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FOCUS: The Legal Fight Awaiting Us After the Election |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=51459"><span class="small">Jeffrey Toobin, The New Yorker</span></a>
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Wednesday, 23 September 2020 10:42 |
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Toobin writes: "The aftermath of November's vote has the potential to make 2000 look like a mere skirmish."
This year, each side has mustered for a legal fight that began months ago and may well continue long after Election Day. (image: Tyler Comrie/Zena Holloway/Nathan Griffith/Getty Images)

The Legal Fight Awaiting Us After the Election
By Jeffery Toobin, The New Yorker
23 September 20
The aftermath of November’s vote has the potential to make 2000 look like a mere skirmish.
he immediate aftermath of the Presidential election of 2000 has taken on the air of legend. On Election Night, news organizations first called Florida for Vice-President Al Gore—then, about two hours later, withdrew the call and, about four hours after that, declared that George W. Bush, the governor of Texas, had won the state, giving him enough electoral votes to become President. Gore called Bush to concede, and left his hotel in a motorcade to announce the end of his campaign to his supporters. His aides, learning that the race in Florida was, in fact, too close to call, tried frantically to contact the Vice-President in his limousine. They reached him just in time, and he telephoned Bush to retract the concession. Bush indignantly told Gore that his “little brother”—the governor of Florida, Jeb Bush—had said that he had won. “Let me explain something,” Gore replied. “Your little brother is not the ultimate authority on this.”
Like all historical events, the following thirty-five days can look, in retrospect, inevitable, even preordained. But they were a product of choice, improvisation, and happenstance. Gore demanded recounts in four Democratic-leaning counties, which began the painstaking process of studying their punch-card ballots and determining whether the tiny boxes known as chads had been fully detached. Bush responded by filing a lawsuit in federal court in Miami to stop the recounts. In one of the lesser-known events surrounding that case, James A. Baker III, Bush’s lead strategist at the time, called John C. Danforth, the former Republican senator from Missouri and an ordained minister, who was famous for his rectitude. Baker wanted Danforth to be Bush’s spokesman in the suit. Danforth was horrified. “Candidates don’t sue,” he told Baker. “You could ruin Governor Bush’s career. He’s only fifty-four years old, and the decision to file a court case like this would be a black mark that followed him forever. And it would destroy the reputation of everyone involved on the Bush side.”
Danforth came from an era when political norms dictated a culture of deference to announced electoral outcomes. (Richard Nixon, reflecting these values, chose not to challenge the results of his narrow defeat in 1960.) Baker thanked Danforth for his time and proceeded to file that lawsuit and several others, mobilizing the Republican Party behind the efforts for the George Bush–Dick Cheney ticket. There were street protests outside the Vice-President’s mansion (“Get out of Cheney’s house!”), and a deployment of the finest political and legal talent in the Republican Party. Many of the lawyers working on the recount cases, far from suffering damage to their careers, were guaranteed political futures—they included John G. Roberts, Jr., whom Bush appointed to the Supreme Court, and Noel Francisco, who became President Trump’s Solicitor General.
To the frustration of countless Democrats, Gore took a high-minded, traditional approach, asserting that the recount was a legal, not a political, process, and directing his supporters to stay off the streets. (Gore told the Reverend Jesse Jackson to call off protests that he had organized against the disenfranchisement of African-Americans in Florida.) In this spirit, Gore named the diplomat Warren Christopher, rather than a pol, to lead his recount efforts, and relied on a talented but small group of lawyers in Florida, who struggled to keep up with Republican reinforcements from around the country. The contrasts were cultural in addition to being substantive. David Boies, Gore’s lead lawyer toward the end of the process, promenaded along the broad plazas of Tallahassee, bantering cheerfully with reporters and passersby. Benjamin Ginsberg, the general counsel to the Bush campaign and the dean of Republican election lawyers, paced the streets in a state of rage. “They are trying to steal this,” Ginsberg said repeatedly, of the Democrats, color rising to the top of his bald head. In the end, Bush’s resort to the courts proved to be his salvation. In the case known as Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four, held that the recounts violated Bush’s rights, thus sealing his victory in Florida.
Ultimately, George Bush was declared the winner in Florida by five hundred and thirty-seven votes, out of some six million cast. The result might have been the same if Gore had chosen a more assertive strategy, but the parties’ contrasting approaches—Republican aggression versus Democratic restraint—remain a crucial legacy of the contest. That year, the recount struggle came as a surprise to both candidates. This year, each side has mustered for a legal fight that began months ago and may well continue long after November 3rd. President Trump has ratcheted up the Bush strategy of total political warfare: he has already refused to commit to accepting the outcome of the election. “The only way we’re going to lose this election is if the election is rigged—remember that,” he said recently. “So we have to be very careful. . . . The only way they’re going to win is that way. And we can’t let that happen.”
Democrats say that a strategy of reticence is a thing of the past. One Democratic veteran assured me that the Democratic Party of today is “totally different” from the Party of 2000: “Much less institutionally focussed, more ideologically grounded, and uncompromising. There is zero chance that anybody is going to say at some point that it’s better for the country that we settle the matter now, give in, and then try to win in four years. No one thinks that another four years of Trump is survivable. The campaign believes this is an existential battle.”
Compounding all this is the coronavirus pandemic, which will force dramatic changes in how voters cast their ballots. The number of mail-in ballots will increase substantially: recent national polls suggest that about a third of all voters plan to vote by mail this year. Trump has assailed the practice of voting by mail, asserting without evidence that it is susceptible to fraud. In fact, Washington, Oregon, Colorado, and Utah have used universal mail-in voting—in which the state mails a ballot to each registered voter—for some time, including in previous Presidential elections, with few significant problems. There is no meaningful difference between absentee voting and mail-in voting, but Trump supports absentee voting, even using it himself. In early August, when he was signing his Florida absentee-ballot application, he said, “Absentee ballots are good. Universal mail-ins, when you get inundated with these things, are bad and will lead to terrible things, including voter fraud.” More recently, Trump has spoken at length about the purported evils of universal mail-in voting. “They are sending out fifty-one million ballots to people that didn’t ask for them,” he said during an interview with Sean Hannity on Fox News, on the final night of the Democratic National Convention. “This will be the most fraudulent election in history. . . . It’s just a horrible thing. It’s going to be impossible to police.” (It’s unclear where Trump got that figure; at other times, he has used the figure of eighty million.)
Last month, the House of Representatives passed a bipartisan bill to provide an additional twenty-five billion dollars to the U.S. Postal Service, largely to insure that it could process the additional mailed ballots. Trump has vowed to veto the bill if it reaches him. “They need that money in order to make the post office work, so it can take all of these millions and millions of ballots,” he said. “If we don’t make a deal, that means they don’t get the money. That means they can’t have universal mail-in voting. They just can’t have it.” In recent weeks, he has also attacked the use of drop boxes, which allow voters to deposit their ballots before Election Day. He has claimed, without evidence, that they can be used to perpetrate electoral fraud.
Trump’s grievance is almost certainly tied to the fact that Democrats are more likely to vote by mail in the upcoming election than Republicans are. This will contribute to a phenomenon called the “blue shift”—votes that are counted, and reported, later on tend to favor Democrats. This year’s blue shift may be particularly dramatic. In a recent poll by Hawkfish, a data firm associated with Democrats, only nineteen per cent of Trump supporters said that they planned to vote by mail, compared with sixty-nine per cent of Biden supporters. Using data from late-summer polls, Hawkfish predicted that Election Night results could show Trump in the lead, with a total of four hundred and eight electoral votes. Four days later, with seventy-five per cent of the mail-in votes counted, Biden would take the lead, with two hundred and eighty electoral votes and, with all the votes counted, the former Vice-President would win the Presidency, with three hundred and thirty-four electoral votes.
Throughout the campaign, Trump has sought to undermine voters’ faith in the democratic process—going so far as to suggest, on Twitter, that the election should be delayed until people could “properly, securely and safely” vote. (He later backtracked on the idea, which would require a change to federal law.) Last week, Trump tweeted, “the Nov 3rd election result may NEVER BE ACCURATELY DETERMINED.” The norms of political conduct, already fading at the turn of the century, now seem to have disappeared altogether. As a result, the aftermath of the 2020 election has the potential to make 2000 look like a mere skirmish.
