RSN Fundraising Banner
FB Share
Email This Page
add comment
Politics
FOCUS | They Died for Henry Kissinger's "Credibility": The Real History of Our Vietnam Immorality Print
Sunday, 18 October 2015 10:29

Milne writes: "In 1971, a returning veteran named John Kerry testified powerfully before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He indicted the war as 'the biggest nothing in history' and posed a powerful question: 'How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?' Kissinger's best answer to Kerry's question was 'for the sake of credibility.'"

Henry Kissinger. (photo: unknown)
Henry Kissinger. (photo: unknown)


They Died for Henry Kissinger's "Credibility": The Real History of Our Vietnam Immorality

By David Milne, Salon

18 October 15

 

There was no good answer when John Kerry asked how you ask a man to be the last to die for a mistake. Here's why

étente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China were significant breakthroughs in their own right. Indeed, a positive appraisal of the Nixon administration’s foreign policies is predicated on our viewing them this way. But Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did not view them in isolation at the time. Instead, both men believed that Moscow and Beijing, keen to extract economic and strategic benefits from an improved relationship with Washington, would apply pressure on Hanoi to agree to peace terms permitting a full American withdrawal. On this topic their reasoning was misguided. It did not accord sufficient respect to North Vietnam’s fiercely guarded status as an independent actor, or indeed to the ideological solidarity that existed on at least a bilateral basis between Hanoi and its two Marxist-Leninist patrons.

So when the United States withdrew from Vietnam in January 1973, when “peace” was finally achieved, it came at a horrendous cost. Cambodia was dragged directly into the fray, leading ultimately to the rise of the Khmer Rouge and a genocide that killed approximately 1.7 million people— 20.1 percent of Cambodia’s population. Hundreds of thousands of North and South Vietnamese soldiers and noncombatants lost their lives. Of the fifty-seven thousand American soldiers who died on or above Vietnamese soil, twenty thousand perished during Nixon’s presidency. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Nixon had stated his intention to achieve “peace with honor.” In 1971, a returning veteran named John Kerry testified powerfully before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He indicted the war as “the biggest nothing in history” and posed a powerful question: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?”

Kissinger’s best answer to Kerry’s question was “for the sake of credibility.” The national security adviser understood that the United States could not “win” the Vietnam War and largely agreed with Kerry that the Americanization of the conflict had been a mistake. But he was adamant that the nation could not be seen to “lose” it either. In a widely noted essay in Foreign Affairs in January 1969 titled “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Kissinger placed greatest emphasis not on the tangible ramifications of withdrawal but on the amorphous psychological ones:

The commitment of 500,000 Americans has settled the issue of the importance of Viet Nam. What is involved now is confidence in American promises. However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms “credibility” or “prestige,” they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness . . . In many parts of the world—the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, even Japan— stability depends on confidence in American promises.

Henry Kissinger’s plan for a staged withdrawal from Vietnam was thus sustained by the logic of keeping up appearances. “We could not simply walk away from an enterprise involving two administrations, five allied countries, and thirty-one thousand dead,” Kissinger observed in his memoir, “as if we were switching a television channel.” More would die to display America’s continued potency to friends and enemies. The nation would not slink away under cover of darkness but depart with all guns blazing.

Credibility was important to nineteenth-century diplomats like Metternich and Bismarck. (The latter established extensive German colonies in Africa primarily for reasons of credibility, not because he believed that an African empire added much to Berlin’s strategic or economic strength.) But its logic was harder to sell in twentieth-century America, where battlefield deaths born of prestige-driven actions were tolerated less well by political elites beholden to mass democracy and subject to media scrutiny. In Paris in March 1969, President Charles de Gaulle asked Kissinger, “Why don’t you get out of Vietnam?” Surprised by de Gaulle’s bluntness, Kissinger answered, “Because a sudden withdrawal might give us a credibility problem.” “Where?” demanded de Gaulle. Kissinger specified the Middle East. “How very odd,” said de Gaulle. “It is precisely in the Middle East that I thought your enemies had a credibility problem.” De Gaulle understood something that Kissinger did not: America’s allies—even ambivalent ones like France—believed Washington’s credibility would be enhanced, not diminished, by casting aside fictions, cutting its losses, and pursuing an expedited withdrawal.

Kissinger’s ostensible peace goals were twofold: that North Vietnamese troops leave South Vietnam at the point of armistice, and that North Vietnam respect South Vietnam’s independence after America’s withdrawal. Kissinger was not so naïve that he believed either goal was realistically attainable. Rather, as he observed to Hans Morgenthau in 1968, he would “drag on the process” of withdrawal “for a while because of the international repercussions.”

This dragging effect would be achieved with multiple weights and pulleys. First, the withdrawal of American troops would commence at a steady rate—twenty-five thousand American troops left Vietnam in 1969 and hundreds of thousands soon followed. Second, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), whom the Americans would train and equip to the highest standards, would fill the gap left by the departing American troops—a strategy described as “Vietnamization.” Third, the United States would escalate the war in the most efficient (read destructive) manner possible. As the ground war was being deescalated, the U.S. bombing campaign increased sharply in intensity—and secretly, for such actions were always likely to create a firestorm of protest. Nixon and Kissinger expanded the U.S. bombing campaign in the spring of 1969 to include targets in Cambodia. This action caused two of Kissinger’s assistants, Anthony Lake and Roger Morris, to resign in protest. A year later, American troops began their “incursion” (read: invasion) of Cambodia in the hope—forlorn, as it turned out—of destroying North Vietnamese command facilities.

