankers; as he accused Zionists of lacking “English irony.” When confronted with these statements—there are plenty more—he tended to express irritation rather than contrition.

A venerable political party that poses as the enemy of racism was suddenly and demonstrably rife with it. From the other side of the Atlantic, it was hard not to entertain the anxiety that something similar might plausibly happen here, and soon: In the leftward shift of the Democratic Party, a strain of Corbynism might implant itself.  

As I have turned over this worry—the fear that the populist left might replicate the sins of the populist right—my concerns have usually been allayed by the fact that the American version of Jeremy Corbyn is Bernie Sanders. The two resurgent relics of the ’70s left have ascended in tandem—and their ascents have exposed subtle (but crucial) moral and ideological distinctions.

The reasons to lump Corbyn and Sanders together are obvious enough. During the prime of their political careers, they were both dissidents howling at the neoliberal consensus. Decades of defiance left them as the lone, rumpled tribunes of an ideology that had supposedly been vanquished by history. But when the financial crisis of 2008 stoked raging indignation against the prevailing order, the zeitgeist unexpectedly gusted in their direction. Everything that had held them back—their righteous indignation, their indifference to artifice, their political isolation—suddenly propelled them forward.

While they share a skepticism of capitalism, they have different defining passions. As anyone who watched Bernie Sanders’s campaign in 2016 can attest, he doesn’t care that deeply about foreign policy. (For the first five months of that campaign, his website didn’t have a foreign-policy section.) Corbyn, by contrast, comes from a segment of the left motivated by anti-imperialism and its impulse to display solidarity with the subaltern. This makes Corbyn both more skeptical of his own government—as well as of the European Union—and more sympathetic to whatever groups he deems colonial victims. He made apologies for the Syrian barrel bomber Bashar al-Assad and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. He once described members of Hamas and Hezbollah as “friends,” despite their histories of terrorism—a description he eventually retracted, after it already betrayed his core beliefs.

There’s no doubt that Sanders shares some of the Corbyn view of the world. He will sometimes invoke the inglorious American history of intervening in Latin America. But Sanders is less conspiratorial and more open-minded than his British cousin. Consider how differently they have reacted to Vladimir Putin. When the Russians poisoned an ex-spy and his daughter in Salisbury last year, Corbyn expressed immediate skepticism about how quickly the British government apportioned blame for the crime. Sanders hasn’t similarly hesitated to criticize Putin. He readily condemned Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. And he has said that he would make opposition to authoritarian kleptocrats central to his foreign policy. (His speeches linking global inequality to illiberal authoritarianism contain a theory of kleptocracy that other candidates should borrow.)

While Sanders might have been a foreign-policy outlier in the years immediately following 9/11, his views aren’t so far from the prevailing post-Iraq consensus. He doesn’t reject humanitarian intervention on principle, even as he rails against endless wars. Sanders supported the U.S. air strikes during the Kosovo War; he was sympathetic to Barack Obama’s intervention in Libya, although he eventually came to view that policy skeptically. Where Corbyn has said that he wished NATO never existed, Sanders has merely bellyached about member states paying their dues.

At the core of Corbyn’s foreign policy is an obsession with Israel, which has manifested as incessant sneering about Zionism. Sanders hasn’t stoked rage against Zionists, perhaps because he is the descendant of Holocaust survivors, who spent several months living on a Kibbutz near Haifa in his early 20s. Although he tends to avoid talking about his ethnic identity, he published a recent essay in Jewish Currents, in which he wrote about his “pride and admiration for Israel” and the “enormous achievement of establishing a democratic homeland for the Jewish people after centuries of displacement and persecution.”

That said, Sanders is often highly critical of Israel. He has toyed with the idea of leveraging U.S. military aid to prod Israel into ending the occupation of the West Bank, for instance, a substantial break with the consensus. And he has proved reluctant to call out anti-Semitism in the ranks of his own supporters, including one of his surrogates. On the subject of Corbyn’s bigotry, he has remained disappointingly silent.