Democrats and Republicans have already filed dozens of lawsuits in attempts to define the rules in November—an overture for the battles that may follow the election. If Trump is the id of his campaign, its superego is Justin Riemer, the chief counsel of the Republican National Committee, who previously worked for the Virginia Board of Elections. Riemer eschews overstatement in favor of the careful words of a onetime bureaucrat. “We see what’s going on as a systemic attack on the existing absentee-voting safeguards that are in place around the country,” Riemer told me. “We acknowledge that there is going to be much more absentee voting, so it’s never been more important to have those safeguards.” In recent weeks, the Trump campaign has been sending questionnaires to election officials in swing states, asking for details about how they intend to conduct the election and count the votes. The officials’ answers could become important evidence in any post-Election Day litigation.
The architect of the Democrats’ pre-Election Day legal strategy is a Washington lawyer named Marc Elias. He is a partner at the firm Perkins Coie, the former professional home of Bob Bauer, who defined the role of the Democratic election specialist and served as the White House counsel under President Obama. Bauer is bearded and professorial; he now teaches at New York University School of Law and advises the Biden campaign. Elias, who relishes the combat of litigation, is more of a street fighter. He came to prominence in 2008 and 2009, when he represented Al Franken in an extended recount in a Minnesota Senate race. Franken eventually prevailed by three hundred and twelve votes, out of nearly three million cast. “That shaped my approach,” Elias told me. “Everything you do in the voting process should shape what happens at the end, when the votes are counted.” In light of the likely challenges to changes in vote totals after Election Day, the Biden campaign has established a legal task force, which includes hundreds of lawyers. It’s led by Bauer and Dana Remus, the campaign’s general counsel, and includes two recent Solicitors General in Democratic Administrations, Walter E. Dellinger III and Donald G. Verrilli, Jr.
Shortly after the pandemic broke out in the United States, in March, Elias, in a blog post titled “Four Pillars to Safeguard Vote by Mail,” outlined the Democrats’ approach:
- Postage must be free or prepaid by the government.
- Ballots postmarked on or before Election Day must count.
- Signature matching laws need to be reformed to protect voters.
- Community organizations should be permitted to help collect and deliver voted, sealed ballots.
To someone unversed in the arcana of election law, these demands may seem uncontroversial—but Riemer likes to frame each of Elias’s pillars as an invitation for voter fraud. “Federal law says that Election Day is the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, and we believe that’s when the election ends,” Riemer told me. “And the postmark rule is impractical.” He believes that states should make their own decisions about postage-paid envelopes, and that election officials must compare the signatures on absentee ballots with those on voter-registration documents to insure that only eligible people vote and that no one votes twice.
Riemer also emphatically opposes the community collection of ballots—the practice by which campaigns or community groups gather absentee ballots from multiple voters and submit them together—known by Republicans as “ballot harvesting.” It is true that community ballot collection, unlike Elias’s other pillars, has been associated with voter fraud, if rarely. In a 2018 race in North Carolina’s Ninth Congressional District, a Republican operative, according to investigators, filled in at least a thousand mail-in-ballot requests, many without the voters’ knowledge. After the fraud was exposed, the state held the election again, several months later. Republicans often cite this past May’s election for city council in Paterson, New Jersey, which led to charges of fraud for the misuse of mail-in ballots against several local officials. Trump tweeted, “So much time is taken talking about foreign influence, but the same people won’t even discuss Mail-In election corruption. Look at Paterson, N.J. 20% of vote was corrupted!” At a news conference, Trump told reporters that they should look into Paterson, “where massive percentages of the vote was a fraud.” The fraud involved several hundred votes; as in North Carolina, a judge ordered a new election.
Campaigns face a maddening variety of challenges as they try to change, or even fully understand, the rules of the road. The United States has arguably the most decentralized election administration of any advanced democracy. This is especially evident in the process for choosing a President. Each state conducts a separate contest for its electoral votes, with its own rules for casting and counting ballots. But there are approximately ten thousand five hundred different voting jurisdictions, many of which have their own distinctive procedures as well. The legal doctrine known as the Purcell principle, named for a Supreme Court case from 2006, holds that courts should refrain from making changes to election procedures close to Election Day, because of the potential for creating confusion for voters. (The court has never defined how close is too close.) As a result, the debates over Elias’s four pillars, and also over universal mail-in voting, are being played out in state after state at a frantic pace.
Each party has created a Web site to track the progress of election litigation around the country. The Republican site, protectthevote.com, lists cases in nineteen states, and the Democratic site, democracydocket.com, lists cases in twenty-eight. By one accounting, there are now more than two hundred pending lawsuits about the rules for the November election. The claims in the lawsuits vary, but there are consistent themes. The Democrats are seeking both to make it easier to vote and to relax restrictions that prevent individual ballots from being counted. The Republicans are insisting on measures that they assert will limit the number of improper or fraudulent votes.
During the first week of August, Nevada’s Democratic legislature and governor passed a substantial revision to the state’s election law, effectively creating an all-mail contest in November. The Trump campaign sued. “Many of those provisions will undermine the November election’s integrity,” the suit asserted, in a hundred-and-fourteen-page complaint. “Some go beyond that, crossing the line that separates bad policy judgments from enactments that violate federal law or the United States Constitution.” According to Trump’s lawyers, the revised law “requires county or city clerks to count potentially fraudulent or invalid ballots, thereby diluting the votes of honest citizens and depriving them of their right to vote in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In response, Elias’s team asserted that the Nevada legislature “has taken the necessary and appropriate steps to ensure that all Nevadans have safe and meaningful opportunities to vote, both during the pandemic and after.” (The case is pending.) More recently, New Jersey made a similar move to offer all residents the opportunity to vote by mail, and Republicans sued to invalidate the new rules, again asserting that the system would lead to fraud. Phil Murphy, the state’s Democratic governor, who initiated the change, said, of the Republican suit, “Bring it on.” (This case is also pending.)
There are at least five ongoing cases in Pennsylvania, several of them Republican-backed efforts to restrict “ballot harvesting.” But, even if limits are imposed, it is not clear how they would be enforced or what, exactly, they would be. Could family members drop off one another’s ballots? What about distant family members? Close friends? How close? Who would monitor that process? Democrats have filed a suit in Pennsylvania to obtain prepaid postage for absentee ballots and to relax a postmark-date requirement. In another of the Pennsylvania cases, a Republican challenge to the vote-by-mail procedures, a federal judge, J. Nicholas Ranjan, told the plaintiffs, in effect, to put up or shut up—to produce evidence of fraud “in their possession, or if they have none, state as much.” The Republican plaintiffs submitted a five-hundred-and-twenty-four-page filing that mentioned examples of fraud by voter intimidation at the polls and by the alteration of vote totals, but provided no examples of fraud in mail-in elections. (This case, too, is pending.) Last week, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave the Democrats an important victory, holding that the state should count all mailed-in votes that were postmarked by Election Day and permitting election officials to add more ballot drop boxes.
Some of the lawsuits involve relative minutiae. In Iowa, Republicans sued three counties that sent absentee-ballot applications to voters with their names and addresses already filled in. “We think voters should have to fill out that information themselves,” Riemer told me. (The G.O.P. won that case.) Only a handful of the lawsuits appear to have been resolved. Rhode Island waived a requirement stipulating that voters obtain the signature of a witness in order to file an absentee ballot. Republicans challenged the change. Their case was rejected in federal district court and in the First Circuit Court of Appeals, and they failed to persuade the Supreme Court to review the judgment. But, even when the Republicans fail to win in court, their lawsuits succeed in raising issues that Trump and his allies may use to claim fraud in the event that the vote count ends with Biden in the lead.
One of the ironies of the Republicans’ obsession with fraud is that theirs is the party with the more significant recent history of misconduct at the polls. Shortly before the 1981 governor’s race in New Jersey, the Republican National Committee created the National Ballot Security Task Force. The group consisted mostly of armed off-duty police officers hired by the G.O.P. to monitor polling sites in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods in Newark and Trenton. The group, whose members wore “NBST” armbands, posted large signs outside polling places that read “WARNING—THIS AREA IS BEING PATROLLED BY THE NATIONAL BALLOT SECURITY TASK FORCE. IT IS A CRIME TO FALSIFY A BALLOT OR TO VIOLATE ELECTION LAWS.” The task-force members challenged the right of some people to vote and blocked the way to the polls for others. In the election, the Republican challenger, Thomas Kean, narrowly defeated the incumbent Democrat, James Florio.