The bombing of Cambodia encapsulated all of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s failings regarding transparency, strategy, and morality. The bombings were conducted in total secrecy and were falsely designated as attacks on North Vietnam. Congress and the public were not informed. As per usual, many within the administration knew as little as Congress: the State Department, inevitably, and even the secretary of the Air Force. Yet keeping a large-scale bombing campaign under wraps was impossible. On May 9, 1969, The New York Times ran a front-page story publicizing this expansion of the war into Cambodia. Nixon was furious, exclaiming to Kissinger, “What is this cock-sucking story? Find out who leaked it, and fire him.” Without foundation, Kissinger pinned the blame on Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and confronted him directly: “You son of a bitch. I know you leaked that story, and you’re going to have to explain it to the president.” Laird simply hung up. Kissinger subsequently conceded that he had accused the wrong man. To identify the real culprit, he and Nixon requested the director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, to install a series of wiretaps on three of Kissinger’s NSC staff: Daniel Davidson, Morton Halperin, and Hal Sonnenfeldt, as well as one of Melvin Laird’s assistants at the Pentagon, Colonel Robert Pursley. The number of wiretaps Nixon and Kissinger authorized on administration staff eventually totaled seventeen, but none captured anything incriminating. Nixon lamented that the wiretaps “never helped us,” they merely comprised “gobs and gobs of material. Gossip and bullshitting.” Only one recording device captured a detail that led to a high-level resignation. It was voice-activated and whirred into action whenever the president opened his mouth.

The bombing of Cambodia killed thousands of people and destabilized a sovereign nation to little if any discernible effect. The secret bombing raids—for the administration persisted in denying their existence in spite of compelling evidence to the contrary—continued for fourteen months, during which U.S. B-52s flew 3,875 sorties and dropped 108,823 tons of bombs. The objective of the raids was to destroy North Vietnam’s political and military headquarters—the Central Office for South Vietnam—and in this it failed. Kissinger felt no moral qualms about escalating the war in this fashion. The fact that the primary strategic objective had not been met seemed not to faze him. This was because the bombing had a negligible impact on the United States beyond the cost of the tonnage—and the lives of the airmen who died delivering their payloads.

Kissinger was as hawkish as Walt Rostow when it came to bombing, observing, “I refuse to believe that a little fourth-rate power like Vietnam does not have a breaking point.” Unsurprisingly, Rostow was on hand to encourage Kissinger to stay the course, that the bombing was having its desired effect. In November 1970, he told Kissinger, “On Vietnam, I suggest you give some thought in light of intelligence coming from Hanoi, that they are having some difficult morale problems in the field as well as at home . . . I get word that for the first time in the whole thing leaflets saying go home, work the farms, grow some rice, raise some kids—that’s something the army in the field and the people at home may be ready to listen to.” Rostow’s words were an echo from the previous administration; he had told LBJ the same story for months in 1967 and 1968. It is hard to say whether Rostow’s observations pepped up Kissinger or depressed him.

Throughout this process of escalation, Kissinger was concurrently engaged in peace negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris. As Le Duc Tho, the chief North Vietnamese negotiator, well understood, “Vietnamization” was a patchy device designed to cloak an inevitable U.S. withdrawal. So he was not particularly amenable to granting concessions prematurely. The South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, was vehemently opposed to Nixon and Kissinger’s withdrawal strategy and drew only limited succor from the expansion of the war into Cambodia. Kissinger could not decide which side he disliked more. Thieu was “this insane son of a bitch,” and the North Vietnamese were “bastards . . . [who] have been screwing us.” Broadly speaking, he concluded that his Vietnamese interlocutors on both sides of the 17th parallel were “just a bunch of shits.”

Thieu and Le Duc Tho understandably formed a similar view of Kissinger. Thieu’s South Vietnam was being given up for dead—this was the reality. The United States was bombing North Vietnam, meanwhile, to preserve Kissinger’s pool of “credibility” and as a parting gift to Thieu. In May 1972, the White House tried to solicit support from George Kennan for an escalation in the bombing campaign. Kennan’s “I thought it was inordinately costly in terms both of extraneous destruction and of our international reputation,” was not at all the hoped-for reply. The Christmas bombing campaign of December 1972 marked the first occasion that B-52 bombers, incapable of precision strikes, wreaked destruction on the centers of Hanoi and Haiphong—the destroyed wing of Bach Mai hospital was just one example of collateral damage. America’s allies and enemies universally condemned the campaign.

On the other side of the equation, in order to secure Thieu’s agreement, Nixon and Kissinger threatened to cut off all aid to South Vietnam and cast the nation adrift. The pursuit of “honor” thus played little role in any of Kissinger’s Vietnam gambits. The peace that came a few weeks later was not so much sullied as disfigured beyond recognition. On January 8, Kissinger shook Le Duc Tho’s hand and told him, “It was not my fault about the bombing.” Tho replied, “You have tarnished the honor of the United States. Your barbarous and inhumane action has aroused the general and tremendous indignation from the world peoples.” John Ehrlichman later asked Kissinger how long South Vietnam was likely to last. Kissinger predicted, “I think that if they’re lucky, they can hold out for a year or two.”

For making peace in January 1973, Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize later in the year. Knowing what was around the corner, Tho refused the award. Kissinger had no such qualms, although he understood as well as Tho that the “peace” was stopgap—a sham. Edwin Reischauer, the Harvard scholar and former U.S. ambassador to Japan, observed that the award “shows either that the people of Norway have a very poor understanding of what happened out there or a good sense of humor.” The critic and humorist Tom Lehrer famously announced his retirement on the grounds that reality had rendered satire obsolete. Kissinger and Nixon complained that insufficient respect was being accorded to what was a significant achievement. On October 17, 1973, Kissinger asked Nixon if he had seen “The New York Times blasting the Nobel Prize.” “Why have they blasted it?” asked Nixon. “Because they can’t bear the thought the war in Vietnam has ended,” replied Kissinger. After Nixon observed, “that’s amusing,” Kissinger elaborated: “They can’t bear the thought— you know, Mr. President, when they said the de?tente wouldn’t work. They never say the de?tente enabled us to settle the Vietnam War because that’s the thing they cannot bear—with honor.” Nixon replied, “Yeah, that’s right. When we stick to the honor—that’s the last straw.”