But the point is that the rise of the left could have gone much worse for the Democrats. It could have taken the form of an apologist for dictators and a fomenter of anti-Semitism. Attacks on globalization could have veered into coded smears of globalists. The rightful flaying Wall Street deserves could have been expressed in nasty tropes. Perhaps judging a politician in relation to Jeremy Corbyn isn’t the most stringent moral test one could apply, but it’s worth a moment’s gratitude that Sanders passes.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
McConnell's Plan for Sham Trial Reveals Depths of Trump's Corruption Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=52544"><span class="small">Greg Sargent, The Washington Post</span></a>   
Friday, 13 December 2019 09:40

Sargent writes: "If Mitch McConnell goes through with his reported plan to hold a sham impeachment trial that acquits President Trump without calling witnesses, it will provide the perfect coda for the corrupt and farcical way Trump's defenders have handled this saga all throughout."

Sen. Mitch McConnell. (photo: J. Scott Applewhite/AP)
Sen. Mitch McConnell. (photo: J. Scott Applewhite/AP)


McConnell's Plan for Sham Trial Reveals Depths of Trump's Corruption

By Greg Sargent, The Washington Post

13 December 19

 

f Mitch McConnell goes through with his reported plan to hold a sham impeachment trial that acquits President Trump without calling witnesses, it will provide the perfect coda for the corrupt and farcical way Trump’s defenders have handled this saga all throughout.

In so doing, the Senate majority leader and other assorted Trump propagandists will be unabashedly enshrining their position as follows: We’ve already decided in advance that the full facts will not persuade us to turn on Trump, no matter how damning they are, so why should we listen to them at all?

The latest updates in the Trump impeachment process

This is how Trump’s defenders actually view the situation — and the awful implications of this should not be sugar-coated.

Yet the scheme may not prove as easy to get away with as they think. Handled properly, Democrats can use it to demonstrate that Republicans themselves know Trump’s substantive defenses are weak and his corruption is indefensible — and vividly show how Republicans are functioning as Trump’s full-blown accomplices.

The Post has the latest on McConnell’s scheming: Republican senators are “coalescing” behind a quick impeachment trial that would call no witnesses and result in a quick acquittal vote. Republicans are trying to resist Trump’s stated desire to turn this into a huge and messy spectacle by insisting on hearing from witnesses such as Hunter Biden.

In essence, Trump envisions a trial that would become a mere continuation of the corrupt scheme for which he’s being impeached in the first place. It would keep on trying to validate Trump’s invented narrative of Joe Biden’s corruption, but use the trial to do so, when previously he tried to extort Ukraine into helping him do it.

But there’s a problem with this, as The Post reports:

McConnell is not sure Republicans have enough votes to only call Trump’s preferred list, the person said. Any agreement to call a witness would require 51 votes, and if Democratic votes were needed to end an impasse among Republicans, Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.) would demand his own list of witnesses as part of any compromise.

Under McConnell’s thinking, this could possibly mean calling Vice President Pence and top White House aides, such as acting chief of staff Mick Mulvaney, to testify.

“Witnesses would be a double-edged sword,” Sen. Mike Braun (R-Ind.) said.

Republicans might not have 51 GOP votes to realize this scheme — any such process decisions would require majority approval. This would mean if only a handful of the 53 GOP senators declined to approve it, Democrats would have leverage to demand witnesses of their own.

McConnell doesn’t want that. As The Post notes, McConnell cryptically hinted at this, suggesting recently he hopes 51 GOP senators just say “they’ve heard enough and believe they know what will happen.”

Translation: GOP senators don’t need to hear from witnesses called by Democrats, because they know that they’re going to acquit Trump no matter what emerges.

It’s important to note here that we still haven’t heard from numerous key players who almost certainly have direct knowledge of Trump’s most corrupt acts — because the White House has blocked that from happening.

Among those witnesses are people who directly interacted with Trump over his freezing of hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to Ukraine, such as acting White House chief of staff Mick Mulvaney and former national security adviser John Bolton.

Ambassador to the European Union Gordon Sondland admitted to using that money to leverage Ukraine into announcing the sham investigation of Biden that Trump wanted, at what he fully understood as Trump’s direction.