The Democratic National Committee sued the R.N.C. for its role in creating the task force, and in 1982 the two sides settled the case with a so-called consent decree. The Republicans admitted no wrongdoing, but they agreed to refrain from engaging in tactics that suppressed the vote, especially those that affected minority voters. They also said they would not hire anyone to wear armbands at the polls and agreed to allow a federal court to review in advance any plans to conduct ballot-security operations at polling places. Over the years, the R.N.C. has attempted to have the consent decree lifted, arguing that it is obsolete and unnecessary, without success. Finally, in 2018, Judge John Michael Vazquez, over Democratic objections, lifted the decree.
The 2020 Presidential election will be the first in almost four decades in which Republicans will be free from the strictures of the consent decree. The Trump campaign and its allies have announced plans to hire fifty thousand poll watchers in fifteen states to monitor voting locations. Riemer told me, “The Democrats have had an unfair advantage for years because of the consent decree, and we’re just trying to have a fair playing field. Our people will be well trained. They are not there to intimidate, they are not there to suppress the vote. They are there to get out the lawful vote.” But the President has suggested that the Republican poll watchers will not necessarily be so restrained. Sean Hannity, in the interview during the Democratic Convention, asked him, “Are you going to have an ability to monitor, to avoid fraud and cross-check whether or not these are registered voters—whether or not there’s been identification to know that it’s a real vote from a real American?” Trump answered, “We’re going to have everything. We’re going to have sheriffs, and we’re going to have law enforcement, and we’re going to have, hopefully, U.S. Attorneys, and we’re going to have everybody, and attorney generals.” (The President has no authority over local officials.) Sherrilyn Ifill, the president and director-counsel of the N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Education Fund, said, of the poll watchers, “We should prepare for widespread intimidation of voters at the polls and the use of dubious lists that challenge their eligibility to vote. This has long been a tool that has been recognized as a form of voter suppression. It’s an utterly appalling message that no President should be sending out to the public.”
In advance of the 2016 election, Roger Stone, Trump’s longtime friend and adviser, organized a group called Stop the Steal, which was ostensibly intended to stop voter fraud at the polls. In response, Elias’s team invoked the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which prohibits private citizens from interfering with the right to vote, and won a court injunction against Stone’s efforts. Elias doesn’t rule out a similar lawsuit this fall. In addition, Democrats and nonpartisan civil-rights groups like Ifill’s plan on being stationed at as many polling places as possible, to defend the rights of voters. In such a polarized environment, the presence at the polls of watchers with conflicting agendas presents one of the leading possibilities for conflict, if not violence, on Election Day.
Shortly after the polls close, states will begin releasing vote tallies, largely based on ballots cast at polling places. The news networks and the Associated Press are likely to be cautious about issuing projections of victory for one candidate or the other on Election Night. Instead, the vote-counting process could go on for days, if not weeks, under the constant gaze of partisans from both sides. According to Richard Hasen, a professor of law at the University of California, Irvine, “Representatives of the campaigns have the right to be present during every step. Every ballot has to be verified, every envelope has to be sealed, every voter identity checked, and the campaigns get to dispute every judgment that’s made.” Even if courts have clarified the procedures for casting and counting votes in each state and locality, the possibilities for disputes arising as those rules are applied to the actual ballots are nearly endless. How closely must the signature on an absentee ballot match that on the voter-registration form? What happens if a voter clearly indicates her intent—say, by circling a candidate’s name—but fails to fill in the correct bubble on the form?
New York’s Democratic primaries, on June 23rd—among the first major contested elections to take place during the pandemic—offered a modest preview of the chaos we could see after November 3rd. In those races, landslides were called quickly and without controversy. But the process of resolving the closer contests was long and agonizing. I observed one of them at a Board of Elections counting center, on West Thirty-first Street, in Manhattan. The main race still in dispute was the Democratic primary between Carolyn Maloney, the longtime representative from a district that includes the East Side of Manhattan and slivers of Brooklyn and Queens, and Suraj Patel, a young businessman and activist. Turnout was high for a primary. Patel had also challenged Maloney in 2018—about forty-four thousand people voted in that election. This year, the tally on Election Night put Maloney ahead by six hundred and forty-eight votes, 1.6 per cent, but more than sixty-five thousand votes had been cast by mail, and, two weeks later, none of those had yet been counted. In a typical pre-pandemic race in New York State, about ninety-five per cent of voters cast their ballots in person. This year, it is estimated that between forty and sixty per cent will vote by mail. (In Illinois, more than 1.1 million people had applied for absentee ballots by August; in 2018, only four hundred and thirty thousand people in the state voted absentee.)
The magnitude of the challenge for election officials was evident as soon as I entered the counting room, which took up most of the eighth floor of a large office building. There were about twenty counting tables, set at least six feet apart. Two board staffers sat at each table, and they were monitored by representatives from both campaigns; everyone was masked. At the tables, people tried to maintain social distance—mostly in vain, since they were all squinting at the same ballots. The staffers first compared the signatures on the envelopes with the ones in the registration book, and then inspected the ballots themselves. The pace was glacial. At first, staffers counted just two hundred ballots a day, though after a week or so the pace quickened to about eight hundred a day. Still, the initial count took more than a month.
New York, which is heavily Democratic, is unlikely to be competitive in the Presidential election, but there is every reason to believe that the count in the Maloney-Patel race will be simple and straightforward compared to what might happen around the country in the Presidential contest. Based on previous trends, at least twice as many people will vote in November as voted in the June primary; that means at least double the number of absentee ballots to count. In the case of a close race, a recount—in which each side could contest the validity of each ballot—would certainly go on for longer than the month-plus that it took for Maloney to declare victory.
As the New York race also demonstrated, mailed ballots have a markedly higher rate of disqualification. About twenty per cent of the ballots from Manhattan and Queens, and nearly thirty per cent of those from Brooklyn were disqualified—many because voters didn’t sign the envelopes of the absentee ballots, or because they sealed the envelope with tape rather than with moisture. The Postal Service had failed to apply postmarks to many of the absentee ballots, so the Board of Elections disallowed all those that were received after Election Day. Patel successfully sued in federal court to have more ballots counted, especially those without postmarks. But by that point, in early August, Maloney’s lead had grown to four per cent, and the Associated Press called the race for her. (Patel conceded on August 27th.) “The Democrats want to blame Trump and the Republicans for all the problems with voting, and claim that it’s vote suppression,” Samuel Issacharoff, a professor at New York University School of Law, told me. “But the Republicans had nothing to do with the fiasco in New York. The Democrats made all the rules there. There was no conspiracy—the system is just not set up to absorb that many absentee ballots and count them in a reasonable period of time.”
The high disqualification rate for absentee ballots poses a special peril for Democrats. According to a study co-written by Daniel Smith, a professor at the University of Florida Law School, the mail-in ballots of racial and ethnic minorities, and also of young voters, were rejected at a substantially higher rate than those of older white voters across counties, even though the counties varied in the over-all rate at which they rejected ballots. High disqualification rates for mail-in votes were evident in 2020 races around the country. According to studies by the Washington Post and NPR, during the primaries, mailed ballots were disqualified at a far higher rate than in 2016—five hundred thousand in total were deemed invalid. (By comparison, about three hundred and eighteen thousand ballots were disqualified in the 2016 general election.) Franita Tolson, a professor at the U.S.C. Gould School of Law, told me, “You will still see many claims that absentee ballots have been wrongly rejected, and those will lead to court cases. The fact that we are generating lots of voting by mail will generate a lot of litigation.”
Daniel Smith said, “Ultimately, in Florida, it may all come down to the three-member Canvassing Boards, who will decide whether each vote counts. This time, they won’t be staring at chads but comparing signatures and deciding if they match.”