There was in fact a connection between de?tente and the settlement of the Vietnam War, and it had occurred six months previously at the Moscow Summit. Over the course of a wide-ranging discussion, Brezhnev recounted to Nixon an earlier conversation he had had with his national security adviser, during which “Dr. Kissinger told me that if there was a peaceful settlement in Vietnam you would be agreeable to the Vietnamese doing whatever they want, having whatever they want after a period of time, say 18 months. If that is indeed true, and if the Vietnamese knew this, and it was true, they would be sympathetic on that basis” to reaching an agreement. Brezhnev had outed Kissinger’s acceptance of a “decent interval” between American withdrawal and a North Vietnamese invasion of the South.

This interval lasted a little longer than Kissinger had estimated. In March 1975, North Vietnam army regulars crossed the 17th parallel and advanced rapidly on Saigon, encountering token resistance along the way. The ARVN collapsed or melted from view, Saigon fell within a month, and a murderous final reckoning ensued. The abiding image of those harrowing events is an American helicopter perched precariously atop one of the embassy’s auxiliary buildings, a ladder dangling below providing last-gasp deliverance for a fortunate few. A little farther down, at ground level, thousands of desperate South Vietnamese citizens besiege the embassy’s gates, unable to escape, soon to enter a very different world.

George Kennan was pleased that the United States had terminated a meaningless conflict and shed an unreliable ally. “They won. We lost. It is now their show . . . our attitude should be: you are heartily welcome to each other; it serves you both right.” The callousness of Kennan’s appraisal is perhaps mitigated by the fact that his opposition to the Vietnam War was long and consistently disinterested in morality. Kissinger’s record is harder to defend. He had inherited a debacle, the escalation of which he supported from afar, and had failed to achieve any of his declared aims beyond a compromised peace agreement and U.S. withdrawal, on terms similar to those Averell Harriman had proposed in 1968. American credibility was already low when the nation took its gloves off and bombed Cambodia and North Vietnam with few restrictions; the world’s most powerful nation deploying its heavy bombers against tightly packed cities did not make for edifying viewing. American credibility was almost undetectable in 1975 as Saigon burned.

In an ideational sense, the Vietnam War combined the worst of two worlds. The conflict was made and escalated by liberal Cold Warriors—in the name of ideals that can be traced to Wilson—and was terminated by devotees of realpolitik at a deliberately glacial pace for reasons of credibility.

Like the Civil War, Vietnam would cast a pall over American society, and its foreign policy, for decades. Like the Civil War, its history and meaning are fiercely contested to this day. In recent years, orthodox critics and revisionist defenders of the war have clashed over issues such as whether the war was ever winnable, and whether the United States really lost. So Ngo Dinh Diem was a disaster unworthy of American support; Diem was a heroic leader whom the United States fecklessly destroyed. South Vietnam lacked the wherewithal to stand alone; South Vietnam was pro-Western, growing in strength, and badly betrayed. LBJ’s bombing campaign was brutal; LBJ’s bombing campaign was timid. The United States losing the Vietnam War was inevitable; America would have won had its political leaders shown greater fortitude. So go the lessons of history—or not.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
The Murder of JFK, Part 2: Counterfeit ID Planted in Oswald's Wallet? Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=26125"><span class="small">Bill Simpich, Reader Supported News</span></a>   
Sunday, 18 October 2015 08:51

Simpich writes: "In my previous article, I asked the question 'Who found Oswald's wallet at the murder scene?' Here, I pose another question: Was a phony identification card for 'Alek Hidell' inserted into the wallet after Oswald's arrest?"

A Counterfeit ID found in Oswald's wallet. (photo: Warren Commission Report)
A Counterfeit ID found in Oswald's wallet. (photo: Warren Commission Report)


The Murder of JFK, Part 2: Counterfeit ID Planted in Oswald's Wallet?

By Bill Simpich, Reader Supported News

18 October 15

 

n my previous article, I asked the question “Who found Oswald’s wallet at the murder scene?” 

Here, I pose another question: Was a phony identification card for “Alek Hidell” inserted into the wallet after Oswald’s arrest? “Alek Hidell” was the name used to order the rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository the day JFK was killed.

Listen here to Dallas Police Department Officer Gerald Hill discuss the capture of Lee Harvey Oswald on November 22, 1963. [Editor’s note: to cut to the chase, go to 3:17 in the audio file.]

Listen for what Hill does not say:

He does not say anything about “Hidell” or an identification card.

Is this omission significant? I think it is.

My previous article recounted the details. FBI agent Bob Barrett said he saw Oswald’s wallet in the hands of DPD Captain Pinky Westbrook at the scene of the murder of Dallas police office J.D. Tippit on November 22, 1963.

The article also recounted that the arresting officer, Paul Bentley, told a different story. Bentley said he found Oswald’s wallet while frisking him in the police car after leaving the Texas Theatre, where Oswald was arrested on November 22.

Both men say that the wallet contained identification cards for both Lee Harvey Oswald and “Alek Hidell.”

So was Oswald carrying the Alek Hidell ID in his wallet when he was arrested?