Obviously, if those witnesses confirmed in some way that Trump personally and explicitly discussed the military aid extortion plot with them, it would be even more devastating than what has already been established.

It’s true that we don’t know what those witnesses would say. But the rub is that Republicans don’t want to find out. And their reasoning has been laid bare for all to see: They are determined to acquit Trump no matter how incredibly damning such testimony might be, so they may as well spare themselves the political hardship that such testimony might inflict on them.

Of course, there’s also the outside risk that such testimony might make it impossible for a handful of GOP senators to vote to acquit Trump. Such a break must also be averted at all costs.

About those 51 senators

In that context, it’s telling that McConnell does not yet have 51 votes in hand for this plan. This shows it may be difficult for a few GOP senators to associate themselves with a trial that’s rigged to acquit Trump while avoiding hearing anything new about his corruption.

As this analysis by Perry Bacon Jr. shows, senators such as Mitt Romney and Lisa Murkowski want to maintain the appearance of principled independence from Trump. Meanwhile, Susan Collins, Cory Gardner, Martha McSally and Joni Ernst will feel pressure to appear to take evidence seriously to survive reelection.

And a Democratic aide points out to me that, if McConnell doesn’t have 51 votes for procedural gimmickry allowing Trump to skate, that will allow Democrats to try to assemble a majority in the Senate for sounder procedures.

“It’s very hard for any senator to vote against seeking the truth," the aide tells me.

At bottom, though, all this reveals how fraudulent Trump’s posture on the trial really is. Trump’s aides insist he wants to mount a full defense of himself in the Senate while prosecuting the case against Biden. But Trump emphatically does not want this to result in testimony from all the witnesses Trump has blocked.

So it would not be surprising if Trump accedes to McConnell’s wishes. Because what Trump really wants is a trial that allows him to keep smearing Biden while simultaneously keeping the coverup of his true designs in full swing.

Which is to say, he just wants the Senate trial to pick up where his whole corrupt scheme left off.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
Decades-Old Protections for Protesters Are in Jeopardy Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=52224"><span class="small">Vaidya Gullapalli, The Appeal</span></a>   
Friday, 13 December 2019 09:40

Gullapalli writes: "Alton Sterling was one of more than 200 Black men, women, and children killed by police in 2016. His death came just one day before the police killing of Philando Castile in Minnesota. More than 100 people were arrested at the protest in Baton Rouge, most for obstructing a highway. Among them was DeRay Mckesson, the prominent Black Lives Matter activist."

Marchers in Baton Rouge protest the police shooting of Alton Sterling on July 5, 2016. (photo: Mark Walheiser/Getty)
Marchers in Baton Rouge protest the police shooting of Alton Sterling on July 5, 2016. (photo: Mark Walheiser/Getty)


Decades-Old Protections for Protesters Are in Jeopardy

By Vaidya Gullapalli, The Appeal

13 December 19


Spotlights like this one provide original commentary and analysis on pressing criminal justice issues of the day. You can read them each day in our newsletter, The Daily Appeal.

n July 5, 2016, Alton Sterling, a Black resident of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, was shot and killed by two on-duty police officers responding to an anonymous 911 call. Soon after, members of the city’s Black community took to the streets, including the area in front of Police Department headquarters, to express their anguish, celebrate Mr. Sterling’s life and humanity, and convey the need for accountability and transformative change.”

This is from the petition for certiorari presented to the Supreme Court by the American Civil Liberties Union in Doe v. McKesson. It continues:

“As with protests prompted by police violence elsewhere, one way those assembled conveyed their dismay was by insisting, to the police before them, their community, and the watching world, that ‘Black Lives Matter.’”

Alton Sterling was one of more than 200 Black men, women, and children killed by police in 2016. His death came just one day before the police killing of Philando Castile in Minnesota.

More than 100 people were arrested at the protest in Baton Rouge, most for obstructing a highway. Among them was DeRay Mckesson, the prominent Black Lives Matter activist. In an interview with the New York Times immediately after the protest and arrests, Mckesson said “the police want protesters to be too afraid to protest.”