In the days following Election Night, there is likely to be an increasing disparity between the initial poll tallies and the numbers that include mail-in votes. This is not exactly new. According to Edward B. Foley, a professor at the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, for most of the twentieth century, the preliminary count on Election Night was about ninety-nine per cent of the total count, but, even before COVID, “a new normal developed, because of greater reliance on vote by mail.” For example, on Election Night in 2018, the Republican Martha McSally led the Democrat Kyrsten Sinema by one per cent in the Arizona Senate race. But there were still about six hundred thousand votes to be counted, a quarter of the total number, and, once they were, it was clear that Sinema had won comfortably, by about fifty-five thousand votes. This year, with more mail-in votes, a blue shift is likely to take place in nearly every state.
Voters in nine states will get their ballots mailed to them directly by default, and thirty-six states will offer no-excuse absentee voting—that is, voters will be allowed to choose to vote by mail without having to give a reason. These include two major swing states, Pennsylvania and Michigan. In the past four Presidential elections, Foley explained, Pennsylvania experienced a blue shift of about twenty thousand votes: “That was before COVID and before the state moved to no-excuse absentee voting, so that means there will be a great deal more mail-in votes this year than in the past.” (In the Pennsylvania Democratic primary, in June, which had a low turnout because the Presidential nomination had already been decided, it took more than two weeks to count the votes.)
There is nothing sinister about the fact that Democrats use mail-in voting more than Republicans do. Foley’s concern is that Trump will claim that the blue shift, if it occurs, is evidence of partisan foul play, particularly if it eliminates an apparent Election Night lead in an important state. (Some Democrats have deemed a possible Trump lead on Election Night the “red mirage.”) “If the votes keep shifting, Trump may demand that the Election Night numbers be certified, because he doesn’t trust the mail-ins,” Foley said. In 2018, after a blue shift narrowed the Election Night leads of Republican statewide candidates in Florida, Trump tweeted, “The Florida Election should be called in favor of Rick Scott and Ron DeSantis in that large numbers of new ballots showed up out of nowhere, and many ballots are missing or forged. An honest vote count is no longer possible—ballots massively infected. Must go with Election Night.”
The prospect of a blue shift, and Trump’s reaction to it, is one reason that Michael Bloomberg decided to spend a hundred million dollars to help Biden in Florida. “In swing states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, they count their Election Day votes first and then the mail-in votes, so it’s entirely possible that Trump will be ahead there,” Howard Wolfson, a senior political adviser to Bloomberg, told me. “Trump has no respect for decorum or tradition, so we assume that he will just claim victory at that point and argue that any ballots that come in after that point are fraudulent.” Florida, on the other hand, counts mail-in votes as they arrive, so the Election Night total may well come close to the state’s final result. Wolfson explained, “Florida is obviously very close, and it’s a state that Trump really has to win to get to two hundred and seventy electoral votes. If we can show that he lost Florida on Election Night, it makes it pretty much impossible for him to claim victory in the election. That was a huge factor in why we decided to invest in Florida.”
It took a Supreme Court ruling to conclude the Presidential race in 2000—and there is an additional set of procedures that may come into play in 2020. They have roots in an even more controversial Presidential election, which took place in 1876. That year, on the night of November 7th, it appeared that Samuel J. Tilden, the Democrat, had defeated Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican. But the results in several Republican-dominated states had not yet been reported. The vote was especially close in Florida. Shortly before the Electoral College was to meet, in December, the Florida Canvassing Board certified electors pledged to Hayes, but the state’s attorney general certified Tilden as the winner. Louisiana and South Carolina also sent contradictory certifications to Washington. Because neither candidate commanded a clear Electoral College majority, Congress improvised a solution, establishing an electoral commission of five senators, five House members, and five Justices of the Supreme Court. A few days before Inauguration Day, 1877, the commission voted eight to seven to award the Presidency to Hayes. Republicans like Hayes had established Reconstruction in the South after the Civil War, but, as part of the deal that made him President, Hayes agreed to end Reconstruction, with disastrous implications for African-Americans.
Foley told me, “Congress knew that what happened in 1876 was a disaster, an embarrassment, and then there were two more close elections, in 1880 and 1884, so they realized they really had to do something about it.” As a result, Congress passed the Electoral Count Act of 1887, which purported to establish a procedure for resolving disputed Presidential elections. The statute was, Foley said, “a placeholder, better than nothing, which they figured would be improved over time. But Congress has never returned to the issue, and the law has never really been tested. No one really knows what it means.”
There does seem to be general agreement on one provision of the 1887 act: the “safe harbor” clause. It provides that, if a state submits its final tally in the Presidential contest by six days before the meeting of the Electoral College, that decision is “conclusive” and thus free from legal challenge. This year, the safe-harbor deadline is December 8th; the Electoral College meets in each state capitol on December 14th.
It is unclear, however, what will happen if a slow vote count puts a state in jeopardy of missing the deadline. The Court’s opinion in Bush v. Gore provides one possibility, based on Article II of the Constitution, which says that the states must appoint electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” In its Bush v. Gore opinion, the Court observed that, in the early days of the Republic, the state legislatures, not the voters, selected the Presidential electors in some states. Thus, the opinion went on, “the State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors.” The bland legal language obscures the magnitude of this conclusion. It means that a state legislature can simply ignore the votes cast by the state’s citizens and award its Presidential electors to the candidate of its choice. “This is the most frightening prospect of all,” Issacharoff said. “It’s a deep confrontation with the idea that we as citizens have the right to vote for President.”
In 2000, Republicans in the Florida legislature had been planning to invoke this constitutional provision if the length of the recount jeopardized the state’s ability to submit electors in time to be counted. But, to date, no state in the modern era has attempted to preëmpt its voters in this way. Still, the Constitution can arguably be read to give legislatures the power to do so. It’s even conceivable that, if President Trump claimed that a Biden victory in a state was based on fraud, a Republican legislature could overturn the result. If a legislature wanted to try this maneuver—to award its state’s Electoral College votes on its own—could the governor veto it?
In four crucial swing states—Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—there is a Republican legislature and a Democratic governor. The Constitution speaks only of the legislature, and the answer appears to be that the governor would have no role—but no one knows for sure. The 1887 act also says that, after a state makes a “final ascertainment” of its results, the governor must send a certification to the Archivist of the United States. If the governor refused to do so—or sent a certification of a result that conflicted with the legislature’s, or the courts’, determination—would that action invalidate the certification by the legislature? No one knows. In any case, it appears clear that, if a state fails to submit a winner by December 14th, the decision about its electoral votes goes to Congress.
The 1887 act appears to offer some guidance on the question of what Congress might then do—but not much. “I defy you to read the law and understand it,” Foley said. “I’ve been working on it for a decade, and I still don’t understand it completely. It’s just a morass.” The law mandates that both Houses of Congress meet in a joint session—scheduled, this cycle, for January 6, 2021—to certify the Electoral College tally. At that meeting, there can be a challenge to the counting of votes if at least one representative and one senator offer it. At the joint session in 2001, several House members sought to challenge Bush’s victory over Gore, but no senator joined them. Thus, Vice-President Gore, as the presiding officer, was obliged to rule the challenges to his defeat out of order. Michael Moore, in his documentary “Fahrenheit 9/11,” included excerpts from the joint session, using the failure of even a single Democratic senator to challenge Bush’s victory as a symbol of the Party’s spinelessness.
So what happens if, unlike with the 2000 election, at least one senator joins a House member to challenge the electoral-vote results in a state? The law offers minimal guidance. One thing is clear: the House and the Senate would have separate proceedings, and vote separately, on which electors to seat in the contested states. With the result of the election on the line, the level of contention would be extraordinary. Would there be hearings? Would witnesses testify? How long would the House and the Senate debate the issue? No one knows.
The complexities accumulate. It’s possible that some states, if their results are tied up in the courts, might not submit any electors to Congress. What happens if there are fewer than five hundred and thirty-eight electoral votes cast? As Charles Stewart III, a professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said, “Do you need a majority of those cast, or do you need two hundred and seventy? That is not clear.” And what if the House approves one slate of electors and the Senate approves a different one? Since Democrats now control the House and Republicans the Senate, such a scenario seems possible, even likely. According to Stewart, in the event of a conflict between the House and the Senate over which slate to approve, the Electoral Count Act says that the one signed by the governor of the state prevails. (If the Democrats retake the Senate in November, the chances of conflict between the House and Senate will be lessened, because this vote will occur after the third of the year, when the new senators will be seated.)
