Peak Oil Is Dead, Long Live Peak Oil!

By Michael T. Klare, TomDispatch

09 January 14

mong the big energy stories of 2013, "peak oil" -- the once-popular notion that worldwide oil production would soon reach a maximum level and begin an irreversible decline -- was thoroughly discredited. The explosive development of shale oil and other unconventional fuels in the United States helped put it in its grave.

As the year went on, the eulogies came in fast and furious. "Today, it is probably safe to say we have slayed 'peak oil' once and for all, thanks to the combination of new shale oil and gas production techniques," declared Rob Wile, an energy and economics reporter for Business Insider. Similar comments from energy experts were commonplace, prompting an R.I.P. headline at Time.com announcing, "Peak Oil is Dead."

Not so fast, though. The present round of eulogies brings to mind Mark Twain's famous line: "The reports of my death have been greatly exaggerated." Before obits for peak oil theory pile up too high, let's take a careful look at these assertions. Fortunately, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Paris-based research arm of the major industrialized powers, recently did just that -- and the results were unexpected. While not exactly reinstalling peak oil on its throne, it did make clear that much of the talk of a perpetual gusher of American shale oil is greatly exaggerated. The exploitation of those shale reserves may delay the onset of peak oil for a year or so, the agency's experts noted, but the long-term picture "has not changed much with the arrival of [shale oil]."

The IEA's take on this subject is especially noteworthy because its assertion only a year earlier that the U.S. would overtake Saudi Arabia as the world's number one oil producer sparked the "peak oil is dead" deluge in the first place. Writing in the 2012 edition of its World Energy Outlook, the agency claimed not only that "the United States is projected to become the largest global oil producer" by around 2020, but also that with U.S. shale production and Canadian tar sands coming online, "North America becomes a net oil exporter around 2030."

That November 2012 report highlighted the use of advanced production technologies -- notably horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing ("fracking") -- to extract oil and natural gas from once inaccessible rock, especially shale. It also covered the accelerating exploitation of Canada's bitumen (tar sands or oil sands), another resource previously considered too forbidding to be economical to develop. With the output of these and other "unconventional" fuels set to explode in the years ahead, the report then suggested, the long awaited peak of world oil production could be pushed far into the future.

The release of the 2012 edition of World Energy Outlook triggered a global frenzy of speculative reporting, much of it announcing a new era of American energy abundance. "Saudi America" was the headline over one such hosanna in the Wall Street Journal. Citing the new IEA study, that paper heralded a coming "U.S. energy boom" driven by "technological innovation and risk-taking funded by private capital." From then on, American energy analysts spoke rapturously of the capabilities of a set of new extractive technologies, especially fracking, to unlock oil and natural gas from hitherto inaccessible shale formations. "This is a real energy revolution," the Journal crowed.

But that was then. The most recent edition of World Energy Outlook, published this past November, was a lot more circumspect. Yes, shale oil, tar sands, and other unconventional fuels will add to global supplies in the years ahead, and, yes, technology will help prolong the life of petroleum. Nonetheless, it's easy to forget that we are also witnessing the wholesale depletion of the world's existing oil fields and so all these increases in shale output must be balanced against declines in conventional production. Under ideal circumstances -- high levels of investment, continuing technological progress, adequate demand and prices -- it might be possible to avert an imminent peak in worldwide production, but as the latest IEA report makes clear, there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will occur.

Inching Toward the Peak

Before plunging deeper into the IEA's assessment, let's take a quick look at peak oil theory itself.

As developed in the 1950s by petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert, peak oil theory holds that any individual oil field (or oil-producing country) will experience a high rate of production growth during initial development, when drills are first inserted into a oil-bearing reservoir. Later, growth will slow, as the most readily accessible resources have been drained and a greater reliance has to be placed on less productive deposits. At this point -- usually when about half the resources in the reservoir (or country) have been extracted -- daily output reaches a maximum, or "peak," level and then begins to subside. Of course, the field or fields will continue to produce even after peaking, but ever more effort and expense will be required to extract what remains. Eventually, the cost of production will exceed the proceeds from sales, and extraction will be terminated.