He had not been previously seen using the ID card, or the Hidell alias. Oswald wasn’t carrying a “Hidell” ID card in his wallet three months before in August 1963 when he was arrested in New Orleans for fighting with Cuban exiles disturbed by his pro-Castro activism. After his arrest, Oswald said he was in touch with a fellow Castro supporter named “Hidell,” which was a lie.

Questions

If Oswald’s wallet containing the Hidell ID card was found on Oswald’s person on November 22, 1963, why do none of the contemporaneous police reports from that day say anything about “Hidell” or an ID card in another name besides Oswald’s?

Bentley did not say that the Hidell ID was in Oswald’s wallet until June 11, 1964. Bentley never testified to the Warren Commission.

The critical question is not so much whether you believe Oswald created the obviously false Selective Service card identifying him as Alek James Hidell. You can go round and round on that one. (Genuine Selective Service cards did not include a photo.) He could have made the phony card in his job at Jaggers-Chiles-Stovall, a photographic production company, where he worked for a few months starting in late 1962.

A better question is why would Oswald carry that card in his wallet on November 22? It wasn’t like he was seeking notoriety after JFK was killed. When asked later that day if he had shot the president, Oswald denied it.

Only on November 23 did the finding of the “Hidell” card become public knowledge in a statement made by Henry Wade, the Dallas district attorney.

That statement came just hours after the FBI allegedly discovered early on the morning of November 23 that “Hidell” had ordered the Mannlicher-Carcano rifle thought to have been used in the assassination, and had it delivered to Oswald’s post office box address. Now, for the first time, there was a paper trail supposedly linking the rifle found on the sixth floor to Oswald!

Wallet disputed

Mark Lane, the attorney hired by Lee Oswald’s mother, told the Warren Commission that the Hidell card was only found in the wallet after the discovery of Hidell’s mail order rifle purchase. Nonetheless, the Warren Commission refused to let Lane cross-examine the district attorney about the Hidell card and the rifle.

The Secret Service men present for the interrogation of Oswald in the Dallas Police Department headquarters on November 22 recalled no questions about the “Hidell” ID card. And it wasn’t like they were totally in the dark. Oswald had referred to a man named ”Hidell” as a Fair Play for Cuba Committee leader and was asked about it on November 22.

From November 23 on, the witnesses who wrote reports on November 22 slowly began to remember that Hidell’s ID was in Oswald’s wallet.

Almost everybody’s story was different, which is noteworthy.

Law enforcement officers are trained to include all relevant data in their reports. It’s hard to think of anything more relevant than the supposed finding of the Hidell ID in Oswald’s wallet on November 22.

Were all these witnesses given a secret order to not mention the Hidell name? Unlikely.

Was the Hidell ID planted in Oswald’s wallet after his arrest?

None of the five officers who drove Oswald from the Texas Theater to the police station mentioned Bentley’s discovery of the Hidell ID in their reports, including Bentley himself.

More than a week after November 22, Bentley’s report of Oswald’s arrest says only that “on the way to the city hall…. I turned his identification over to Lt. Baker. I then went to Captain Westbrook’s office to make a report of the arrest.”

The date of the report was December 3, a rather disquieting 12-day delay, given Bentley’s claim that he went to Westbrook’s office to file a report immediately after the arrest. In any case, Bentley didn’t mention the Hidell ID.

Gerald Hill told the Warren Commission months later that Bentley had found the ID while en route to police headquarters, recalling that it was the same name that had been used to order the rifle. In contrast, hours after the Hidell ID was discovered, here’s what Hill told NBC:

HILL: The only way we found out what his name was was to remove his billfold and check it ourself; he wouldn’t even tell us what his name was….

Q: What was the name on the billfold?

HILL: Lee H. Oswald. O-S-W-A-L-D.

In a radio interview earlier that afternoon, Hill mesmerized the world by revealing Oswald’s time in the USSR and that he was a “communist.” 

What went unnoticed: On both occasions, Hill said nothing about the phony Hidell ID.

Bentley’s and Hill’s failure to remember the “Hidell” ID was contagious.

A review of the reports filed by other three officers who transported Oswald from the Texas Theater – Charles T Ford (December 2, 1963), Bob Carroll (December 3), and K.E. Lyons (December 4) – shows that none of them said anything about finding the ”Hidell” ID. 

Yet several of them later told the Warren Commission that they remembered the card.

They also claimed that the Hidell alias was passed on to Dallas HQ as they were driving Oswald to the police station at 2 pm – but there is nothing in the radio log.

It appears that the first reference about “Hidell” may have come from George Doughty at the Identification Section of the Dallas police at about 3:15 pm, passing on information about “a selective service card bearing the name of Hidell” to military intelligence officer Robert Jones in San Antonio. 

According to the military intelligence officer, his caller made no reference to “Oswald” aliases, multiple IDs, or that the ID was an obvious counterfeit because it had a photo!

Why would Doughty withhold any of that information? Especially that the draft card was an obvious counterfeit? It was hardly a moment to test the veracity of military intelligence.

Using the information about “Hidell,” military intelligence was able to cross-index “Oswald and Hidell” from files that were mysteriously destroyed in 1973

Right about the same moment that afternoon, Dallas Police intelligence officer Don Stringfellow sent a post to a different military intelligence officer inaccurately claiming that Oswald was a “card carrying Communist” and that he had “defected to Cuba in 1959.” By the end of the day, this information was sent to the U.S. Strike Command at Fort MacDill in Florida, the base prepared for any attack to be launched against Cuba. Some people were ready to see an attack on Cuba.

Some basic questions should be asked: During that long afternoon, what did the Dallas police know about Oswald? Which officers knew what? And how? 