Another hypothetical: after the House and the Senate rule on the challenges, neither candidate obtains either two hundred and seventy electoral votes or a majority of those votes cast. Then the final decision would belong to the House of Representatives. The vote in the House would take place not in the usual fashion, by members of Congress, but, rather, by delegation. In other words, each state would get one vote in the House, based on a majority vote of the members of the state’s delegation. If it comes to this, the result seems clear. Republicans control twenty-six delegations in the House, and Democrats control twenty-three. Trump would win the election. “Sometimes, when I think about this stuff, I have to go take a nap, because it’s so convoluted,” Stewart said.
Bob Bauer, the veteran Democratic lawyer, is not inclined to hysteria. “I don’t portray the situation as a catastrophe, because all that does is scare away voters,” he said, of the upcoming election. “But it is true that it’s an unparalleled challenge, because we have a frail election infrastructure in the best of circumstances, and now the pandemic is layered on top.” One of Bauer’s concerns is outside the control of either campaign—that foreign powers would engage in cyberterrorism on Election Day and afterward. “There’s a risk of cyber insecurity, with the possibility that foreign actors will try to interfere with the process,” he said. The specific possibilities include hacking into voter-registration databases and vote-counting software, and a full-fledged attack on the electric power grid. Bauer went on, “But there’s a higher risk that they will try to convince people that they’ve interfered with the process and create confusion that way.”
There’s an extreme imbalance in party resources when it comes to information about possible foreign interference, because the President controls the nation’s intelligence apparatus. In a public statement on August 7th, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence asserted that China, Russia, and Iran were already attempting to interfere in the election. Russia’s extensive efforts on Trump’s behalf in 2016 have long been documented, and, according to the statement, they are continuing in 2020: “Russia is using a range of measures to primarily denigrate former Vice President Biden.” Other possible foreign efforts “seek to compromise our election infrastructure for a range of possible purposes, such as interfering with the voting process, stealing sensitive data, or calling into question the validity of the election results.”
Later that month, the Trump Administration shut down some access to information about these foreign efforts, asserting without evidence that there had been leaks in previous briefings. In a series of letters to congressional leaders on August 29th, John Ratcliffe, whom Trump recently named the director of National Intelligence, after his service as a Republican representative from Texas, announced that he would cease in-person briefings about “election security, foreign malign influence, and election interference,” and instead supply only written reports. Democrats were indignant about being unable to question intelligence officials before the election. “President Trump, through his hand-picked DNI—chosen for loyalty, not experience—is attempting to deprive Congress of the information they need to do their part,” Biden said in a statement. “There can be only one conclusion: President Trump is hoping Vladimir Putin will once more boost his candidacy and cover his horrific failures to lead our country through the multiple crises we are facing.” Last week, Ratcliffe reversed course and agreed to provide some in-person briefings to Congress, but Democrats will still head into the election substantially in the dark about how foreign powers may attempt to manipulate the outcome.
As Election Day approaches, the President has escalated his level of incitement. With the death of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, last week, a battle with the Democrats in the Senate is almost inevitable. Trump has already moved from allegations of fraud to intimations of unlawfulness and violence. “Gotta be careful with those ballots,” he said on September 8th, in a speech in North Carolina. “Watch those ballots. I don’t like it.” He continued, “Be poll watchers when you go there. Watch all the thieving and stealing and robbing they do.” Trump has advised his supporters to vote twice—once by absentee and once at the polls, to make sure their votes count. (This would be a crime.) He has expressed sympathy for the anti-Black Lives Matter counter-protesters who fired paintballs at their adversaries in Portland, and has defended Kyle Rittenhouse, the pro-Trump vigilante who is accused of killing two protesters in Kenosha, Wisconsin. Trump also retweeted a prediction that political unrest “could lead to ‘rise of citizen militias around the country.’ ” In light of these provocations, it seems that anything short of a landslide for either Biden or Trump could lead to chaos. It’s unsurprising that, when the Transition Integrity Project, a group of a hundred bipartisan experts, ran a series of simulations, they concluded that “the potential for violent conflict is high, particularly since Trump encourages his supporters to take up arms.”
One Republican, perhaps the one most knowledgeable about how elections really work, has decided that Trump has gone too far. Earlier this month, Benjamin Ginsberg, the scourge of the Gore forces in Florida, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post, calling out Trump’s baseless provocations about the election. “I spent 38 years in the GOP’s legal trenches,” he wrote. “I was part of the 1990s redistricting that ended 40 years of Democratic control and brought 30 years of GOP successes in Congress and state legislatures. I played a central role in the 2000 Florida recount and several dozen Senate, House and state contests.” Ginsberg denounced Trump’s encouragement of double voting and rejected the President’s claim of widespread voter fraud: “The truth is that after decades of looking for illegal voting, there’s no proof of widespread fraud. . . . Elections are not rigged.”
Ginsberg told me, “I was a tough partisan and proud of it—but I think it’s important for Republicans and Democrats to look at the real evidence of what’s happened over forty years. Unfortunately, Republicans have gotten away from that during this cycle.” For decades, Republican candidates depended on Ginsberg for his counsel and his advice, but there is every sign that he, like all apostates from the cause of Trump, will be ignored and scorned by the President and his allies. Instead, it will be Trump’s party that sets the path to Election Day, and beyond.

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Democrats, It's Time to Get Mad - and Even |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=8625"><span class="small">Eugene Robinson, The Washington Post</span></a>
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Wednesday, 23 September 2020 08:21 |
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Robinson writes: "This is a moment to get mad and to get even. The way to do that is to crush President Trump and pulverize the Republican Party in the coming election."
A man holds banners as protesters gather Saturday outside the Louisville home of Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell in opposition to his plan to immediately vote on a replacement of Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. (photo: Bryan Woolston/Reuters)

Democrats, It's Time to Get Mad - and Even
By Eugene Robinson, The Washington Post
23 September 20
his is a moment to get mad and to get even. The way to do that is to crush President Trump and pulverize the Republican Party in the coming election.
Trump has the power to name a replacement for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who died last week. He says he will nominate a woman, surely an archconservative just raring to kill the Affordable Care Act and reverse Roe v. Wade. The GOP-led Senate has the power to confirm her. And because it can, we should expect that it will.
Doing so would be hypocritical, given the way Republican senators held up Merrick Garland’s Supreme Court nomination, cynical and corrosive to the very idea of democracy. But so what? We’re talking about Trump, who desperately wants voters to focus on something other than the nearly 200,000 people who have died of covid-19 on his watch. We’re talking about Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.), who could not care less what mere citizens might think. And we’re talking about the Senate Republicans, who reliably roll over and give Trump and McConnell whatever they want.
No one can stop them if they decide to go through with this putsch-like power play. But Democrats can make them pay by taking their power away. All of it.
If you’re angry about how the GOP is tilting the Supreme Court, the first thing to focus on is booting Trump out of the White House and into well-deserved obscurity.
Four years ago, too many Democrats — especially young people and African Americans — stayed home on Election Day. Just 80,000 more Democratic votes spread across Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania would have given Hillary Clinton, not Trump, the power to nominate three Supreme Court justices, shaping the high court’s ideological makeup for decades to come.
I don’t know who those Clinton-appointed justices would have been, but I know they wouldn’t be Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh and whoever Trump picks later this week. The Supreme Court has to be made a turnout-driving issue for Democrats, the way it has long been for Republicans.
That doesn’t mean, however, letting the battle over replacing Ginsburg become the central issue in the campaign. Joe Biden needs to continue hammering away at Trump’s weaknesses: his abysmal and tragically dishonest performance on the covid-19 pandemic; the economic devastation that resulted from his failure to contain the virus the way leaders of other rich countries did; and his decision to respond to the movement against systemic racism by championing Confederate monuments and channeling bitter White grievance.
Trump knows he is losing and wants to change the subject. Don’t let him.
The other vital task for Democrats is taking control of the Senate. In some of these races — unlike in the presidential contest — the Republicans’ approach to the Supreme Court should be a more central focus.
“I want you to use my words against me,” Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Lindsey O. Graham (R-S.C.) said in 2016, as Republicans were denying even the courtesy of a hearing to Garland, President Barack Obama’s high court nominee. “If there’s a Republican president in 2016 and a vacancy occurs in the last year of the first term, you can say Lindsey Graham said let’s let the next president, whoever it might be, make that nomination.”