For Hubbert and his followers, the rise and decline of oil fields is an inevitable consequence of natural forces: oil exists in pressurized underground reservoirs and so will be forced up to the surface when a drill is inserted into the ground. However, once a significant share of the resources in that reservoir has been extracted, the field's pressure will drop and artificial means -- water, gas, or chemical insertion -- will be needed to restore pressure and sustain production. Sooner or later, such means become prohibitively expensive.

Peak oil theory also holds that what is true of an individual field or set of fields is true of the world as a whole. Until about 2005, it did indeed appear that the globe was edging ever closer to a peak in daily oil output, as Hubbert's followers had long predicted. (He died in 1989.) Several recent developments have, however, raised questions about the accuracy of the theory. In particular, major private oil companies have taken to employing advanced technologies to increase the output of the reservoirs under their control, extending the lifetime of existing fields through the use of what's called "enhanced oil recovery," or EOR. They've also used new methods to exploit fields once considered inaccessible in places like the Arctic and deep oceanic waters, thereby opening up the possibility of a most un-Hubbertian future.

In developing these new technologies, the privately owned "international oil companies" (IOCs) were seeking to overcome their principal handicap: most of the world's "easy oil" -- the stuff Hubbert focused on that comes gushing out of the ground whenever a drill is inserted -- has already been consumed or is controlled by state-owned "national oil companies" (NOCs), including Saudi Aramco, the National Iranian Oil Company, and the Kuwait National Petroleum Company, among others. According to the IEA, such state companies control about 80% of the world's known petroleum reserves, leaving relatively little for the IOCs to exploit.

To increase output from the limited reserves still under their control -- mostly located in North America, the Arctic, and adjacent waters -- the private firms have been working hard to develop techniques to exploit "tough oil." In this, they have largely succeeded: they are now bringing new petroleum streams into the marketplace and, in doing so, have shaken the foundations of peak oil theory.

Those who say that "peak oil is dead" cite just this combination of factors. By extending the lifetime of existing fields through EOR and adding entire new sources of oil, the global supply can be expanded indefinitely. As a result, they claim, the world possesses a "relatively boundless supply" of oil (and natural gas). This, for instance, was the way Barry Smitherman of the Texas Railroad Commission (which regulates that state's oil industry) described the global situation at a recent meeting of the Society of Exploration Geophysicists.

Peak Technology

In place of peak oil, then, we have a new theory that as yet has no name but might be called techno-dynamism. There is, this theory holds, no physical limit to the global supply of oil so long as the energy industry is prepared to, and allowed to, apply its technological wizardry to the task of finding and producing more of it. Daniel Yergin, author of the industry classics, The Prize and The Quest, is a key proponent of this theory. He recently summed up the situation this way: "Advances in technology take resources that were not physically accessible and turn them into recoverable reserves." As a result, he added, "estimates of the total global stock of oil keep growing."

From this perspective, the world supply of petroleum is essentially boundless. In addition to "conventional" oil -- the sort that comes gushing out of the ground -- the IEA identifies six other potential streams of petroleum liquids: natural gas liquids; tar sands and extra-heavy oil; kerogen oil (petroleum solids derived from shale that must be melted to become usable); shale oil; coal-to-liquids (CTL); and gas-to-liquids (GTL). Together, these "unconventional" streams could theoretically add several trillion barrels of potentially recoverable petroleum to the global supply, conceivably extending the Oil Age hundreds of years into the future (and in the process, via climate change, turning the planet into an uninhabitable desert).

But just as peak oil had serious limitations, so, too, does techno-dynamism. At its core is a belief that rising world oil demand will continue to drive the increasingly costly investments in new technologies required to exploit the remaining hard-to-get petroleum resources. As suggested in the 2013 edition of the IEA's World Energy Outlook, however, this belief should be treated with considerable skepticism.