By 10 pm on November 22, FBI agent Manning Clements questioned Oswald and reviewed the contents of his wallet on the desk. Clements said that the Hidell ID was inside the wallet at that time, but Oswald wouldn’t answer any questions about it. Clements’ inventory of the wallet cites the Hidell ID, but was not dictated until November 23

Did Bentley plant the Hidell ID on Oswald on November 22?

Another approach is to look at the consistent statements made by FBI agent Barrett that Westbrook asked him about both Oswald and Tippit at the Hidell murder scene.

JFK researcher Jones Harris suggested that it was logical for patrolmen to avoid referring to the Hidell IDs in their reports. Aliases were common but were not within many officers’ areas of expertise – the authenticity of something like the Hidell ID might be entrusted to a “bunko squad.”

With a horrified world watching on TV, there was pressure to cinch the case as fast as possible and Oswald was the only suspect. In such an atmosphere, it is not surprising they left this troublesome area alone. Even Captain Fritz himself was cautious. His notes indicate that he did not discuss the Hidell card with Oswald while in the presence of the FBI and Secret Service on November 22.

It was only safe for lower-ranked officers to discuss the Hidell ID after the FBI summary report of early December 1963 (known as CD 1.) affirmed that Oswald had the Hidell card on him at the time of his arrest.

What Hill did say

Jones Harris conducted extensive interviews with Gerald Hill, who worked in the Personnel Division with Westbrook. Hill was a reporter who became a policeman. Harris trusted what Hill told him. 

I do not trust Hill’s story, for many reasons. The foremost is that Hill was photographed leaning out the window of the sixth floor at the depository, shouting that he had found something. It was determined that this photograph was taken at 12:55. But the official story is that the shells from the rifle were not found on the sixth floor until 1:15. I think Hill planted the shells.

Like a Johnny-on-the-spot, Hill was one of the first officers to appear at the Tippit murder scene minutes later. Hill said that when he arrived at the Tippit crime scene, he was approached by an unknown witness. Hill said, “the first man that came up to me, he said, ‘The man who shot him was a white male about 5 foot 10 inches, weighing 160 to 170 pounds, had on a jacket and a pair of trousers, and brown bushy hair.’”

The height and weight match the inaccurate FBI/CIA Oswald descriptionthat was provided by an unknown man minutes after JFK was shot but before Tippit was shot. Hill never learned the man’s name. Hill claimed that he turned the unknown man over to another officer. No one knows anything about Hill’s supposed witness. 

Hill said that he returned to the office at about 3 pm to write his report while it was fresh in his mind. Westbrook came up to Hill and excitedly recounted a long story about Oswald being in the Marines, married to a Soviet citizen, being a defector, a “communist” (which no one else remembers) and more – all of which Hill repeated on the radio later that day, as heard at the beginning of this article.

Westbrook had no crime investigation experience, did not wear a police uniform, and had no business being at either the Tippit crime scene or the Texas Theatre.

Because of Westbrook’s rank, he was in charge at both events. Hill was Westbrook’s confidant and cohort. Hill was transferred into Westbrook’s department just weeks before the assassination. Who knew more about the secrets of the members of the Dallas Police Department than Captain Westbrook and Jerry Hill at Personnel?

Were Westbrook, Hill, Doughty and Bentley working together? 

When Bentley examined Oswald’s wallet in the police car, did he slip the Hidell ID inside it?

Did Doughty massage that information, hoping to get a big reaction from military intelligence?

These assumptions would explain a lot if the wallet examined by Westbrook at the Tippit murder scene was the same wallet that Bentley claimed to find in Oswald’s pocket after leaving the Texas Theatre. On the other hand, if there were two different wallets, these assumptions may explain why the wallets looked so much alike.

The police work described here is what you’d expect when assumptions are made that the democratic process doesn’t matter.

The police work described here is what has led Americans from Robert Kennedy to Edward Snowden to risk their lives and their freedom. They understand that history is written by people who act on their convictions. Cases like the JFK murder are resolved when citizens summon their collective political will.



Bill Simpich is a civil rights attorney and the author of State Secret. His work is cited in Salon founder David Talbot’s new book, The Devil’s Chessboard: Allen Dulles, the CIA, and the Rise of America’s Secret Government, just released this week. Targeting foreign leaders for assassination and overthrowing nationalist governments not in line with his political aims, Dulles employed those same tactics to further his goals at home, Talbot charges, offering shocking new evidence in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Reader Supported News is the Publication of Origin for this work. Permission to republish is freely granted with credit and a link back to Reader Supported News.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
The Anti-Free-Speech Movement at UCLA Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=6030"><span class="small">Conor Friedersdorf, The Atlantic</span></a>   
Sunday, 18 October 2015 08:46

Friedersdorf writes: "Perhaps 18-to-22-year-olds can be forgiven for failing to appreciate what's at stake in their activism. But UCLA administrators cannot be forgiven for complying with student demands to punish this free expression - a glaring illustration of their low-regard for the First Amendment, California law, and liberal ideals."

Students attend the University of California, Los Angeles. (photo: Kevork Djansezian/Getty Images)
Students attend the University of California, Los Angeles. (photo: Kevork Djansezian/Getty Images)


The Anti-Free-Speech Movement at UCLA

By Conor Friedersdorf, The Atlantic

18 October 15

 

Administrators and student activists at the university are attacking core First Amendment rights in a bid to punish expression that offends them.

half-century ago, student activists at the University of California clashed with administrators during the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, a series of events that would greatly expand free-speech rights of people at public colleges and universities.

Today, activists at UCLA are demanding that administrators punish some of their fellow students for expressive behavior that is clearly protected by the First Amendment.

In the past, free-speech clashes have turned on whether Americans have the right to criticize their own government during wartime, to march as neo-Nazis past the homes of Holocaust survivors, to submerge a crucifix in urine, or to burn the United States flag.