Now Graham vows to fast-track Trump’s court pick. His Democratic challenger, Jaime Harrison — with whom he is statistically tied, according to polls — has already begun hammering Graham as a man whose word cannot be trusted.
GOP Sens. Susan Collins of Maine, Martha McSally of Arizona and Thom Tillis of North Carolina trail their Democratic opponents; while Cory Gardner of Colorado, Joni Ernst of Iowa, Steve Daines of Montana and Graham are also in serious trouble. If Democrats win any four of those seats, then even if Democrat Doug Jones gets ousted in deep-red Alabama, McConnell’s majority is gone.
If he stays true to form, McConnell will plow forward and try to fill Ginsburg’s seat before the election. But if he decides that doing so would threaten his control of the chamber — or if enough endangered or moderate Republicans balk — he could decide to delay the deed.
He could still do it in the lame-duck session, even if Trump and the Republicans are given the kind of landslide whipping they deserve. But we, the people, will have spoken with a roar. And, come January, Democrats will have the power to do a lot more than nurse their anger.

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How Trump Let Covid-19 Win |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=33386"><span class="small">German Lopez, Vox</span></a>
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Wednesday, 23 September 2020 08:21 |
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Excerpt: "Trump's magical thinking couldn't beat the coronavirus. America is stuck with the consequences."
Covid-19 and Trump. (image: Christina Animashaun/Vox)

How Trump Let Covid-19 Win
By German Lopez, Vox
23 September 20
Trump’s magical thinking couldn’t beat the coronavirus. America is stuck with the consequences.
s America, and even his own administration, woke up to the threat of Covid-19, President Donald Trump still didn’t seem to get it. Within weeks of suggesting that people social distance in mid-March, the president went on national TV to argue that the US could reopen by Easter Sunday in April. “You’ll have packed churches all over our country,” Trump said in March. “I think it’ll be a beautiful time.”
The US wasn’t able to fully and safely reopen in April. It isn’t able to fully and safely reopen in September.
The virus rages on, affecting every aspect of American life, from the economy to education to entertainment. More than 200,000 Americans are confirmed dead. Many schools are closing down again after botched attempts to reopen — with outbreaks in universities and K-12 settings. America now has one of the worst ongoing epidemics in the world, with the second most daily new Covid-19 deaths among developed nations, surpassed only by Spain.
America does not have the most Covid-19 deaths per capita of any rich country, but it’s doing worse than most. The US reports about seven times the Covid-19 deaths as the median developed country, ranking in the bottom 20 percent for coronavirus deaths among wealthy nations. Tens of thousands of lives have been needlessly lost as a result: If America had the same death rate as, for example, Canada, about 120,000 more Americans would likely be alive today.
The Easter episode, experts said, exemplified the magical thinking that has animated Trump’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic before and after the novel coronavirus reached the US. It’s a problem that’s continued through September — with Trump and those under him flat-out denying the existence of a resurgence in Covid-19, falsely claiming rising cases were a result of more tests. With every day, week, and month that the Trump administration has tried to spin a positive story, it’s also resisted stronger action, allowing the epidemic to drag on.
A pandemic was always likely to be a challenge for the US, given the country’s large size, fragmented federalist system, and libertarian streak. The public health system was already underfunded and underprepared for a major disease outbreak before Trump.
Yet many other developed countries dealt with these kinds of problems too. Public health systems are notoriously underfunded worldwide. Australia, Canada, and Germany, among others, also have federalist systems of government, individualistic societies, or both — and they’ve all fared much better.
Instead, experts said, it’s Trump’s leadership, or lack thereof, that really sets the US apart. Before Covid-19, Trump and his administration undermined preparedness — eliminating a White House office set up by the previous administration to combat pandemics, making cuts across other key parts of the federal government, and proposing further cuts.
Once the coronavirus arrived, Trump downplayed the threat, suggesting that it would soon disappear “like a miracle.” The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) took weeks to fix botched tests, and the administration actively abdicated control of issues to local, state, and private actors.
“There was a failure to realize what an efficiently spreading respiratory virus for which we have no vaccine and no antiviral meant,” Amesh Adalja, a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, told me. “From the very beginning, that minimization … set a tone that reverberated from the highest levels of government to what the average person believes about the virus.”
Several developed countries — including Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain — were caught off-guard by the pandemic and were hit hard early, suffering massive early outbreaks with enormous death tolls. But most developed countries took these crises seriously: adopting lengthy and strict lockdowns, widespread testing and contact tracing, masking mandates, and consistent public messaging about the virus. (Though parts of Europe are now seeing second waves, seemingly because they prematurely relaxed social distancing measures.)
America did not take the steps necessary, even after an outbreak spiraled out of control in New York. So the US suffered a wave of huge cases over the summer that other developed nations generally avoided, leading to new and continued surges in both cases and deaths. And while other developed countries have seen spikes in cases as fall neared, America also has seen cases start to rise once again.
“If George W. Bush had been president, if John McCain had been president, if Mitt Romney had been president, this would have looked very different,” Ashish Jha, dean of the Brown University School of Public Health, told me, emphasizing the failure to act after Covid-19 hit the US hard was a phenomenon driven by Trump.
Experts worry that things will again get worse: Colder weather is coming, forcing people back into risky indoor environments. So are holiday celebrations, when families and friends will gather from across the country. Another flu season looms. And Trump, experts lamented, is still not ready to do much, if anything, about it.
The White House disputes the criticisms. Spokesperson Sarah Matthews claimed Trump “has led an historic, whole-of-America coronavirus response” that followed experts’ advice, boosted testing rates, delivered equipment to health care workers, and remains focused on expediting a vaccine.
She added, “This strong leadership will continue.”
The US wasn’t prepared for a pandemic — and Trump made it worse
During the 2014 Ebola outbreak, President Barack Obama’s administration realized that the US wasn’t prepared for a pandemic. Jeremy Konyndyk, who served in the Obama administration’s Ebola response, said he “came away from that experience just completely horrified at how unready we would be for something more dangerous than Ebola,” which has a high fatality rate but did not spread easily in the US and other developed nations.
The Obama administration responded by setting up the White House National Security Council’s Directorate for Global Health Security and Biodefense, which was meant to coordinate the many agencies, from the CDC to the Department of Health and Human Services to the Pentagon, involved in contagion response.
But when John Bolton became Trump’s national security adviser in 2018, he moved to disband the office. In April 2018, Bolton fired Tom Bossert, then the homeland security adviser, who, the Washington Post reported, “had called for a comprehensive biodefense strategy against pandemics and biological attacks.” Then in May, Bolton let go the head of pandemic response, Rear Adm. Timothy Ziemer, and dismantled his global health security team. Bolton claimed that the cuts were needed to streamline the National Security Council, and the team was never replaced.
In the months before the coronavirus arrived, the Trump administration also cut a public health position meant to detect outbreaks in China and another program, called Predict, that tracked emerging pathogens around the globe, including coronaviruses. And Trump has repeatedly called for further cuts to the CDC and National Institutes of Health, both on the front lines of the federal response to disease outbreaks; the administration stood by the proposed cuts after the pandemic began, though Congress has largely rejected the proposals.
The Trump administration pushed for the cuts despite multiple, clear warnings that the US was not prepared for a pandemic. A 2019 ranking of countries’ disaster preparedness from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security and Nuclear Threat Initiative had the US at the top of the list, but still warned that “no country is fully prepared for epidemics or pandemics.”
A federal simulation prior to the Covid-19 pandemic also predicted problems the US eventually faced, from a collapse in coordination and communication to shortages in personal protective equipment for health care workers.
Bill Gates, who’s dedicated much of his Microsoft fortune to fighting infectious diseases, warned in 2017, “The impact of a huge epidemic, like a flu epidemic, would be phenomenal because all the supply chains would break down. There’d be a lot of panic. Many of our systems would be overloaded.”
Gates told the Washington Post in 2018 he had raised his concerns in meetings with Trump. But the president, it’s now clear, didn’t listen.