During the protest, a police officer was seriously injured when someone threw a hard object that hit him. The person who threw the object was never identified. The officer, proceeding anonymously, decided to file a lawsuit. Its targets? The hashtag #BlackLivesMatter, Black Lives Matter, and Mckesson. Mckesson’s quote in the New York Times article published after the protest was cited in the complaint alleging that he was responsible for inciting violence.

The lawsuit was filed in federal district court, and the federal judge concluded it “bordered on the delusional,” wrote Adam Liptak of the New York Times. With respect to the first target, the judge wrote, “A hashtag is patently incapable of being sued.” Black Lives Matter was also an entity that could not be sued, he explained, describing it as “a social movement rather than an organization or entity of any sort.” Finally, the part of the lawsuit seeking damages from Mckesson was dismissed on First Amendment grounds. “Liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence,” the judge wrote, quoting from the Supreme Court’s  landmark civil rights decision, NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co, issued in 1982. (The case concerned a lawsuit by white merchants after some acts of violence during an economic boycott organized by the local NAACP.)

Yet the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that although the Black Lives Matter hashtag and movement could not be sued, McKesson could, on the grounds that he “should have known that leading the demonstrators onto a busy highway was most nearly certain to provoke a confrontation between police and the mass of demonstrators.” A full panel of the court reviewed the case and issued what was, in effect, the same decision.

Constitutional law professor Garrett Epps, who has been following the casedescribed the offensiveness of the Fifth Circuit decision: “The stakes are high, and the Fifth Circuit panel’s offense is rank. The decision was not simply lawless, but insolently so.”

In the Claiborne ruling, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote that the organizers of the boycott sought “to challenge a political and economic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this country had fought a Civil War to secure.” To permit lawsuits  against individuals because of the violence of others would discourage those challenges and make it easier for the government to suppress the rights of Black citizens

Now, Mckesson and the ACLU have asked the Supreme Court to review his case and the Fifth Circuit decision.

If the case were allowed to proceed, Mckesson could prevail at trial. Yet the burden of defending himself is precisely the kind of cost that would chill free speech rights. And the ability to sue protesters for consequences entirely unrelated to their actions is exactly the power of harassment that law enforcement should not be allowed to wield.

The gulf (as Epps describes it) between the Fifth Circuit’s decision and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and the consequences that the circuit court’s decision will have for future protests are central to the importance of this case. The point of the lawsuits against protest organizers is not hard to discern. They are part of an effort, that predates our current moment, to make organizing and activism as personally costly as possible for organizers. Even if Mckesson were to win at a trial, he would have to expend the time, energy, and resources to defend himself until then. And the prospect of having to do that is meant to discourage organizers of future protests.

As Ian Millhiser wrote in ThinkProgress, the circuit court’s opinion “offers a road map to police officers—or, really, to anyone injured by a single participant in a political movement they disagree with—to shut down those movements with litigation.”

Alanah Odoms Hebert, the head of the ACLU of Louisiana, said in a statement to The Atlantic: “The principles outlined in this decision put civil disobedience at risk. If this doctrine had existed during the civil rights movement there would not have been a civil rights movement.”

The Supreme Court’s decision in Claiborne nearly 40 years ago was reached with an understanding of the need for political organizing. As Millhiser wrote: “Opinions like Claiborne exist for a reason. They exist because wise judges understood that the price of political organizing is that sometimes people with violent motives will join a movement without the knowledge of the movement’s leaders. If those leaders can be held liable for the wrongful actions of a fringe minority, then such organizing would be too dangerous for any but the most deep-pocketed movements, and core First Amendment rights will become meaningless.”

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
<< Start < Prev 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 Next > End >>

Page 659 of 3432

THE NEW STREAMLINED RSN LOGIN PROCESS: Register once, then login and you are ready to comment. All you need is a Username and a Password of your choosing and you are free to comment whenever you like! Welcome to the Reader Supported News community.

RSNRSN