All of those things, the courts have ruled, are protected speech.

What did UCLA students find so outrageous as to warrant the violation of the fundamental right to free expression? A “Kanye Western” theme party where students wore costumes that parodied rap superstar Kanye West and his celebrity wife, Kim Kardashian. For this, UC student activists would squander their inheritance.

Perhaps 18-to-22-year-olds can be forgiven for failing to appreciate what’s at stake in their activism. But UCLA administrators cannot be forgiven for complying with student demands to punish this free expression—a glaring illustration of their low-regard for the First Amendment, California law, and liberal ideals.

How did this happen?

Last week, when this controversy began, many news outlets reported that some of the fraternity and sorority members who attended the “Kanye Western” theme party wore blackface. While that offensive behavior would not change the First Amendment analysis to come, there is no evidence for the claim: The Greek organizations deny it and no published photographs from the party depict anyone in blackface.

“We have been asked to respond specifically to rumors that some guests attended the event in blackface,” the fraternity said in a statement. “It is important that we put this rumor to rest. Some of our guests attended the event dressed as miners in reference to the Kanye West song ‘Gold Digger,’ but their attire had nothing to do with race.”The Huffington Post has published a photograph that seems to confirm this explanation: a group of girls pose with a bit of soot smudged on their faces, but not covering it, and there can be no doubt that they are attempting to dress as miners, or “gold diggers,” because they are all holding plates of “gold” as if panning for it.

Others who objected to the theme party deemed it an example of cultural appropriation, a “microaggression” against black students, or deeply insensitive and hurtful.

“The sagging or baggy jeans that students wore to the party represent one of the most notorious African American stereotypes in fashion,” UCLA student Caleb Jackson wrote in The Daily Bruin. “So notorious in fact, that it has led several cities across the country to make sagging illegal. The racial undertones associated with this clothing style make its cultural appropriation highly offensive to Black students.”

Said Hanan Worku, another UCLA student, on Facebook, “Yes that’s right, a frat decided it would be okay to have their members repeat a part of history that demoralized, mocked and dehumanized African Americans/ And celebrate while doing it. They showed up with their chains and braids with stuffed butts for God knows what reason. True Bruin values amiright????!!!!! Not to mention all of this happened last night which happened to be a part of Black Bruin Welcome Week! Coincidence right??????”

Meanwhile, critics of the critics insist that West is a famous celebrity, not a stand-in for black culture; that stuffed butts were a reference to Kim Kardashian, who is white and of Armenian descent, not black; that there is nothing wrong with appropriating the dress of hip-hop culture, which is not the same as black culture; that it’s myopic for privileged student activists to focus on a frat theme party while living in a city plagued by police killings, homelessness, housing discrimination, and other injustices; that activists are giving Greek organizations too much power to set their agenda; and that college kids these days are oversensitive to the point of self-parody.

Those substantive debates are healthy and both sides raise plausible points.

It is salutary for collegians to contest such matters in the student newspaper, on campus, and on social media. Evidently, public discourse has changed some minds. Said the frat, “we sincerely apologize for the offense and hurt we caused to our fellow Bruins, especially those in the African American community ... We are grateful for the dialogue we have had so far, and we intend to continue communicating with our fellow Bruins about how SigEp and Alpha Phi can make this a learning opportunity.”

What’s unhealthy is the movement to suppress free speech at UCLA.

University administrators bear the most culpability. After hearing objections to the theme party, but before finishing an investigation into it, UCLA officials suspended the social activities of the fraternity and sorority, effectively punishing them without due process even as these same officials publicly acknowledged that they didn’t have all the facts. Moreover, university officials are abusing their authority merely by investigating protected speech in the first place. And the student newspaper is cheering them on, demanding in an editorial that the office of UCLA Fraternity and Sorority Relations take a more active role in preemptively clearing all party themes.

UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh, one of America’s foremost First Amendment scholars, has published several Washington Post items explaining why these reactions are legally dubious. “The suspension of the fraternity and sorority is likely unconstitutional,” he wrote. “Costumes that convey a message are treated as speech for First Amendment purposes (see, e.g., Schacht v. United States (1970) and Cohen v. California (1971)). And a university may not punish speech based on its allegedly racist content; see, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector (1995), which holds that a university may not discriminate against student speech based on its viewpoint.”

He adds that “interim speech restrictions imposed before a full investigation and adjudication have historically been seen as more constitutionally suspect (as so-called ‘prior restraints’), see, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement, Inc. (1980); and the prior restraint doctrine is applicable to restrictions imposed by universities, see Healy v. James (1972). But in any event, even setting aside the prior restraint doctrine, suspending an organization’s social activities because of the offensive message conveyed by the organization’s past speech violates the First Amendment.”

In a followup post, he notes that the Supreme Court has unanimously held that student organizations have the right to express “the thought that we hate,” a far more offensive message than anything conveyed by the Greek organizations at UCLA:

In that case, Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), the Court held that universities may require student organizations that get university-provided benefits to accept all would-be members — including ones whose beliefs are at odds with the organization’s principles (e.g., if an atheist wants to join the Christian student group, or vice versa). I think that was correct, for reasons I gave in this article. (The article was published several years before the Christian Legal Society decision, so it doesn’t cite that decision.) But the result is certainly controversial: The majority consisted just of five Justices, the four liberals plus Justice Kennedy; the four other conservatives dissented.

Yet even the majority made clear that, while reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions on student group membership policies are constitutional, viewpoint-based restrictions on student group speech are unconstitutional:

Although registered student groups must conform their conduct to the Law School’s regulation by dropping access barriers, they may express any viewpoint they wish — including a discriminatory one. Today’s decision thus continues this Court’s tradition of “protect[ing] the freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.'”