Among the principal challenges to the theory are these:

1. Increasing Technology Costs: While the costs of developing a resource normally decline over time as industry gains experience with the technologies involved, Hubbert's law of depletion doesn't go away. In other words, oil firms invariably develop the easiest "tough oil" resources first, leaving the toughest (and most costly) for later. For example, the exploitation of Canada's tar sands began with the strip-mining of deposits close to the surface. Because those are becoming exhausted, however, energy firms are now going after deep-underground reserves using far costlier technologies. Likewise, many of the most abundant shale oil deposits in North Dakota have now been depleted, requiring an increasing pace of drilling to maintain production levels. As a result, the IEA reports, the cost of developing new petroleum resources will continually increase: up to $80 per barrel for oil obtained using advanced EOR techniques, $90 per barrel for tar sands and extra-heavy oil, $100 or more for kerogen and Arctic oil, and $110 for CTL and GTL. The market may not, however, be able to sustain levels this high, putting such investments in doubt.

2. Growing Political and Environmental Risk: By definition, tough oil reserves are located in problematic areas. For example, an estimated 13% of the world's undiscovered oil lies in the Arctic, along with 30% of its untapped natural gas. The environmental risks associated with their exploitation under the worst of weather conditions imaginable will quickly become more evident -- and so, faced with the rising potential for catastrophic spills in a melting Arctic, expect a commensurate increase in political opposition to such drilling. In fact, a recent increase has sparked protests in both Alaska and Russia, including the much-publicized September 2013 attempt by activists from Greenpeace to scale a Russian offshore oil platform -- an action that led to their seizure and arrest by Russian commandos. Similarly, expanded fracking operations have provoked a steady increase in anti-fracking activism. In response to such protests and other factors, oil firms are being forced to adopt increasingly stringent environmental protections, pumping up the cost of production further.

3. Climate-Related Demand Reduction: The techno-optimist outlook assumes that oil demand will keep rising, prompting investors to provide the added funds needed to develop the technologies required. However, as the effects of rampant climate change accelerate, more and more polities are likely to try to impose curbs of one sort or another on oil consumption, suppressing demand -- and so discouraging investment. This is already happening in the United States, where mandated increases in vehicle fuel-efficiency standards are expected to significantly reduce oil consumption. Future "demand destruction" of this sort is bound to impose a downward pressure on oil prices, diminishing the inclination of investors to finance costly new development projects.

Combine these three factors, and it is possible to conceive of a "technology peak" not unlike the peak in oil output originally envisioned by M. King Hubbert. Such a techno-peak is likely to occur when the "easy" sources of "tough" oil have been depleted, opponents of fracking and other objectionable forms of production have imposed strict (and costly) environmental regulations on drilling operations, and global demand has dropped below a level sufficient to justify investment in costly extractive operations. At that point, global oil production will decline even if supplies are "boundless" and technology is still capable of unlocking more oil every year.

Peak Oil Reconsidered

Peak oil theory, as originally conceived by Hubbert and his followers, was largely governed by natural forces. As we have seen, however, these can be overpowered by the application of increasingly sophisticated technology. Reservoirs of energy once considered inaccessible can be brought into production, and others once deemed exhausted can be returned to production; rather than being finite, the world's petroleum base now appears virtually inexhaustible.

Does this mean that global oil output will continue rising, year after year, without ever reaching a peak? That appears unlikely. What seems far more probable is that we will see a slow tapering of output over the next decade or two as costs of production rise and climate change -- along with opposition to the path chosen by the energy giants -- gains momentum. Eventually, the forces tending to reduce supply will overpower those favoring higher output, and a peak in production will indeed result, even if not due to natural forces alone.