There are limitations to better preparedness, too. “If you take what assets the United States had and you use them poorly the way we did, it doesn’t matter what the report says,” Adalja said, referring to the 2019 ranking. “If you don’t have the leadership to execute, then it makes no difference.”
As Covid-19 spread, Trump downplayed the threat
On February 25, Nancy Messonnier, director of the CDC’s National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases, told reporters that Americans should prepare for community spread of the coronavirus, social distancing, and the possibility that “disruption to everyday life might be severe.”
Six months later, Messonnier’s comments seem prescient. But soon after the briefing, she was pushed out of the spotlight — though she’s still on the job, her press appearances have been limited — reportedly because her negative outlook angered Trump. (Messonnier didn’t respond to a request for comment.)
The CDC as a whole has been pushed to the sidelines with her. The agency is supposed to play a leading role in America’s fight against pandemics, but it’s invisible in press briefings led by Trump, Vice President Mike Pence, advisers, and health officials like Anthony Fauci and Deborah Birx who are not part of the organization. CDC Director Robert Redfield acknowledged as much: “You may see [the CDC] as invisible on the nightly news, but it’s sure not invisible in terms of operationalizing this response.”
University of Michigan medical historian Howard Markel put it in blunter terms, telling me the US has “benched one of the greatest fighting forces against infectious diseases ever created.”
Meanwhile, the president downplayed the virus. The day after Messonnier’s warning, Trump said that “you have 15 people [with the coronavirus], and the 15 within a couple of days is going to be down to close to zero.” This type of magical thinking appears to have driven Trump’s response to Covid-19 from the start, from his conviction that cases would disappear to his proclamation that the country would reopen by Easter.
This was deliberate. As Trump later acknowledged in recorded interviews with journalist Bob Woodward, he knew that the coronavirus was “deadly stuff,” airborne, more dangerous than the flu, and could afflict both the young and old. Yet he deliberately downplayed the threat: “I wanted to always play it down,” he told Woodward on March 19. “I still like playing it down, because I don’t want to create a panic.”
Trump has long said he believes in the power of positive thinking. “I’ve been given a lot of credit for positive thinking,” he told Axios reporter Jonathan Swan during a wide-ranging discussion about Covid-19 in July. “But I also think about downside, because only a fool doesn’t.” Pressed further, he added, “I think you have to have a positive outlook. Otherwise, you have nothing.”
The concern, experts said, is the signal this messaging sends. It tells the staffers under Trump that this issue isn’t a priority, and things are fine as they are. And it suggests to the public that the virus is under control, so they don’t have to make annoying, uncomfortable changes to their lives, from physical distancing to wearing masks.
It creates the perfect conditions for a slow and inadequate response.
The CDC botched the initial test kits it sent out, and it took weeks to fix the errors. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) also took weeks to approve other tests from private labs. As supply problems came up with testing kits, swabs, reagents, machines, and more, the Trump administration resisted taking significant action — claiming it’s up to local, state, and private actors to solve the problems and that the federal government is merely a “supplier of last resort.”
South Korea, which has been widely praised for its response to coronavirus, tested more than 66,000 people within a week of the first community transmission within its borders. By comparison, the US took roughly three weeks to complete that many tests — in a country with more than six times the population.
Asked about testing problems in March, Trump responded, “I don’t take responsibility at all.” In June, Trump claimed that “testing is a double-edged sword,” adding that “when you do testing to that extent, you’re going to find more people — you’re going to find more cases. So I said to my people, ‘Slow the testing down, please.’”
The testing shortfall was a problem few thought possible in the wealthiest, most powerful nation on earth. “We all kind of knew if a biological event hit during this administration, it wasn’t going to be good,” Saskia Popescu, an infectious disease epidemiologist, told me. “But I don’t think anyone ever anticipated it could be this bad.”
Trump also consistently undermined the advice of experts, including those in his administration. When the CDC released reopening guidelines, Trump effectively told states to ignore the guidance and reopen prematurely — to “LIBERATE” their economies. When the CDC recommended masks for public use, Trump described masking as a personal choice, refused to wear one in public for months, and even suggested that people wear masks to spite him. (He’s changed his tone recently.) While federal agencies and researchers work diligently to find effective treatments for Covid-19, Trump has promoted unproven and even dangerous approaches, at one point advocating for injecting bleach. Trump’s allies have even held up CDC studies that could contradict the president’s overly optimistic outlook.
The most aggressive steps Trump took to halt the virus — travel restrictions on China and Europe imposed in February and March, respectively — were likely too limited and too late. And to the extent these measures bought time, it wasn’t properly used.
The federal government is the only entity that can solve many of the problems the country is facing. If testing supply shortfalls in Maine are slowing down testing in Arizona or Florida, the federal government has the resources and the legal jurisdiction to quickly act. Local or state offices looking for advice on how to react to a national crisis will typically turn to the federal government for guidance.
But the inaction, contradictions, and counterproductive messaging created a vacuum in federal leadership.
In the months after Trump’s prediction that coronavirus cases would go down to zero, confirmed cases in the US grew to more than 160,000. As of September 22, they stand at more than 6.8 million.
Months into the pandemic, Trump has continued to flail
After the initial wave of coronavirus cases began to subside in April, the White House stopped its daily press briefings on the topic. By June, Trump’s tweets and public appearances focused on Black Lives Matter protests and the 2020 election — part of what Politico reporter Dan Diamond described, based on discussions with administration officials, as an “apparent eagerness to change the subject.”
Then another wave of coronavirus infections hit beginning in June, peaking with more than 70,000 daily new cases, a new high, and more than 1,000 daily deaths.
America’s response to the initial rise of infections was slow and inadequate. But other developed countries also struggled with the sudden arrival of a disease brand new to humans. The second surge, experts said, was when the scope of Trump’s failure became more apparent.
By pushing states to open prematurely, failing to set up national infrastructure for testing and tracing, and downplaying masks, Trump put many states under enormous pressure to reopen before the virus was under control nationwide. Many quickly did — and over time suffered the consequences.
Rather than create a new strategy, Trump and his administration returned to magical thinking. Pence, head of the White House’s coronavirus task force, wrote an op-ed titled “There Isn’t a Coronavirus ‘Second Wave’” in mid-June, as cases started to increase again. Internally, some of Trump’s experts seemed to believe this; Birx, once a widely respected infectious disease expert, reportedly told the president and White House staff that the US was likely following the path of Italy: Cases hit a huge high but would steadily decline.
Trump trotted out optimistic, but misleading, claims and statistics. He told Axios reporter Jonathan Swan in July that the US was doing well because it had few deaths relative to the number of cases. When Swan, clearly baffled, clarified he was asking about deaths as a proportion of population — a standard metric for an epidemic’s deadliness — Trump said, “You can’t do that.” He gave no further explanation.
Seemingly believing its coronavirus mission accomplished, the Trump administration, the New York Times reported, moved to relinquish responsibility for the pandemic and leave the response to the states — in what the Times called “perhaps one of the greatest failures of presidential leadership in generations.”
“The biggest problem in the US response is there is not a US response,” Konyndyk, now a senior policy fellow at the Center for Global Development, told me. “There is a New York response. There’s a Florida response. There’s a Montana response. There’s a California response. There’s a Michigan response. There’s a Georgia response. But there is not a US response.”
When the coronavirus first hit the US, the country struggled with testing enough people, contact tracing, getting the public to follow recommendations such as physical distancing and masking, delivering enough equipment for health care workers, and hospital capacity. In the second wave, these problems have by and large repeated themselves.
Consider testing: It has significantly improved, but some parts of the country have reported weeks-long delays in getting test results, and the percentage of tests coming back positive has risen above the recommended 5 percent in most states — a sign of insufficient testing. The system once again appeared to collapse under the weight of too much demand, while the federal government failed to solve continuing problems with supply chains. Months after Congress approved billions of dollars in spending to deal with testing problems, the Trump administration has not spent much of it.
Some of Trump’s people seemed to listen to his calls to slow down testing: On August 24, the CDC updated its guidelines to suggest people exposed to others with Covid-19 don’t necessarily have to get tested — a move for effectively less testing that experts described as “dangerous” and “irresponsible.” Only after weeks of criticism did the CDC back down and, on September 18, once again call for testing people without symptoms.