So if a group wants to express hostility to homosexuality—or hostility based on race, or sex, or religion, or what have you—it has the right to do that. And that’s so even if the group seeks access (on the same terms as other groups) to generally available university property, services, and subsidies. And on this point, the Court was unanimous: The liberal Justices plus Justice Kennedy took this view; the other conservative Justices would have just taken this further, to secure student groups’ right to choose their members as well as their right to choose their speech.

On Monday, UCLA student Caterina Kachadoorian argued in a Daily Bruin op-ed that, as an Armenian, she wasn’t offended by the Kim Kardashian costumes, and that student activists at UCLA would do better to focus on black-on-black violence (a position that I find wrongheaded). Says a censorious comment beneath that article:?

I have sent Caterina Kachadoorian's letter to the Office of Internal Affairs. I have demanded an investigation into the Daily Bruin to determine how this hate speech was published. I have requested an internal investigation and firing of the staff member that allowed this hate and discrimination to be published.

This student impulse to demand that authority figures punish other students who say or do things that they don’t like could not come at a more inopportune time. As Glenn Greenwald wrote in a recent article at The Intercept, “One of the most dangerous threats to campus free speech has been emerging at the highest levels of the University of California system, the sprawling collection of 10 campuses that includes UCLA and UC Berkeley. The university’s governing Board of Regents, with the support of University President Janet Napolitano and egged on by the state’s legislature, has been attempting to adopt new speech codes that—in the name of combating ‘anti-Semitism’—would formally ban various forms of Israel criticism.”

He continued:

Under the most stringent such regulations, students found to be in violation of these codes would face suspension or expulsion. In July, it appeared that the Regents were poised to enact the most extreme version, but decided instead to push the decision off until September, when they instead would adopt non-binding guidelines to define “hate speech” and “intolerance.”

One of the Regents most vocally advocating for the most stringent version of the speech code is Richard Blum, the multi-millionaire defense contractor who is married to Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California. At a Regents meeting last week, reported the Los Angeles Times, Blum expressly threatened that Feinstein would publicly denounce the university if it failed to adopt far more stringent standards than the ones it appeared to be considering, and specifically demanded they be binding and contain punishments for students found to be in violation.

The San Francisco Chronicle put it this way: “Regent Dick Blum said his wife, U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., ‘is prepared to be critical of this university’ unless UC not only tackles anti-Jewish bigotry but also makes clear that perpetrators will be punished.” The lawyer Ken White wrote that “Blum threatened that his wife … would interfere and make trouble if the Regents didn’t commit to punish people for prohibited speech.” As campus First Amendment lawyer Ari Cohn put it the following day, “Feinstein and her husband think college students should be expelled for protected free speech.”

Students who value fundamental human rights, protecting unpopular activism, or safeguarding the political liberties of the least powerful among us ought to be lobbying for the most stringent free-speech protections possible, not undermining core human rights that have benefitted generations of marginalized people as a salve for outrage at a frat party. As the ACLU once explained in answer to the question of why it sometimes mounts defenses of speech that is racist or promotes intolerance:

Free speech rights are indivisible.

Restricting the speech of one group or individual jeopardizes everyone's rights because the same laws or regulations used to silence bigots can be used to silence you. Conversely, laws that defend free speech for bigots can be used to defend the rights of civil rights workers, anti-war protesters, lesbian and gay activists and others fighting for justice. For example, in the 1949 case of Terminiello v. Chicago, the ACLU successfully defended an ex-Catholic priest who had delivered a racist and anti-semitic speech. The precedent set in that case became the basis for the ACLU's successful defense of civil rights demonstrators in the 1960s and '70s.

The indivisibility principle was also illustrated in the case of Neo-Nazis whose right to march in Skokie, Illinois in 1979 was successfully defended by the ACLU. At the time, then ACLU Executive Director Aryeh Neier, whose relatives died in Hitler's concentration camps during World War II, commented: "Keeping a few Nazis off the streets of Skokie will serve Jews poorly if it means that the freedoms to speak, publish or assemble any place in the United States are thereby weakened."

The college students fighting to limit free speech or to punish free expression are courting tremendous harms that would ultimately fall disproportionately on the least powerful, most marginalized groups of the present and future––and as UCLA graduates, they are highly unlikely to be in either group, which may help explain their lack of concern for how their behavior could affect the less privileged. It is nevertheless incoherent for activists who say that they live in a system of white supremacy to empower state administrators to police speech at their discretion!

And all calls for university administrators to police the minutiae of campus life rob students of the opportunity to learn how to govern themselves even as they contribute to the spike in administrative costs that render so many unable to afford tuition. The notion that university money is best spent paying someone to sit in an office vetting the themes of fraternity parties sounds like the premise of a SNL skit.

To deflect criticisms like these, defenders of the student activists are using the increasingly common tactic of treating the fringe position of a small number of ideologically homogeneous progressives as if it were equivalent to the opinion of all black people. “When black students share their hurt and disappointment with something like the ‘Kanye Western’ party, too often we respond with the way we see things, and it’s usually accompanied with criticism about how incorrect we think the black point of view is,” Chris Tang, who is not black, writes in another op-ed in The Daily Bruin. “But there’s an issue with this because we are implicitly saying that we understand the black point of view, when in reality, many of us don’t.”

There is nothing wrong with a black student being offended by a theme party, and attempts to articulate such grievances ought to be met with open-mindedness and compassion. ?And frats and sororities should be more sensitive to how their actions will be received.