Such an outcome is, in fact, envisioned in one of three possible energy scenarios the IEA's mainstream experts lay out in the latest edition of World Energy Outlook. The first assumes no change in government policies over the next 25 years and sees world oil supply rising from 87 to 110 million barrels per day by 2035; the second assumes some effort to curb carbon emissions and so projects output reaching "only" 101 million barrels per day by the end of the survey period.

It's the third trajectory, the "450 Scenario," that should raise eyebrows. It assumes that momentum develops for a global drive to keep greenhouse gas emissions below 450 parts per million -- the maximum level at which it might be possible to prevent global average temperatures from rising above 2 degrees Celsius (and so cause catastrophic climate effects). As a result, it foresees a peak in global oil output occurring around 2020 at about 91 million barrels per day, with a decline to 78 million barrels by 2035.

It would be premature to suggest that the "450 Scenario" will be the immediate roadmap for humanity, since it's clear enough that, for the moment, we are on a highway to hell that combines the IEA's first two scenarios. Bear in mind, moreover, that many scientists believe a global temperature increase of even 2 degrees Celsius would be enough to produce catastrophic climate effects. But as the effects of climate change become more pronounced in our lives, count on one thing: the clamor for government action will grow more intense, and so eventually we're likely to see some variation of the 450 Scenario take shape. In the process, the world's demand for oil will be sharply constricted, eliminating the incentive to invest in costly new production schemes.

The bottom line: global peak oil remains in our future, even if not purely for the reasons given by Hubbert and his followers. With the gradual disappearance of "easy" oil, the major private firms are being forced to exploit increasingly tough, hard-to-reach reserves, thereby driving up the cost of production and potentially discouraging new investment at a time when climate change and environmental activism are on the rise.

Peak oil is dead! Long live peak oil!

Good Riddance to Liz Cheney, Our Tracy Flick

By Frank Rich, New York Magazine

09 January 14

iz Cheney ended her tumultuous bid to unseat Wyoming senator Mike Enzi on Monday, citing unspecified family health issues for her exit. Does Cheney's departure say anything larger about the state of the GOP and her father's legacy? Or is this just a case of an ill-advised, ill-timed candidacy?

Cheney's campaign was a rollicking disaster - she was dying in the polls - and some of her failure was specific to her: She was perceived (correctly) as an entitled carpetbagger who'd parachuted from tony Northern Virginia to tony Jackson Hole; a brazenly ambitious opportunist exploiting her family name; and a flip-flopper. Next to her, Tracy Flick, the ruthless student politician played by Reese Witherspoon in Election, seems like Eleanor Roosevelt. Besides, Enzi is well-liked and as conservative as many GOP voters in Wyoming would want, no matter how hard Cheney tried to contrive positions to his right.

But there are two larger issues that do speak to the state of the GOP and her father's legacy. The first is that the brand of truculent neocon foreign policy championed by Dick Cheney and George W. Bush is hopelessly tarnished, so much so that even Liz Cheney, who had initially endorsed American intervention in Syria in keeping with her father's worldview, had to retreat from it during her campaign and instead fall in line with the rising conservative neo-isolationism of Rand Paul. The second issue, of course, is gay marriage. In her zeal to be on the "right" side of that issue with a Republican electorate, she insulted and disowned her own sister, Mary, as well as Mary's spouse, Heather Poe, and the couple's two children. It's not clear that this offensive and hypocritical stand did Liz Cheney any good with voters, but it did highlight how mean-spirited politicians look when they trash gay marriages and gay parents, let alone those in their own family. Mary Cheney had it right when she said her sister was on the wrong side of history. So is most of the GOP. And that history continues to move very fast, making antediluvian conservatives look more malign by the day. That's why, among the many obnoxious Liz Cheney moments in her short-lived political career, one of the most egregious was her exit: She claimed to be leaving the race because she was putting her family first when in fact the most famous incident in her campaign was her decision to trash her own sister's family.