Mask-wearing also remains polarized. While surveys show that the vast majority of Americans have worn masks in the past week, there’s a strong partisan divide. According to Gallup’s surveys, 99 percent of Democrats say they’ve gone out with a mask in the previous week, compared to 80 percent of Republicans. Leveraging surveys on mask use, the New York Times estimated that the percentage of people using masks in public can fall to as low as 20, 10, or the single digits — even in some communities that have been hit hard. Anti-mask protests have popped up around the country.
Testing and mask-wearing are two of the strongest weapons against Covid-19. Testing, paired with contact tracing, lets officials track the scale of an outbreak, isolate those who are sick, quarantine their contacts, and deploy community-wide efforts as necessary to contain the disease — as successfully demonstrated in Germany, New Zealand, and South Korea, among others. There’s also growing scientific evidence supporting widespread and even mandated mask use, with experts citing it as crucial to the success of nations like Japan and Slovakia in containing the virus.
It’s not that other developed nations did everything perfectly. New Zealand has contained Covid-19 without widespread masking, and Japan has done so without widespread testing. But both took at least one aggressive action the US hasn’t. “While there’s variation across many countries, the thing that distinguishes the countries doing well is they took something seriously,” Kirsten Bibbins-Domingo, an epidemiologist at the University of California San Francisco, told me.
One explanation for the shortfalls in the US response is Trump’s obsession with getting America, particularly the economy, back to normal in the short term, seemingly before Election Day this November. It’s why he’s called on governors to “LIBERATE” states. It’s why he’s repeatedly said that “the Cure can’t be worse than the problem itself.” It’s one reason, perhaps, he resisted embracing even very minor lifestyle changes such as wearing a mask.
The reality is that life will only get closer to normal once the virus is suppressed. That’s what’s working for other countries that are more earnestly reopening, from Taiwan to Germany. It’s what a preliminary study on the 1918 flu found, as US cities that emerged economically stronger back then took more aggressive action that hindered economies in the short term but better kept infections and deaths down overall.
“Dead people don’t shop,” Jade Pagkas-Bather, an infectious diseases expert and doctor at the University of Chicago, told me. “They can’t stimulate economies.”
The window to avert further catastrophe may be closing
As cases and deaths climbed over the summer, and as the November election neared, Trump at times appeared to spring back into action — bringing back coronavirus press conferences and briefly changing his tone on masks (before going back to mocking them).
But Trump still seems resistant to focusing too much on the issue. He’s tried to change the subject to former Vice President Joe Biden’s supposed plans to destroy the “Suburban Lifestyle Dream.” He’s continued to downplay the crisis, saying on July 28, as daily Covid-19 deaths once again topped 1,000, “It is what it is.” His Republican convention continued to diminish the risks of Covid-19 and exaggerate Trump’s successes in fighting the virus. At a campaign rally in Ohio on September 21, Trump claimed the virus “affects virtually nobody.”
So while combating Covid-19 aligns with Trump’s political incentives (it remains Americans’ top priority), he and his administration continue to flounder. And White House officials stand by their response so far, continually pushing blame to local and state governments.
“There’s no national plan to combat the worst pandemic that we’ve seen in a century,” Jen Kates, director of global health and HIV policy at the Kaiser Family Foundation, told me.
The summer surge of Covid-19 has calmed now, although cases across the US flattened out at a much higher level than they were in the spring, likely a result of cities, counties, states, and the public taking action as the federal government didn’t. Still, cases have started to pick back up again.
Experts now worry that the country could be setting itself up for another wave of Covid-19. Schools reopening across the country could create new vectors of transmission. The winter will force many Americans indoors to avoid the cold, while being outdoors in the open air can hinder the spread of the disease. Families and friends will come together from across the country to celebrate the holidays, creating new possibilities for superspreading events. And in the background, another flu season looms — which could limit health care capacity further just as Covid-19 cases spike.
“The virus spreads when a large number of people gather indoors,” Jha said. “That’s going to happen more in December than it did in July — and July was a pretty awful month.”
There are reasons to believe it might not get so bad. Since so many people in the US have gotten sick, that could offer some element of population immunity in some places as long as people continue social distancing and masking. After seeing two large waves of the coronavirus across the country, the public could act cautiously and slow the disease, even if local, state, and federal governments don’t. Social distancing due to Covid-19 could keep the spread of the flu down too (which seemed to happen in the Southern Hemisphere).
But the federal government could do much more to push the nation in the right direction. Experts have urged the federal government to provide clear, consistent guidance and deploy stronger policies, encouraging people to take Covid-19 as a serious threat — now, not later.
“I’m really concerned that the window might be closing,” Kates said.
Without that federal action, the US could remain stuck in a cycle of ups and downs with Covid-19, forcing the public to double down on social distancing and other measures with each new wave. As cases and deaths continue to climb, America will become even more of an outlier as much of the developed world inches back to normal. And the “beautiful time” Trump imagined for Easter will remain out of reach.

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The Justices Themselves Can Turn Down the Heat - by Creating Their Own Term Limits |
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Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=51446"><span class="small">Danielle Allen, The Washington Post</span></a>
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Wednesday, 23 September 2020 08:21 |
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Allen writes: "The Supreme Court has in its own hands the power to turn the heat down on this election."
A makeshift memorial for late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg near the steps of the Supreme Court on Monday. (photo: Alex Edelman/AFP/Getty Images)

The Justices Themselves Can Turn Down the Heat - by Creating Their Own Term Limits
By Danielle Allen, The Washington Post
23 September 20
he Supreme Court has in its own hands the power to turn the heat down on this election.
This the justices can do by establishing, voluntarily among themselves, a rule for their court that each justice will limit service to 18 years, thereafter rotating off the Supreme Court to another bench in the federal judiciary or into senior status. One new justice would be appointed every two years, going forward.
Yes, President Trump has the power and right to nominate a justice. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) has the power and right to bring a nomination to a floor vote. But should they? No. Not unless they also win the upcoming election. They should not press their victory from the last election so far as to make this appointment now.
Novelist Ralph Ellison argued that democracy should be governed by an ethic of “winner take nothing.” That is surely too much to ask, but neither can democracy be sustained by McConnell’s mantra, “Winners make policy; losers go home.” After all, there are always winners and losers in democratic politics. Democracies work only if both winners and losers have reasons to stay in the game.
The answer in a healthy democracy lies in between. Winners get to chair decision-making processes in which losers also are expected to take part. We need a reset back to a place where winners seek to win losers over, not press their advantage over them to the last point.
Eighteen-year terms for justices would help lower the stakes in the necessary way and give us that reset, as my colleague Charles Lane wrote. Federal legislation could, of course, accomplish this, as was recently proposed in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences commission report that I helped chair, but there is no hope of that at this moment in time.
In the near term, it’s up to the justices. We need the eight who remain to take it upon themselves to lower the stakes of any given Supreme Court appointment. If they could voluntarily establish a term-limits regime for themselves, presidents would no longer have the chance to shape the judiciary for a lifetime over the course of an eight-year administration. Every president would have the chance to appoint two justices in each term. This would meaningfully ratchet down the intensity of our politics and give the judiciary a fighting chance of making its way back above the fray.
Both the left and the right think the degree of politicization now afflicting the appointment of justices is a significant problem for our country, but each seems to approach that problem with a surprising degree of fatalism. Thus, the editorial board of the Wall Street Journal writes:
It’s a shame that the Court and the judiciary have become so central to American politics, but that is the legacy of decades of judicial activism. Even as we honor Justice Ginsburg, there is no escaping that political reality this year.
And the New York Times writes this:
Everyone who cares about the integrity of the nation’s highest court has been dreading a moment like this — the death of a justice as Americans are already casting their ballots in the most contentious and consequential presidential election in living memory.
The kind of heroic act I’m calling for has precedents on smaller scales. I served as the first term-limited trustee of the Mellon Foundation, then a $6 billion foundation, after a group of trustees with life terms decided to term limit themselves to 10-year terms because they had come to understand that life tenure left their institution in an unhealthy position.
Of course, the degree of power the justices of our Supreme Court would have to give up is much more significant. But to hold that power for 18 years is no small thing. Surely it should suffice for a mortal.
Our Supreme Court justices hold in their hands the power to begin the healing of our republic. May they use it. They would be following George Washington’s noble example.

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