Written by Winston P. Nagan   

Dear Senator McCain,

I watched with great interest your vigorous interrogation of the President’s nominee for Secretary of Defense. I was struck by your focus on certain issues in this war, which you felt required, a straight yes or no answer. I considered this specific question, which provoked this response on your part as well as the answer given by the nominee. Your question was: Was the surge a success or a failure? Answer yes or no. I would certainly like to have your view not only in terms of yes or no, but also why? Let me explain. First, the answer given was that it was too soon and that history would probably be the better judge. This reply you found insufficient. Let me ask you to revisit the question and in revisiting the question, ask you to clarify whether the surge was meant to be judged as a strategic action or one that was essentially a tactical adjustment of strategy. As you well know, in the context of military decision making a critical distinction is made about the difference between situations specific tactics and the issue of the overall strategic objectives of the use of armed force. It is unclear to me whether you required an answer on the surge as a strategy or a tactic. Additionally, it is not clear to me how clear the thinking was in terms of the tactical objectives of the surge or whether these objectives were meant to be vindicating a strategic objective, which is also not clear to me.
The context of the surge related to an escalation of high intensity violence that in part reflected sectarian animosities with all sides also targeting the American presence in Iran. I will have to assume that the surge was a tactical move to reduce or eliminate the ubiquity of high intensity sectarian violence. It cannot be said with confidence that the surge was an unqualified failure or success. It did succeed in reducing violence and in this sense; it was a partial tactical success. This has to be balanced against over 1,000 American deaths, not counting the thousands of Iraqi deaths and thousands of Americans wounded. I must assume that the cost of the surge was multiple billions in borrowed dollars. It would be useful if you could give us a sense of the benefits and the losses that resulted from this surge and whether it was a clear yes or no issue of winning or losing.
The tactic of the surge had some significant strategic implications. The reduction of violence meant the consolidation of a regime firmly in the control of Iraqi Shiites. The Iraqi Shiites are ethnically Persian and in confession, share the same religious outlook as Iran. Additionally, Iran has been a significant source of support for the Iraqi Shiites. What the surge did in empowering the Iraqi Shiites and weakening countervailing power is that the surge created a significant sphere interest in Iraq for the Iranians. Something they could never have achieved through coercive strategies. In short, the surge gave us something that resembled a “greater Iran.” The question then is, when you look at the surge in these terms, was it a success or a failure: yes or no.
At this point, it would be useful to follow the style of reasoning of the distinguished Senator McCain by posing a number of questions also related to the success or failure of the Iraqi adventure. First, it would be useful to keep in mind some well-known criteria that military thinkers have insisted on over the centuries. For example, Sun Tzu a great Chinese military thinker, who came to fame hundreds of years before the birth of Christ insisted that if you get into commitment to use military force you must have clear political objectives, which is the purpose for the use of force. The great German theorist of the 19th Century, Otto von Clausewitz, echoed this theme acknowledging that the use of military force is to secure political objectives by other means. Using this standard as a guide to the yes or no, we can start with the idea that we went into Iraq because of the regime’s weapons of mass destruction. This political aim proved an illusion. Do you agree that it was an illusion and a mistake: yes or no. Do you think that Vice President Cheney’s high-level secret meeting of the energy leaders was a meeting to confirm a strategy to use force to control Iraqi oil? Yes or no. In dealing with the cost of the war, Secretary Rumsfeld said that it would be in the region of sixty billion. Do you think that these estimates were deliberately misleading the Congress and the American people? Yes or no. With regard to the budget for the war, do you think it was right for Congress not to insist on a budget being presented to it with a concern as to how the war was to be paid for? Did you and your colleagues voice any concern about the fact that we could simply borrow money from China and run up a debt to pay for the war? Yes or no.
Secretary Rumsfeld initiated a policy of privatizing the military. Was this a wise policy? Yes or no. the same gentleman believed in a quick victory based on the idea of shock and awe. Was this a failure? Yes or no. When the Secretary approved robust interrogation methods for the interrogation of prisoners to gather intelligence, did he violate U.S. and international law, which outlaws torture? Yes or no. Did you approve or do you now approve of the CIA’s program of using black sites abroad for the interrogation of suspects? Do you believe that the CIA was wrong in destroying its documentation relating to its black sites? Yes or no. The Bush Doctrine sought to modify the law of war. It emerged with the idea that some states are rogue states and may be subject to U.S. preemptive action. Do you believe that it is an appropriate construction of international law to unilaterally declare a state a rogue and to authorize an attack on its territory? Yes or no.
In Iraq as a consequence of the fall of Hussein’s regime, we worked in collaboration with the Iraqis to organize war crimes show trials. Do you believe these trials were conducted according to civilized standards or were they simply kangaroo courts? Yes or no. The methods of execution conducted under these tribunals appear to be quite horrific. In one instance, the attempt to hang a man resulted in his head being severed from his body. Do you believe that these trials were a pathetic show of justice? Finally, we instituted a ruling czar in Iraq after the fall of Hussein. The main person here was Paul Brenner. The conduct of the czar is somewhat understudied. His key objective appears to be how to appropriate the economic patrimony of Iraq and parcel it out to U.S. beneficiaries. The problem was that there was not a hint of a partnership in nation building here and his conduct, which led to vast unemployment, and expropriation was one of the causes of the growth of sectarian violence. Do you think this process could have been handled better? Yes or no. We conclude with one more question. Do you think it was a monumental blunder to engage of a war of choice and ignore the war on terrorism? Yes or no.

Yours sincerely,
Winston P. Nagan