Bloomberg Markets magazine published a report detailing Bill Clinton's involvement with Laureate, America's largest for-profit-college company. The for-profit-college industry has been tarnished as predatory and disreputable, and Hillary Clinton, in case anyone hasn't heard, is very probably about to run for president of the United States. To paraphrase Jay Leno, what the hell is the Big Dog thinking?

The good news is that with a changing of the guard at the Tonight show, we will soon not have to paraphrase Jay Leno anymore. It's also good news, I guess, that Bill Clinton is not involved with Trump University. But this is just the latest example of the land mines Clinton has been planting in his wife's path for the presidency, should she indeed decide to run. As the Times reported in a major investigation, there are a lot of questions and there is not a lot of transparency about how the Clinton Global Initiative operates. And that's the nonprofit Clinton arm of Bill Clinton's post-presidency. His other business dealings have been profuse and often murky, and every single one of them is going to be investigated by the press if a Hillary Clinton campaign goes forward. The Bloomberg piece does not find any illegality in this instance, but the sleaze factor is considerable. Clinton serving as the "Honorary Chancellor" of a diploma mill that rips off young people - and doing it in a financial partnership that includes the hedge-fund titan Steve Cohen, whose SAC Capital Advisors is ground zero for insider-trading criminality - does not pass the smell test. "No Child Left Behind" has been supplanted by "No Cash Left on the Table." In 2008, Bill Clinton's ill-timed statements often seemed designed to sabotage his wife's campaign, and you really have to wonder what he is thinking when he gets into deals like this that threaten her prospects in 2016.

Last week, Al Qaeda insurgents seized the city of Fallujah, the site of some of the deadliest battles during the U.S. war in Iraq. Hawkish senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham immediately laid the blame on President Obama for withdrawing our troops, and American veterans of the Fallujah sieges wondered publicly if the sacrifices of their fellow troops had now been rendered meaningless. Does this dark episode reflect a major flaw in the president's Iraq strategy, and do you think it will carry over to his approaches to exiting Afghanistan and dealing with Syria?

It is offensive to watch a sanctimonious John McCain, of all people, pop up this week and talk about how sad he is to see the Al Qaeda flag flying again in Fallujah, and about how he doesn't know what we should tell the families of the Americans who lost their lives in the two battles for the city during the Iraq war. McCain (like Graham) was a major cheerleader for this war, predicted it would go "easily," and argued for throwing more troops and money into its bottomless pit. He even minimized the sectarian divisions within the country, saying that the Sunnis and the Shia would "probably get along" once Saddam Hussein was toppled because there was "not a history of clashes" between them. The fact remains that Al Qaeda was not in Iraq until we invaded the country, and that McCain has never had any other policy for the war (including now) other than staying indefinitely. Indeed, Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-run Iraq, which he helped create, is now a sterling ally of Iran, the enemy he jokingly proposed bombing during his ill-fated presidential campaign. Should we now bomb, bomb, bomb Iraq (as he put it at the time)? What McCain should tell the families is that he apologizes for having been so wrong.

As for Obama, he had the right strategy - in truth the only strategy - for Iraq, unless you take McCain's notion of an eternal American presence seriously. Ditto for Obama's strategy in Afghanistan (which even the former defense secretary Robert Gates endorses in his new book trashing the Obama national-security team). As for what Obama - or any president - could accomplish beyond the margins on any Middle Eastern front, the options are limited. To quote Jeffrey Goldberg, what we have is "one war, from Beirut to Baghdad," and the track record for our past intervention in the endless Shia vs. Sunni struggle is tragic. More boots on the ground is out of the question. If we've learned anything since World War II, it's that you can't successfully fight a war without public support, and many, if not most, in McCain's own party (see Rand Paul, above), would dissent from sending troops, in large part in reaction to the Bush-Cheney disaster that McCain helped gin up in Iraq. If anyone has a plausible idea for what might constitute successful American intervention in this inferno, I have not heard of it.