But there is no “black point of view,” a prejudicial notion that is so easily refuted that it’s a wonder anyone invokes it. There are plenty of black people––a majority, I would wager––who understand better than many other Americans the importance of the First Amendment to the history of the civil-rights movement and the future of other civil-rights causes. As if to underscore that point, the Los Angeles Times highlighted an open letter sent to UCLA by Michael Meyers, president of the New York Civil Rights Coalition. He said that “as an African American civil rights leader” he had to speak out. “We are increasingly alarmed—and distressed—by the failure of public university officials to support free speech and diversity of opinion on campus,” he wrote in the letter to UCLA’s chancellor. “Diversity of opinion surely includes the right of students to contest orthodoxy and to poke fun at popular culture and celebrities.”

That is exactly right, and UCLA administrators should publicly apologize for acting to the contrary rather than caving to the illegal demands of student activists.

e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
Biden to Decide on 2016 Bid by Early 2017 Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=9160"><span class="small">Andy Borowitz, The New Yorker</span></a>   
Saturday, 17 October 2015 13:52

Borowitz writes: "Vice-President Joe Biden will make a decision on whether to enter the 2016 Presidential race by early 2017, a close associate told supporters on Friday."

Vice President Joe Biden. (photo: Sun Sentinel)
Vice President Joe Biden. (photo: Sun Sentinel)


Biden to Decide on 2016 Bid by Early 2017

By Andy Borowitz, The New Yorker

17 October 15

 

The article below is satire. Andy Borowitz is an American comedian and New York Times-bestselling author who satirizes the news for his column, "The Borowitz Report."

ice-President Joe Biden will make a decision on whether to enter the 2016 Presidential race by early 2017, a close associate told supporters on Friday.

In an e-mail sent to potential donors, the former Senator Ted Kaufman, a longtime friend and confidant of the Vice-President, wrote that “Joe is still trying to sort things out,” but promised that his decision will come “no later than January, 2017.”

“Joe is trying to decide whether running for President is a good idea, or, conversely, whether it is a bad idea,” Kaufman wrote. “He is very grateful to all of you for your patience as he works through this process, and he promises that he’ll have big news for you by next January.”

“My message to you today is, hang in there,” he wrote.

Kaufman acknowledged that deciding to run for President a full two months after the election “would complicate Joe’s path to the White House,” but promised, “If, in January, Joe decides he’s in, he will be all in. And we hope you’ll be with him.”


e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
Rightwing Terrorists Are Killing Far More Americans Than Islamists Are, and Now the DOJ Will Act Print
Written by <a href="index.php?option=com_comprofiler&task=userProfile&user=36677"><span class="small">Justin Salhani, ThinkProgress</span></a>   
Saturday, 17 October 2015 13:48

Salhani writes: "The Department of Justice (DOJ) has created a new post to fight domestic terrorism. The new position will coordinate investigations into a phenomena that has killed more Americans than foreign terrorism since 9/11."

Mourners gather for a memorial service for the victims of a shooting Wednesday at Emanuel AME Church, Friday, June 19, 2015, in Charleston, S.C. (photo: Stephen B. Morton/AP)
Mourners gather for a memorial service for the victims of a shooting Wednesday at Emanuel AME Church, Friday, June 19, 2015, in Charleston, S.C. (photo: Stephen B. Morton/AP)


Rightwing Terrorists Are Killing Far More Americans Than Islamists Are, and Now the DOJ Will Act

By Justin Salhani, ThinkProgress

17 October 15

 

he Department of Justice (DOJ) has created a new post to fight domestic terrorism. The new position will coordinate investigations into a phenomena that has killed more Americans than foreign terrorism since 9/11.

The DOJ did not say who would take the new role but said that the position’s responsibilities include assisting federal prosecutors working on domestic terrorism cases.

In recent years, the U.S. government’s counterterrorism policy has largely focused on Islamist radicals. This is largely a reaction to the 9/11 attacks. Meanwhile, attacks from right-wing radicals have largely been overlooked by officials. This is despite the fact that attacks from rightwing radicals have led to more deaths than “homegrown jihadists” since 9/11, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC). In fact, since the twin towers were hit, self-proclaimed jihadists have killed 26 people in the U.S. whereas rightwing radicals have killed 48, so says statistics provided by the New America Foundation.

“We’ve seen lone actor attacks about every 33 days, mostly white supremacist or anti-government extremists,” Heidi Beirich of SPLC told NBC News. “Homegrown violent extremists can be motivated by any viewpoint on the full spectrum of hate — anti-government views, racism, bigotry, anarchy and other despicable beliefs. When it comes to hate and intolerance, no single ideology governs.”

The most notable attack by a white supremacist this year was in Charleston, South Carolina in June. A young man entered the Emanuel A.M.E. church, sat for an hour with worshippers, then shot and killed nine black Americans. He had regularly posed with flags that represented his white supremacist views.

“We recognize that, over the past few years, more people have died in this country in attacks by domestic extremists than in attacks associated with international terrorist groups,” Assistant Attorney General John Carlin said during a speech at George Washington University this past week.

During the talk, Carlin said he has spoken to many local law enforcement officials and that they’ve identified the largest domestic threat: people who call themselves sovereign citizens. A sovereign citizen believes that they are no beholden to any laws, courts, or law enforcement officials. “Looking back over the past few years, it is clear that domestic terrorists and homegrown violent extremists remain a real and present danger to the United States,” Carlin said.


e-max.it: your social media marketing partner
 
<< Start < Prev 2291 2292 2293 2294 2295 2296 2297 2298 2299 2300 Next > End >>

Page 2295 of 3432

THE NEW STREAMLINED RSN LOGIN PROCESS: Register once, then login and you are ready to comment. All you need is a Username and a Password of your choosing and you are free to comment whenever you like! Welcome to the Reader Supported News community.

RSNRSN